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4-4 4  International  economic  aspects  of  data protection 
4.1  Definition of  the  problem  and  summary 
4.1.1  Definition of  the  problem 
Ever  since  the  concept  of  modern  data protection first 
arose,  the  discussion  regarding  the  costs  of  data 
protection  has  constituted  an  integral part of  the 
general  data protection  business.  Whilst  the  active 
advocates  and  defenders  of  the  data  protection  ideas  had 
written  on  their  banner  the  motto  "As  much  data 
protection as  is  (at all)  possible",  the  somewhat  more 
sceptical voices  of  the  representatives  of  private  and 
public data  processing  organisations  have  adopted  the 
more  restricted attitude:  "Only  as  much  data protection 
as  is  (absolutely)  necessary".  In  addition  to  the 
traditional  tendency  to  keep  their  data  and  information, 
as  well  as  the  sources  of  the  latter,  secret,  the  latter 
attitude  is largely  influenced  by  the  fear  of  excessive 
data  protection costs.  These  costs  may  be  roughly 
divided  into  the  following  three  categories: 
costs  of  special  (additional)  data protection 
measures 
costs  in  the  form  of  general  inefficiencies  in  the 
sphere  of  data  protection  and  decision-making  caused 
by  data  protection 
4-5 costs  in  the  form  of  lost benefit arising  through 
certain profitable data  processing  procedures 
{including  possible  products  and  services  based 
thereon)  becoming  impossible  to  carry out  owing  to 
data protection  regulations  {opportunity costs). 
Passing  outside  the  framework  of  the  various  national 
societies,  there  are  fears  that  such  data protection 
costs  may  arise  in  a  still greater  degree  in  the 
international  field,  due  either  to  more  or  less  serious 
differences,  incompatibilities  or  even  contradictions 
between  the  various  data  protection  regulations,  or 
simply  due  to  the  fact  that  internationally operating 
undertakings  and  organisations,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
they  must  comply  with  several  national  data protection 
regulation  systems  simultaneously,  will  incur  cumulative 
data protection costs.  There  is  also  theoretically  the 
possibility that  - contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the 
individual  national  legislators  - the  data  protection 
costs  thus  arising  in  the  international  field  may  so 
increase  in  certain sectors  or  in  concrete  individual 
cases  that  important  international data  processing 
applications  {including  possible  further  activities 
thereto)  may  no  longer  be  economically  practicable.  It 
is also  feared  in  circles  of  private  industry  that  in  a 
similar  way  more  or  less  considerable  international 
distortions  of  competition  may  arise. 
4-6 It is  the  task  of  the  present  study  to  estimate  as  far 
as  that is generally possible  - the  costs  of  data 
protection  on  the  national  level,  and  also  any  possible 
distortions of  international  competition which  may  result 
therefrom.  Furthermore,  suitable  harmonisation  measures 
should  be  indicated which  are  calculated  to  reduce  data 
protection costs,  and  in  particular  any  distortions  of 
international  competition  resulting  therefrom,  so  far  as 
this  is  possible  and  necessary;  at  the  same  time  the 
rights  and  interests of  the citizens affected must  also 
be  considered.  It should  be  made  clear,  however,  that 
the  following  investigation  is primarily concentrated  on 
data  protection  costs  in  the  sense  of  costs  arising 
through  special  additional data protection measures. 
General  inefficiencies  and  opportunity costs resulting 
from  data protection measures  could  not  be  considered  in 
detail within  the  framework  laid  down  for  this  study. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that there  is practically  no  suitable 
empirical  material  available,  it appears  questionable  in 
the  light of  considerable empirical  and  methodological 
difficulties whether  it is  possible  at all  to  estimate 
such  costs effectively  and  adequately. 
Furthermore,  regarding  the  problems  of  distortions of 
international  competition,  it should  be  emphasised  that 
we  are  only  discussing  here  distortions  of  competition 
caused  by  data protection costs,  not  those  due  to  data 
protection  in  general. 
4-7 4.1.2  Summary 
In  section 4.2  a  few  basic  concepts  of  economic  theory 
are  expounded  in  their  relation  to  the  problems  of  data 
protection costs,  which  assist  in  the  classification and 
elucidation of  the  problems  of  data  protection costs,  and 
also  offer  suggestions  and  starting points  for  possible 
further  investigations.  In  addition  certain theoretical 
and  methodological  difficulties are  discussed  and  the 
general  theoretical  approach  and  the  concrete 
methodological  procedure  are  explained. 
In  the  following  section,  number  4.3,  various data 
protection cost estimates,  investigations  and  experiences 
from  the  following  selected  countries  are  then  criticaliy 
examined  and  evaluated:  United  Kingdom,  USA,  Sweden,  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  Section  4.4  then  sums  up 
the  general  results. 
On  this basis,  in  section  4.5~ the  problem  of distortion 
of  international  competition  caused  by  data protection 
costs is  then  discussed.  And  section  4.6  finally draws 
conclusions  from  the  entire  investigation  of  data 
protection costs,  by  proposing  certain features  of cost-
effective European  data protection harmonisation policy. 
4-8 4.2  Concepts  of  economic  theory  and  methodology 
4.2.1  Problems  ~f the  application  of  concepts  of  cost-benefit 
analysis  · 
Within  the  framework  of  an  investigation  of  international 
economic  aspects  of  data protection,  the  idea  of  the 
application  of  the  concepts  of  cost-benefit analysis  to  the 
individual  national  data protection  laws  under  consideration 
seems  to  be  a  good  one,  with  the  object  of  then  proceeding 
to  a  comparative  synthesis of  the  economic  effects  of  data 
protection  in  the  international  field.  And  in  fact,  the 
various data protection  laws  (each  considered  as  a  concrete 
public project)  appear  (just  because  of  the  decidedly 
political nature  of  the  object  in  view,  i.e.  "protection of 
privacy  from  invasion  in  the  course  of data processing"2) 
and  in  the  light of  the  fact  that  the  beneficiaries of  data 
protection and  those  who  bear  the  costs of  such  protection 
fall  basically  into  two  separate  groups)  to  be  extremely 
suitable  subjects  for  a  cost-benefit analysis  on  the  basis 
of  social economics,  going  beyond  the  costs  and 
profitability calculations  of  purely private  enterprise 
economics.  By  such  a  cost-benefit analysis  the  changes  to 
be  expected  in  the  benefit  obtained  by  the  individual 
members  of  society,  i.e.  the  social benefits  and  costs  of 
the  individual  data  protection  laws,  would  be 
comprehensively  checked  for  the  existence  of  a  favourable 
1)  The  following  remarks  constitute  a  revision  of  Hogrebe 
1979,  section 8.1,  pp  482-487. 
2)  This  is  as  it was  expressed  by  the  German  Federal 
Parliament,  Deutscher  Bundestag  1976,  p  1. 
4-9 balance.  Certainly  there  is  no  gainsaying  that - apart  from 
the  problem  of  obtaining sufficient empirical  data  - there 
are  quite  considerable  methodological  problems,  requiring 
comprehensive  investigation,  regarding  the  identification 
and  evaluation  of  the  social  benefits  and  costs  of  data 
protection. 
4.2.1.1  Data  protection  as  a  "public  good":  the  problem  of  the 
determination of  the  benefit 
As  regards  the  benefits,  difficult problems  arise  as  the 
socially positive effects of  data protection  - in  particular 
in  the  field  of  law  and  general  social  relations - are  only 
realised  for  individual  persons  in  a  general  way,  which 
cannot  be  determined  or  measured,  and  therefore  "data 
protection"  must  be  regarded  to  a  large extent  as  a  "public 
good"  and  in  any  case  as  "intangible" without  any  market 
price. l) 
1)  For  general  comments  on  the  question  of  cost-benefit 
analysis  and  with  special  reference  to  these  concepts  see 
Prest/Turvey  1965,  pp  685-705;  Recktenwald  1970,  443  ff.; 
Layard  1972,  496  ff.~  and  Sugden/Williams  1978,  p  148. 
The  efforts  made  for  instance  by  Turn/Shapiro  1972,  in 
particular  pp  439  to  440,  to  determine  the  "value  of 
personal  information"  may  perhaps  afford  a  certain  basis 
for  a  monetary  evaluation of  "data protection".  They  are 
however  restricted  as  a  concept  to  the  problem  of  a 
strategy for  the  discouragment  of  breaches  of data 
security,  which  is  somewhat  outside  the  cost-benefit 
analysis  of  data protection.  This  also  applies  - in 
spite  of  the  title  "Approaches  to  a  cost-benefit analysis 
of  data protection"  - to Angermann/Thome  1973,  pp  18-22, 
who  as  part  of  an  approach  which  does  not  make  a  clear 
distinction  between  data protection  and  data  security, 
and  makes  use  of  somewhat  incompatible  methods,  adopt  a 
cost-benefit analysis  concept  which  is  more  orientated 
towards  business  economics. 
4-10 In  the  treatment  of  data  protection  as  a  public  good  it 
is of  no  importance  that data protection - unlike  the 
classic  example  always  referred  to  as  a  paramount  example 
of  a  public good,  viz.  "external national sedurity"  - is 
not  exclusively  "produced"  by  the  Government,  but  in 
combination  by  all subjects of  the  regulations,  whether 
public  or  private~  incidentally "internal national 
security"  - the  other  classic  example  of  a  public  good  -
is also  "provided"  to  a  large  extent  by  private 
individuals  by  self-defence  and  private  justice  (i.e.  by 
private arbitrators,  trade  union  and  association  justice, 
plant and  business protection,  private detectives, 
personal  bodyguards  etc.).l) 
As  is probably  better expressed  by  the  terms  "social 
good"  and  "collective good",  which  are  used  without 
distinction as  synonyms  of  "public good",  the  concept  of 
"public  good"  (or  "services publicly provided")  is 
primarily  based  not  on  its degree  of  usefulness  and 
profitability.2> 
Without  wishing  to  cut  short  the  discussion  in  economic 
circles on  the  theory  of  the public good,  which  has 
recently  been  conducted  in  increasingly differentiated 
form,  it can  be  regarded  as  a  decisive  characteristic of 
(genuine)  "public goods",  that  they  - unlike  (ordinary) 
1)  See  for  this  example  Recktenwald  1970,  p  264. 
2)  See  as  regards  this  terminology,  inter  alia,  Hanusch 
1970,  p  42,  note  3,  also  Hanusch  1972,  p  12,  note  2. 
4-11 "private goods",  which  are  made  available  by' means  of  the 
market  economy,  i.e.  by  transactions  between  individual 
consumers  and  producers,  so  far  as  concerns  the  user 
served  by  them  and  the  degree  of  their  actual utilisation 
- are  not  restricted  primarily  to  a  particular  consumer 
but are equally advantageous  to all other  consumers~  the 
consumption  or  use  of  a  public  good  (e.g.  the  cleansing  of 
the air  by measures,  whether  private or  public,  against 
air pollution)  does  not  take  place  in rivalry with  such 
consumption  or  use  on  the part of  other  consumers.1> 
Whilst  the  consumption  or  the  utilisation of  private 
goods  and  services  (e.g.  the  consumption  of  a  pint of 
beer  or  the  taking  of  a  seat  in  a  passenger  transport 
vehicle)  inevitably makes  the  good  or  service  in question 
unavailable  for  another  individual,  the  utilisation of 
public goods  and  services  by  several  individuals  is  not 
competitive,  in  that  sense,  because  participation of  one 
individual  in  such  utilisation does  not  prejudice  their 
usefulness  to  another  person~  the  use  which  someone 
achieves  in  the  consumption  of  a  public  good  is 
externalised  in  as  much  as  it is  equally available, 
undiminished,  to all other  persons. 
This  fact  certainly has  the  result  that  the  individual 
consumer,  as  one  among  many,  is  normally  not  prepared  to 
1)  Regarding  the  characterisation  of  public  goods  after 
Musgrave,  cf Musgrave/Musgrave/Kullmer  1975  pp  S-7. 
4-12 make  voluntary payments  to  those  offering  public  goods, 
as  he  will prefer  to  enjoy  the  benefit  free  of  charge  of 
what  will  in  any  case  be  provided  by  others.  This 
"free-rider" problem,  which  is  incidentally  in  many  cases 
the  reason  for  State  intervention in  the  form  of  the 
removal  of  certain goods  and  services  from  the market 
economy,  leads  above  all - so  far  as  the  exclusion of 
individuals  from  consumption  (without  payment)  is 
impossible,  uneconomic  or  socially undesirable  - via  the 
direct problem  of  the  denial  of voluntary  payments,  or 
the  impossibility  in practice of collecting  involuntary 
payments,  to  the  fundamental  difficulty of  the 
determination of  the  benefit which  would  enable  the 
Government  to  determine  how  much  of  which  public  goods 
should  be  made  available: 
"Just  as  the  individual  consumer  has  no  reason  to 
offer  voluntary  payments  to  private. producers, 
similarly  he  has  no  reason  to  make  known  to  the 
public  authorities  what  is  his  estimate  of  the  value 
of  the  public  service."!) 
1)  Musgrave/Musgrave/Kullmer  1975,  p  7. 
See  also  Prest/Turvey 1972,  p  87: 
"Ever  since Wicksell,  it has  been  recognised  that  any 
attempt  to  get  consumers  to  reveal  their  preference 
regarding  collective goods  founders  on  the  rock  that 
the  rational  thing  for  any  individual  consumer  to  do 
is  understate  his  demand,  in  the  expectation  that  he 
would  thereby  be  relieved  of  part  or  all of  his  share 
of  the  cost without  affecting  the  quantity obtained." 
4-13 Data  protection  made  available  by  means  and  in  pursuance 
of  a  data  protection regulation  can  only  be  interpreted 
as  a  "public  good"  in  accordance  with  the  concept  here 
described,  as  the  "consumption"  or  the  •utilisation"  of 
data  protection  by  various  individuals  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  competitive.  Moreover,  in  the  closest 
possible  analogy  to  "internal security",  it is  for 
social  reasons  practically not  possible  in  the  nature of 
the  case  to  exclude  the  individual  member  of  society  from 
the  "consumption"  of  data protection,  so  that owing  to 
the  fundamental  impossibility  of  compelling  the 
individual  to  reveal  his preference  as  far  as  concerns 
data  protection  regarded  as  an  (indivisible)  public  good, 
and  also  in view  of  the  very  largely intangible character 
of data protection,  recourse  must  be  had  to  complimentary 
differentiated methods  of  assessment  of  its usefulness.1> 
1)  See  for  instance  the  methodical  efforts of 
Recktenwald  1970,  p  249-266,  to  assess  the  usefulness 
and  efficiency  in  the  sphere  of  internal  security. 
Furthermore  even  when  it is possible  to  some  degree 
to  ascertain  individual  preferences  as  regards  data 
protection - e.g.  in  the  sphere  of  fees  for  requests 
for  access  - there  is still the  problem  - quite 
different  from  the  problem of public  goods  - of  the 
divergence  between  individual  and  collective 
evaluations  of  the  usefulness  of  data protection. 
In  this  connection,  cf.  in  particular  the  discussion 
on  Musgrave's  concept of merit wants: 
Musgrave/Musgrave/Kullmer  1975,  pp  76-781  Recktenwald 
1963,  p  81;  Recktenwald  1970,  p  251,  note  5;  Hanusch 
1972,  pp  139-141  with  further  evidence  and 
Sugden/Williarns  1978,  pp  179-180. 
See  also  Mishan  1975,  p  124  who  points  out  that 
contrary  to private goods,  in  the  case  of  public 
goods  individual  rnatginal  utility varies  for 
different people. 
4-14 As  will  be  made  clear  below,  benefits  also  arise  from 
data protection which  are  jointly or  individually 
achieved  by  and  for  the  "provider"  of  the data 
protection,  that  is by  and  for  the  private  and  public 
bodies  applying  the  data  protection  law.  The 
determination of  these  benefits,  which  must  be  considered 
in particular  in ascertaining  the  net debit of  the data 
protection providers  in  accordance  with  business 
economics,  is  just as  difficult as  the  determination  of 
the  benefits  of  data protection achieved  on  a  joint or 
individual  basis  in  the  case  of  the  data  subjects. 
4.2.1.2  External  and  opportunity costs:  difficulties of 
determination 
In  the  determination  of  the  costs  of  data  protection  (in 
a  concrete  law  or  as  otherwise defined)  considerable 
difficulties are  also  encountered  primarily  in  adequate 
consideration of all social costs  (direct,  external, 
intangibles etc.)  as  part of  an  analysis  of  social  costs 
and  benefits;  these difficulties-are  no  less  in principle 
than  those  involved  in  the  assessment  of  benefits.!) 
1)  To  some  extent  there  is certainly a  tendency  to  under-
estimate  the  difficulty of  determining  data  protection 
costs.  For  instance Futh  1976,  p  228,  points out:  "Whilst 
the  costs  of  data  protection  and  data  security  are  fairly 
easy  to ascertain,  the quantification of  the  benefits  is 
however  very difficult,  in  some  fields  even  impossible." 
It is  however  clear  from  the  context  of  this  quotation 
that  this  idea  is  based  on  a  restricted  concept of cost-
benefit analysis,  oriented  towards  business  economics; 
furthermore  it will  be  clear  in  the  course  of  the  views  to 
be  considered  below,  that even  the  determination  of  the 
costs  of  data  protection  in  terms  of  business  economics  is 
not  without  its difficulties. 
4-15 Unlike  more  or  less clearly circumscribed  governmental 
investment  projects  which  constitute  the  classic 
applications  of  cost-benefit analysis,  the  true 
investment  and  consequential costs of  the  "data 
protection project"  appear  as  extremely widely dispersed, 
because  not  only  is it necessary  to  calculate  the  costs 
incurred  by  the  government  in  an  enormous  number  of 
authorities  and  organisations,  but  also  those  incurred  by 
private  trade  and  industry. 
As  will  be  explained  below,  over  and  above  the difficulty 
of  determining  the  costs  on  the  basis  of  business 
economics  incurred  by  the  {private  and  public)  data 
processing  organisations  themselves,  as  well  as  by  the 
state bodies  carrying  out  the  external data  protection 
control,  two  further  vital  problems,  which  are 
considerably more  difficult,  arise  in  connection  with  the 
determination  of  the  costs  of data  protection  on  a 
national-economic  basis. 
The  first of  these  is  the  assessment  for  costing  purposes 
of  administra~ion,  which  may  in  certain  instances  be 
considerable,  though difficult to  evaluate,  yet  which  has 
been,  so  far  as  can  be  seen,  almost  completely  overlooked 
in  the  data protection literature  so  far  existant,  which 
has,  depending  on  the  concrete design  of  the  procedures 
for  internal  supervision  (notification,  granting  of 
access,  correction,  blocking,  erasure,  etc.)  been 
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subjects,  and  which  is  to  be  considered  from  the  point  of 
view  of  costing  in  the  framework  of  national  economics  as 
"external  costs".!} 
The  second  of  these  problems  is that of  determining  the 
opportunity costs  of  data  protection,  i.e.  the  loss of 
benefit which  arises  due  to  the  fact  that  as  a  result of 
data protection,  certain data  processing  activities, 
actually desirable  and  beneficial either  to  individuals 
or  to  society  (possibly  including  products  and  services 
based  on  them}  cannot  (any  longer}  be  carried  on;  in 
addition  there  are  the  general  inefficiencies  in  the 
sphere  of data processing  and  decision-making  resulting 
from  data protection,  which  may  arise  in  the  form  of  less 
correct decisions  or  inefficient extra work  and 
expenditure. 2) 
1}  This  unloading  of administrative  work  onto  the  data 
subjects  is  regarded  to  some  extent  as  a  general 
problem  in  relation  to  government  administration,  in 
another  connection,  in  coAformity  with  the  demand  for 
"administration favourable  to  the citizen". 
2)  On  the  problems  of opportunity costs  ("alternative 
costs")  of data  protection,  cf.  Brussard  1975,  pp  60-
61.  A concrete  example  of  the  "alternative costs" 
which  may  be  incurred  as  the  result of  such  a 
restrictive  law  is  the  comment  made  by  the  Insurance 
Industry Federation  in  "Deutscher  Bundestag"  (Federal 
German  Parliament},  Innenausschuss  (Interior 
Committee}  1976b,  p  131: 
"A  restriction  on  this activity  (extensive  research 
constantly carried out  by  the  HUK  Association 
regarding  the  causes  of  accidents)  would  lead  to 
unpredictable  personal  and  economic  losses.  It is 
generally  known  that  the  improvements  in  the  road 
system made  as  a  result  of  such  research  led  to  a 
reduction  in  losses  which  in  its first year  alone 
exceeded  the  road  building  costs  involved." 
4-17 The  determination  of  this  so-called  "shadow price"  of 
data protection,  as  thus  defined,  therefore  requires  an 
evaluation  of  alternative  information utilisation 
possibilities prevented  by  data protection  regulations, 
in  other  words,  the  determination  of  the  "costs of  the 
non-processing  of data".l) 
There  are  people  who  even  maintain  that  such  opportunity 
costs of data protection may  considerably  exceed  the 
relatively small  direct data  protection costs.  2> 
1)  The  unusual  form  of  the  enquiry  regarding  the  "costs 
of  non-processing  of data"  is  to  some  extent 
reflected  in  no  less unusual  concepts  such  as 
"negative  information  system",  "cost of withholding 
information",  "negative  value  of  information"  etc., 
as  mentioned  by  Klempner  1973,  pp  111-113,  in  his 
criticism,  for  instance,  of  the  "excess  secrecy  or 
over-classification"  in  connection  with  the  American 
"national secrecy  apparatus". 
2)  Cf.  the  very  decided  remarks  of  Brussard  1975,  in 
particular  p  61  (the  variations  1n  the  somewhat 
imprecise  terminology  are  of  no  importance  in  this 
connection): 
"The  economic  cost  of  protection  of  privacy  is  not 
very  high,  because  most  of  the  measures  are  required 
for  technical  and  organisational  reasons  anyway.  The 
price of  privacy mainly  consists  of  social  costs  in 
terms  of  desired  ends  which  cannot  be  realised  if 
protection of privacy  results  in  restriction of  data 
collection, .processing,  distribution,  and 
utilization." 
Cf.  also  in  this  connection Renninger/Branstad  1974, 
p  24: 
"The  importance  of  information  in  our  service-
oriented  society leads  to  a  consideration  of  the 
social  costs  of  limiting  access  to  data  in  the 
interest of  protecting  individual  privacy  and  data 
confidentiality.  Since  data  collection  is  often 
required  to plan  and  operate  needed  service  programs, 
lack  of  accurate  data  will  either  inhibit  the 
development  of  these  programs  or  raise  the  costs  of 
implementing  and  operating  them." 
4-18 It cannot  be  denied  however  that  there  are  quite 
considerable difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  determination 
of  the  so-called  opportunity costs  of data protection. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  such  costs  can,  in  the  absence 
of  an  adequate  empirical  data  basis,  only  be  estimated, 
it is desirable  to  check  carefully  to  what  extent  it is 
reasonable  to.interpret data  processing  activities  as 
lost benefits,  i.e.  as  opportunity costs,  which  the 
legislator deliberately desired  to  eliminate.  Thus  it 
seems  fundamentally  not  very  reasonable,  to  regard  the 
benefits which  some  individuals  would  derive  from  certain 
acts  as  opportunity costs  of  the  legal  regulations,  which 
label  these  acts  as  "illegitimate"  and  forbid  them 
accordingly.  Such  prohibitive  regulations  have  of  course 
the  aim  of excluding  certain actions  from  the  sphere  of 
legitimate alternative actions,  even  though  the  latter 
aim  at  some  benefit.  Thus  for  example  the  economic 
exploitation  - which  may  possibly  be  achievable  - of  the 
processing  and  utilisation of  very sensitive data,  such 
as  health,  religion,  politica~ conviction,  cannot  very 
reasonably  be  taken  into  account  as  loss  of  benefit  and 
therefore  as  opportunity costs,  in  respect  of  a 
regulation  which  deliberately excludes  such  processing 
and  utilisation as  illegitimate.  It would  be  just as 
reasonable  for  a  contrary approach  ~o bring  into 
consideration  the  proceeds  of  robbery  with  violence  as 
opportunity costs  of  a  legal  prohibition of  robbery  with 
violence  in  considering  the  question  of  whether  such  a 
legal  stipulation was  useful. 
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the  unwanted,  accidental  and  implicit side effects  of  a 
data protection  regulation must  be  brought  into 
consideration  as  opportunity costs.  The  determination  of 
such  effects,  which  present  themselves  rather  as 
concealed  losses,  will  however  to  a  large extent  have  to 
remain  hypothetical  in  nature. 
4.2.1.3  The  fundamental  relevance  of  macroeconomic  concepts 
As  regards  these difficulties,  of  course,  the 
desirability of  such  cost-benefit analysis,  or  utility 
value  analyses,  or  other  investigations  of  benefits  and 
costs,  has  to  be  acknowledged,  as  well  as  the  total 
research deficit,  as  far  as  this  is discernible. 
It should  of  course  be  appreciated  that  here  we  are 
advocating  neither  a  pure  economist's  nor  a  pure 
monetarist's  approach:  naturally  there  is  no  question -
as  Auernhammer  l)  has  rightly_pointed out- in  the 
event  of  the  result giving  a  negative  balance,  of 
mechanically  ~allowing the  path  of  economic  consistency 
and  voting  against data  protection  instead  of  adopting  a 
political decision  oriented  to  the  constitution.  And  of 
course  by  no  means  should  the  attempt  be  made,  neither 
acceptable  as  regards  content  nor  feasible  in  practice 
1)  Auernhammer  1976,  p  1. 
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of setting  a  monetary value  on  all  relevant positive  and 
negative effects  and  aspects  of  data protection. 
On  the  contrary,  against  the  arguments  put  forward  by 
those  financially  interested,  based  on  business 
economics,  and  primarily profitability-orientated  (which 
for  instance  in  the  case  of  the  German  Federal  data 
protection  law  led  to  considerable  concessions  - not 
always  justifying positive evaluation - on  the  part of 
the  legislators  to  economic  interests),  recourse  should 
rather  be  had  to  the  methods  and  analytical  resources  of 
political  economy  only  in  support  of political, 
juridical  and  other  assessments,  in  order  to  reach 
rational  legislative decisions  bearing  in  mind  the 
interests of  society  as  a  whole.  In  doing  so  it would  be 
reasonable  to  make  use,  in  some  sectors  where  monetarist 
methods  could  reasonably  be  applied,  of  the  methods  of 
cost-benefit analysis  - as  the  term  itself suggests  - to 
analyse  the  problem,  not  to decide  the  issue,  and  in 
addition  to pay  attention  to qualitative aspects,  by 
means  of  analyses  of utility value  and  other  methods  of 
investigation of benefits  and  costs. 
Besides  extensively structuring  the  "expenditure/effect" 
problem of data protection,  economic  theory  may  make 
important  strides,  especially  in  the  field  of  cost-
benefit  analysis  and  the  theory  of  public  goods,  to  a 
progressive  conceptualisation of  relevant aspects  of  data 
protection,  which  can  be  mentioned  here  only  in  passing 
4-21 Thus  consideration of  the  external  costs  of data 
protection draws  attention  to  the  problem  of  the 
administrative  burden  being  put  onto  the  shoulders  of  the 
citizen.  Moreover,  data protection  as  a  whole  could  be 
regarded  to  a  large  extent  (e.g.  by  analogy  with 
requirements  for  environmental  protection)  as  costs  to  be 
borne  internally  by  the  data  processing  organisations, 
whilst  the  concepts  of  the  "free-rider"  and  the  "merit-
wants",  for  instance,  provide  arguments  in  favour  of  a 
policy of  fees  for  requests  for  access  regarding  data 
protection  in  as  much  as  they  support  the  tendency  for 
rather  lower  fees,  and  in  any  case  refute  the  argument 
"data protection  is  worth  as  much  as  people  are  prepared 
to  pay  for  it". 
4.2.2  Limitations  to  microeconomic  costs  and  benefits 
In  view  of  the  considerable methodological  and  empirical 
difficulties of  comprehensive  national  economic 
investigations  regarding  data.protection,  to  which 
attention  has  been  drawn,  and  of  the  terms  of  reference 
of  the  projec~,  the  present  investigation  is essentially 
concentrated  on  the  problems  which  arise  for  the  data 
processing  organisations  of  the  costs  and  profits of  data 
protection  in  terms  of business  economics.  However,  the 
aspects  of  business  economic  profits,  and  general 
favourable  effects of  data  protection  so  far  as  the  users 
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is essentially  involved  in  the  considerations  by  the 
arguments. 
The  expenses  imposed  on  the  data  subjects  are  considered 
implicitly since  the  problem  of  fees  for  requests  for 
access  is  investigated.  The  problem  of  the  de  facto 
burden  over  and  above  this,  as  a  result of  the  imposition 
of  a  not  inconsiderable  administrative  burden  on  the  data 
subjects,  already discussed  (for  example  the  data  subject 
must  in practice  keep  a  record  in  the  case  of  only  one 
single  - i.e.  not  periodical  - notification,  in  order  to 
have  a  reliable  idea  of  the  degree  to  which  he  is  exposed 
overall  to data  collection procedures,  and  to  make 
adequate  use  of  his  right  of  access) ,  has  not  been 
investigated  in detail,  but  will  be  considered 
argumentatively  on  relevant occasions. 
4.2.3  Methodological  approach  of  the  study 
Apart  from  an  extensive  international literature on 
various  indiv~dual aspects  of data  protection costs,  the 
investigation  is primarily  based  on  a  few  comprehensive 
systematic  investigations.  Numerous  personal discussions 
and  interviews with  international  data  protection 
experts,  and  pronouncements  of  data  processing 
organisations,  associations,  data  protection authorities 
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it possible  to  check  the  existing  documentation  and  to 
supplement  it. 
It was  necessary  to  dispense  with  carrying  out  an 
empirical  compilation  of data protection  costs  on  the 
level  of  the  data  processing  organisations.  For  one 
thing,  such  a  compilation would  have  had  to  be  carried 
out  internationally  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
reference,  so  that  the  scope  of  the  investigation  would 
have  been  considerably amplified.  For  another  thing, 
however,  the  value  of  such  a  systematic  compilation  would 
necessarily  have  remained  doubtful  in  the  highest  degree. 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  in  some  countries  there  are 
still no  (generally  comprehensive)  data  protection  laws, 
there  are  for  practical purposes  only  three  countries 
(Sweden,  USA,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany)  with  a 
more  or  less  long  experience  of  data protection  on  the 
national  level.  Moreover,  German  experience  is  limited 
in  time,  and  American  experie~ce is still limited  in 
terms  of  the  sectors  concerned. 
In  any  case  it must  be  made  clear  that data  processing 
agencies,  even  though  they  are  subject  to  data  protection 
regulations,  do  not,  as  a  rule,  carry out  an  appropriate 
systematic  costing  procedure,  so  that  even  on  the  basis 
of  a  broadly  based  investigation  in  countries  with  a 
certain data  protection practice,  the  degree  of  precision 
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extremely limited.!)  Any  serious  investigations  of  data 
protection  costs  are  therefore  distinguished  by  the  way 
in which  they  emphasize  how  rough  they  are. 
In  view  of  this  situation,  the  present  investigation 
refrains almost  completely  from quantitative  statements. 
It can  however  be  assumed  that  the  present  investigation 
considers  the  international debate  on  the  costs  of  data 
protection fairly exhaustively  as  regards  its essential 
representative assertions  and  arguments.  In  spite of -
or  rather  because  of  - the  lack  of  quantitative 
(inevitably unreliable)  information,  in  respect  of  the 
following  emphatically qualitative considerations  and 
results  a  high  degree  of  reliability is  therefore 
assured. 
1)  In  this  connection,  cf.  Betriebswirtschaftliches 
Institut fur  Organisation  und  Automation  (BIFOA  -
Business  Economics  Institute  for  Organisation  and 
Automation)  of  Cologne  University  as  reported  in  the 
"Datenschutzberater  1979"  15.08.1979,  p  10. 
" •••  it was  found  in  the  assessment  of  the  economic 
acceptability  (of  data  security measures)  that,  owing 
to  the  lack  of  figtires  based  on  experience,  a  very 
high  degree  of  subjectivity prevails  in  the 
assessment  of  risks  and  benefits.  Morever, 
accountancy  methods,  almost  without  exception,  are 
not detailed  enough  for  accurate  cost  accounting  and 
allocation,  specifically of  the  organisational 
measures  and  the  organisational  adoption  of  technical 
measures.  The  assessment  of  the  economic 
acceptibility of  data  security measures,  and  even  the 
assessment  of  the  costs  incurred,  will  therefore  for 
a  long  time still leave  a  lot to  be  desired.  This 
will  not  be  changed  by  various  ideas  suggested  in 
current literature for  the  calculation of  risks  and 
benefits,  as  the  necessary  concrete  basis  of  these  is 
at present  almost  ~ntirely lacking." 
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selected countries 
The  estimates,  investigations  and  experience  in  relation 
to data protection  in  the  following  four  countries will 
now  be  critically considered  and  evaluated:  UK,  USA, 
Sweden  and  the Federal Republic  of  Germany.  This  choice 
was  made  in  consideration  of various  aspects  concerning 
content  and  pragmatic  issues. 
The  three  countries  USA,  Sweden  and  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  are  the  countries with  the greatest practical 
experience of data  protection  on  the  basis  of  national 
data protection legislation  (in  the  case  of  the  USA 
limited  to  the  federal  administration),  so  that  as  far 
as  these  countries are  concerned it is possible  to  speak 
of  a  more  or  less  consolidated  experience. 
So  far  as  content  is concerned,  the  Swedish  model  and 
the  German  model  represent  within  Europe  two  essential 
basic  conceptions  or .antitheses,  round  which  the 
remaining  European  data  protection  laws  are 
~ 
crystallising.  Britain - whose  decision process  has  not 
yet  concluded  - is  obviously  endeavouring  to  find  an 
independent solution,  and  it is not  clear  how  far  this 
may  lead  to  a  third  basic  conception  within  Europe.  The 
American  approach  in any  case  represents  - primarily 
owing  to  its sectoral  orientation,  but  also  as  a  result 
of  the  avoidance  of  a  special data protection control 
structure - an  original  conception,  with  which  the 
European  models  come  into conflict. 
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. ~  '  ....  '•''\  '.,,,  t  tf.,  ~  .. . .  '\ From  a  pragmatic  point  of  view,  Germany  offers  the 
advantage  of  a  comprehensive data protection literature, 
whereas  Sweden  offers  the  advantage  of  the  concentration 
of  the  relevant  information  and  experience  in  the Data 
Inspection  Board  as  well  as  the  Swedish  Federation  of 
Industries.  For  both  countries  therefore, 
representative  pronouncements  can  be  made  on  data 
protection  cost  problems,  although  no  special  data 
protection cost  investigations  or  comprehensive 
quantitative  assertions  exist.  In  the  case  of  Britain, 
recourse  can  be  had  in particular  to  a  very  informative 
data protection cost study  which  was  carried  out  on 
behalf  of  the  British Data  Protection Committee.  As 
regards  the  USA,  the  favourable  position prevails  of  the 
availability of  a-comprehensive  systematic  investigation 
and  also  an  investigation  resting  on practical 
experience  with  the  Privacy Act,  with  important 
quantitative  contributions  in  each  case. 
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4.3.1.1  General  data  protection  debate 
Although  UK  has  not  yet  passed  a  data  protection  law,  it 
can  already  look  back  to  a  data  protection  debate 
lasting  many  years.  l) 
As  might  be  expected  from  the  pragmatic  mentality  of  a 
trading  nation  involved  for  centuries with  the 
international  finance  markets,  cost  aspects  of  data 
protection  received  fairly  considerable  attention  in 
comparison  to  the  international  debate.  2) 
l)  See  for  instance:  Niblett 1971:  Committee  on 
Privacy 1972:  Home  Office  (Cmnd  6353),  1975aJ  Home 
Office  (Cmnd  6354),  1975:  Committee  on  Data 
Protection  (Cmnd  7341),  1978.  See  with  particular 
reference  to  earlier  legislative  initiatives  the 
Committee  on  Data  Protection  (Cmnd  7341)  1978,  p  3, 
and  as  regards  the  British  data  protection  debate  the 
bibliography  attached  to  the  present  investigation. 
2)  See  for  example  the  recent  publications  of Kenny 
1976,  Samet  1976:  Douglas  1976,  Anderson  1976J 
Avison/Crowe  1976:  Institute of Q!!! _Proecessing 
1976:  British  Computer  Society  1976:  Donovan  1977; 
Green  1977;  Ellison 1977:  Fishlock  1977:  Computing 
Services Assoc1ation  1977J  British  Co  uter 
Society(Computing Services_Assoc  ation Data 
Process1ng  Management  Associat  on  1978:  Committee  on 
Data  Protection  1978:  Lamb  1978;  PA_Computers  and 
Telecommunications  (PACTEL)  1977. 
4-28 Very  recently  data  protection  costs  have  been  the  centre 
of  interest  at  various  conferences  and  seminars.1
> 
Essentially,  however,  the  various  statements  were  merely 
of  an  argumentative  (sometimes  even  polemical)  character 
and  did  not  get  beyond  very partial and  impressionistic 
estimates  of  cost.  Even  in  the  area  of  (technical  and 
organisation)  data  security  2)  so  far  as  cost  aspects 
are  concerned  little more  has  been  achieved  than 
"pseudo-precision".  3> 
l)  See  for  instance Institute of  Personnel  Management/ 
Computing  Services Association:  "Personnel,  Privacy 
and  Computers:  the  Cost  to  Management",  11  November 
1976;  BIS  Applied  Systems  Ltd.,  London:  "Computer 
Security  and  Privacy",  20  October  1977,  London  with  a 
foreword  by  J  R Ellison:  "Assessing  the  Cost  of 
Privacy Legislation";  National  Council  for  Civil 
Liberties,  London:  "Computers,  Records  and  the  Right 
to  Privacy",  24  - 25  January  1979,  London  with  a 
special  workshop  "Computers  and  the  Cost  of  Privacy 
Laws";  National  Computing  Centre,  Manchester:  "What 
Price Privacy?";  11  April  1979,  London. 
2)  In  general,  Britain  may  be  regarded  as  in  the  lead 
in  the  sphere  of data processing  security  in Europe; 
reference  should  be  made  here  for  example  to  the 
distinguished  activities  in  this  field  of  the 
National  Computing  Centre,  Manchester,  as  the 
national  focus,  e.g.  as  part  of  the National  Study 
Group  on  the  Security of  Computer~based Systems 
(1974),  also  to  the  various  publications  of  NCC 
staff;  cf.  for  example  Parr/Chadwick/Wong  1973;  Wong 
1977. 
3)  Cf.  for  example  F  E  Taylor  1974,  p  1007" •••  axiom 
that,  if  the  cost  of  obtaining  information  is  greater 
than  its  value,  then  it is  reasonably  secure". 
4-29 4.3.1.2  Special  cost  estimates 
The  following  sample  survey of  various  cost  estimates 
which  have  been  introduced  into  the  British  data 
protection debate  should  be  mentioned  here  as  a  starting 
point  for  the  further  consideration  of  the  matter: 
- A fraction  of  1%  of  data processing costs: 
In  a  paper  read  on  1  June  1976  to  the  British Society for 
Computers  and  Law  regarding  the  Home  Office White  Paper  on 
data  protection,!)  Paul  Sieghart,  basing  himself  on 
estimates  of  the Association of  Computer  Users  Groups, 
described  the  continuing  additional  costs  required  by  data 
protection as  "minimal".  He  estimated  them  at  that  time  as 
"a  fraction  of  1%  of  data  processing  expenses.2> 
- 5  to  50%  of  the whole  costs  of  the  system: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
According  to  Avison  and  Crowe  the  cost  incurred  by  a 
company  on  conversion of  its whole  system  carrying  out 
"adequate data protection"  may  amount  to  between  5  and  50%  n 
extra.  The  authors  however  consider  suitable measures  for 
the  protection  of  personal  data  as  a  burden  which  every 
system  should  incur,  and  which  should  be  borne  as  ordinary 
business  expenses,  the  same  way  as  safety measures  for  the 
users  of motor  vehicles.  3) 
Home  Office  (Cmnd  6353),  1975a. 
See  report of  L  B Anderson  1976,  p  56:  "Mr  Sieghart, 
basing  his  opinion  on  f1gures  given  him  by  the  Association 
of  Computer  Users  Groups,  thought  that  the  additional 
running  costs  could  be  minimal  (a  fraction  of  1%)". 
Avison/Crowe  1976,  p  12:  "To  add  an  adequate  privacy 
safeguard  to  systems  will,  of  course,  involve  a  cost.  The 
systems  effort  to  change  the  whole  of  a  company's  current 
system  could  be  large  indeed,  anything  from  5  to  50  per 
cent more •••.  Nevertheless,  adequate  provisions  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  privacy  of  individuals  should  be  part 
of  any  system,  and  the  costs  borne  as  a  standard  cost  in 
the  same  way  as  provisions  are  made  for  the  safety  of 
users  of  motor  cars". 
4-30 8  to  220%,  or  "more  than  a  doubling  of  the  data  processing 
costs": 
According  to  press  reports  the  Labour  Member  of 
Parliament  for  Basildon,  Eric  Moonman,  is  afraid  that  "the 
cost  of  safeguarding  privacy  for  the  individual  could  prove 
crippling  to  the  smaller  computer  user".l)  Moonman  based 
this  assertion  on  "a  US  study  which  suggested  that  the  cost 
could  range  from  8  to  220%  of  the  basic  cost  of  the 
computer  installation". 2)  Moonman  also  quotes  the 
American  consultant John  Diebold,  according  to  whom  "privacy 
could  more  than  double  the  basic  computer  cost."  l) 
- data processing  capital costs  increased  by  between  11  and 
185%,  and  running  costs  by  11  to  146%: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
J  F  Donovan  3)  bases  his  remarks  obviously  on  the 
investigations  of Goldstein,  but  quotes  another  publication, 
Fishlock  1977,  p  9. 
Moonman  bases  his  remarks  quite  obviously  on  the  study 
by  Goldstein,  as  reported  in Goldstein  1975c,  pp  65-59, 
which  is  analysed  in  detail  in  4.3.2.2  below.  The 
percentage  figures  quoted  therein  relate  to  "privacy-
related  annual  costs  as  percentage  of  original  annual 
system  cost",  and  not  "basic  cost  of  the  computer 
installation"  as  given  in  Fishlock.  Regarding  the 
divergent  figures  given  in  the  various  publications  of 
Goldstein  see  4.3.2.2.3  and  in  particular  table  4.6 
including  note  1,  also  the  critical  assessment  in  general 
in  4.3.2.2.4. 
Donovan  1977,  pp  18-20. 
4-31 by Goldstein and  Nolan.1
>  Donovan  therefore  bases  his 
remarks  on  an  increase  in  capital  changes  for  data 
processing  of  between  11  and  185%,  and  an  increase  in 
current  DP  charges  of  between  11  and  146%.  2) 
Donovan  also  mentions  that  "another  US  authority  has 
estimated  that  anticipated privacy-legislation will  double 
the  cost  of  data  processing".  3) 
Price  increases  on  important products  and  services: 
The  Nationalised Industries  Computer  Committee  4>  is 
reported  to  have  declared  in  its  comments  to  the  Data 
Protection  Committee  that  it was  afraid  that  data  protection 
legislation  in  accordance  with  a  strict  interpretation  of 
the  proposals  of  the  White  Paper  5
>  would  be  so  expensive 
and  costly  that  important  products  and  services  would  be 
increased  in  price  to  the  consumer.  6) 
Without  going  into  detail  here  regarding  the  estimates  of 
costs  quoted,  the  questionable  nature  of  these  and  similar 
summary  estimates  of  data protection costs  is  obvious.  Even 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Goldstein/Nolan  1975,  pp  62-70. 
See Goldstein/Nolan  1975,  p  66. 
Donovan  1977,  p  19 
Members:  National  Coal  Board,  Central Electricity 
Generating  __ Board,  British _Rail,  National  __ Bus. Company,  B'f!Q, 
British Steel,  ~ritish Airways,  Post Office. 
Home  Office  (Cmnd-6353),  1975. 
See  Computing  1977,  p  1 
4-32 when  - as  in  the  case  of Goldstein's  works  - the  assertions 
made  are  supported  by  systematic  investigations,  such  isolated 
figures  are  in  practice  worthless  to  the  legislator  as  guides 
to  his  decisions,  simply  because  of  his  inability  to  check 
them. 
Furthermore,  they  suggest  an  unrealistic  degree  of  precision, 
since  the  percentage  figures  frequently  given  usually  relate 
to  a  basis  which  is  not  properly explained  and  defined,  which 
in  practice  is  in  great  need  of  interpretation  and  in  fact  is 
itself only  an  estimated  figure.  Furthermore,  even  the 
amounts  to  which  they  refer:  "data processing  expenses", 
"system costs",  "data processing costs"  etc.  are  far  from 
being  well  defined.  l) 
Another  point  is  that  mostly  general  comments  are  made 
regarding  the  cost~ of  data  protection without  any  explanation 
of  what  concrete  type  of  data  protection  forms  the  basis  of 
the  estimate. 
1)  In  this  connection  it should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
attempt  has  already  been  made  here  as  regards 
interpretation  to  achieve  a  certain degree  of 
terminological  predicability.  The  assertions  reproduced 
are  actually  less  well  defined.  For  instance  Moonman,  as 
quoted  by  Fishlock,  uses  the  extremely  vague  concepts 
"basic cost of  the  computer  installation"  and  "basic 
computer  cost".  Sieghart,  as  quoted  by Anderson  in  1976, 
p  6,  speaks  only  of  "additional  running  costs"  and  also  . 
"increased  on  oin  annual  costs".  The  reference  item  used 
by  Av1son  Crowe  1976,  p  12,  1s  "systems effort". 
4-33 The  only  conclusion  which  can  therefore  be  drawn  from  such 
estimates  is  that  data  protection  may  cost a  great  deal  or 
very little, or  actually only  that  there  are  some  people  who 
believe  in  the  possibility of  very  high  costs,  and  some  who 
only  expect  low  costs.  On  the  whole  the  British  debate 
regarding  the  costs  of  data  protection  up  to  the  present 
corresponds  for  example  to  the  position  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany  before  the  passing  of  the  Federal  Data 
Protection  Law. 
On  the  basis  of  extremely  uncertain  data  and  what  is 
essentially a  necessarily  inadequate methodological  foundation, 
the  attempt  is  made  to  estimate  in  advance  the  cost  of  data 
protection  in  itself  or  the  costs  of  a  non-existent  data 
protection  law,  the  form  and  methods  of  application  of  which 
are  still quite  uncertain.  At  the  same  time,  certain 
observations  and  estimates  in  relation  to  data  protection 
costs  merely  serve  to  influence  the  eventual British  data 
protection  legislation  to  favour  various  sectoral  interests. 
4.3.1.3  The  report  of  the  Committee  on  Data Protection 
The  Committee  on  Data  Protection  (DPC,  chairman Sir  Norman 
Lindop)  set  up  in July 1976  by  the  Home  Secretary at  that 
time,  Roy  Jenkins,  attached  particular  importance  both  in  the 
course  of  its work  and  in  its  report  published  at  the  end  of 
1978  l)  to  the  investigation  of  the  cost  aspects  of  data 
protection. 
1)  Committee  on  Data  Protection  (Cmnd  7341),  1978, 
chapter  22. 
4-34 Like  the  previously  published  data protection report  (White 
Paper:  Computers  and  Privacy)  issued  by  the'Brltish  Home 
Office  in  December  1975  l}  and  taking  this  as  a  basis,  the 
DPC  made  a  distinction between  user  costs  and  the 
administrative costs of  a  Data  Protection Authority  (DPA}. 
4.3.1.3.1  User  costs:  the  PACTEL  study 
As  regards  user  costs  required  to  provide  data  protection, 
various  views  were  put  to  the  DPC,  the majority  of  which 
foresaw  considerable  cost  burdens.  However,  only  a  few  of 
these were  supported  by  figures,  and  where  they were,  very 
considerable differences  were  apparent.  As  with  the  views 
just considered  above  with  regard  to  such  ad  hoc  estimates, 
the  DPC  rightly  considered  these  views  as  speculative.2> 
4.3.1.3.1.1  Terms  of  reference 
At  the  suggestion  of  its costs  sub-committee,  the  DPC 
therefore  entrusted  the  consultant  body  PACTEL  (PA  Computers 
and  Telecommuncations  Ltd)  with  the  carrying  out  of  a  limited 
investigation  "to  improve  the  understanding  of  the  possible 
cost  impact  of  data  protection  legislation".  3>  It was  hoped 
that  in this way  the  following  questions  would  be  clarified!4> 
1} 
2} 
3) 
4) 
Home  Office  (Cmnd  6353),  1975a,  paragraphs  32,  35  and  38. 
Committee  on Data  Protection 1978,  paragraphs  22.02,  p  206: 
"The  majority  believed  that  the  costs  of  their  operations 
would  be  increased  substantially by  data  protection 
legislation.  Few  could  support  their  belief  with  figures, 
but where  they  did  these  varied  enormously.  Although  such 
estimates  were  offered  only  after  se~ious consideration, 
they were,  of  course,  based  on  speculation  and,  at  the  stage 
of  our  enquiries,  it could  not  have  been  otherwise". 
The  observations  made  here  are  based  on  the  summing  up 
of  the  PACTEL-study,  PACTEL  1977,  pp  1-15,  the  essence  of 
which  was  reproduced  as  appendix  11  (ii)  "Summary  of  the 
findings  of  the  cost  study  consultants"  in  the  report  of 
the  Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  pp  443-448. 
Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  paragraph  22.04,  p  207. 
4-35 - "What  factors  could  affect  the  cost  of  possible 
proposals?" 
- "Which  statutory principles  were  likely  to  be  the  most 
costly  for  users  to  meet?" 
- "How  sensitive  the  costs  of  different  users  would  be 
to  changes  in  levels  of  compliance  for  each  principle?" 
- "What  levels  of  compliance  might  be  achieved without 
significant costs?" 
4.3.1.3.1.2  Conceptual  and  methodological  approach 
1) 
On  the  basis  of preliminary  work  by  the  National 
Computing  Centre  (NCC)  l)  and  assisted  thereby  in  the 
entire execution of  the  investigation,  PACTEL  covered 
26  private  and  public organisations of  a  most  varied 
character with  a  questionnaire  and  interviewing 
campaign  (see  table  4.1). 
See  for  example  Ellison 1977. 
4-36 Table  4.1:  List of organisations  investigated  (names  not 
mentioned) 
1.  Multinational  firm  (personnel  & payroll) 
2.  Light  industrial  firm  (sales,  purchasing,  payroll  and 
accounts) 
3.  Airline  (seat  reservations) 
4.  Clearing  bank 
5.  Large  finance  house 
6.  Medium  finance  house 
7.  Life  assurance  company 
8.  Non-life  insurance  company 
9.  Bureau  for  domestic  retailers 
10.  Cooperative  retail  business 
11.  Debt  collection  agency 
12.  Credit  reference  agency 
13.  Large  mail  order  house 
14.  Credit betting organisation 
15.  Public  attitudes  research 
16.  Charitable  organisation 
17.  Public  aid  association 
18.  Information  analysis  business 
19.  University 
20.  Regional  health, service 
21.  Electricity supply  board 
22.  Local  authority 
23.  Local  authorities  computer  bureau 
24.  Governmment  department  (central  records) 
25.  Government  department  (payments  system) 
26.  Wholesale  printers 
Source:  PACTEL  1977,  p  3. 
4-37 The  questionnaire  used  l)  builds  on  a  des~ription of 
possible  demands  of  data protection  legislation  (known 
as  the  "hypothetical  basic  scenario") • 2> 
The  requirements  explained  in detail  in  connection with 
the  questionnaire  comply  with  the  following  six aims: 3> 
1.  Informing  the  data subjects of  the  fact,  contents 
and  purpose  of  the  storage  of  personal  data. 
2.  Informing  the  data subjects  of  the  recipients  of 
personal  data. 
3.  Guaranteeing  the  correctness,  relevance, 
completeness  and  up-to-dateness  of  the  data. 
4.  Limitation  of  storage  to  the  required period. 
5.  Guaranteeing  the  security of  the  data. 
6.  Protection during  the  processing  of  data  referring 
to particular  persons,  or  which  can  be  traced  to 
particular  persons  for  statistical  and  similar 
purposes. 
By  means  of  several  checklists4>  the  costs  which 
would  be  incurred  by  carrying out various  more  or  less 
strict potential  data  protection  measures  to  achieve 
the  respective  aims  was  then  ascertained.  For 
instance,  in  each  case  the  cost  was  ascertained  on  the 
l)  The  complete  questionnaire  is given  in Committee 
on  Data  Protection  1978,  Appendix  11  (i),  pp  422-442. 
2)  Op.  cit.  pp  427-429. 
3)  Op •  c i t .  p  4 4 5 • 
4 >  Checklists  Bl  to  86  in  op.  cit.  pp  430-435. 
4-38 '  basis  of  various  different  assumptions  in  relation  to 
existing  systems,  for  a  single  short-term conversion  or 
a  medium-term  incorporation  or  re-development,  also  the 
additional  running  costs  ("extra  cost  of  operation"). 
In  this  way,  by  implication,  the  degree  to  which  the 
organisations  to  whom  the  questionnaire  was  submitted 
already  fulfil  possible  future  requirements  as  regards 
data  protection  was  established. 
In  special  checklists1>  the  amount  of  work  and  the 
costs  involved  were  considered  for  the  one-time short-
term conversion  for  medium-term  (hardware  and  software) 
system development,  and  the additional  operations data 
protection costs according  to  the  various  cost factors 
(i.e.  system  audit  compliance  specification,  equipment, 
software,  machine  time,  organisation,  staff, 
documentation,  training,  physical  security,  consumables, 
postage etc.). 
Apart  from  general  statements  regarding  total  business 
costs,  data  processing  system  development  and  operating 
costs,  finally details  were  requested  regarding  system 
characteristics,  volume  of  data  file  and  frequencies, 
processing  and  printing  out  statistics,  also  regarding 
the  corresponding  effects  of  data  protection 
legislation.2> 
l)  Checklists  Cl-C3,  in  op.  cit.  pp  436-438. 
2)  Checklists  Dl  and  02,  in  op.  cit.  pp  439-442. 
4-39 In  view  of  the  limited  nature  of  the  resources 
available!)  the  investigation was  concentrated  from 
the  outset  rather  on  the  identification  of  cost  focal 
points,  i.e.  the  most  expensive  and  cost-intensive 
elements  of  the  hypothetical  basic  data  protection 
scenario,  and  the data  processing  system  elements  with 
a  determining  influence  on  data  protection costs.2
> 
Instead  of  perfectionist and  yet  imprecise  detailed 
cost calculations,  all  that  was  attempted  was  a 
realistic assessment  of  orders  of  magnitude3)  and 
"thresholds  of  pain"4)  of  data  protection  costs. 5> 
4.3.1.3.1.3  Results  and  evaluation of  the  study 
The  most  important,  in  fact  crucial,  result  of  the 
PACTEL  study  is  the  conclusion,  "that  the  {cost)  impact 
of  likely  {data  protection)  regulations  on  the  various 
respondent  organisations will  be  very different:  some 
l)  The  Committee  had  only  a  budget  of  £9,000  available 
for  the  study of  costs.  See  op.  cit.  p  443. 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Op.  cit.  p  424. 
Op.  cit.  p  423:  "to  agree  on  the  order  of  magnitude  of 
costs which  could  fall  on  computer  users  in  various 
circumstances". 
Op.  cit.  p  425. 
5)  Thus  the  cost  estimates  for  the  conversions  or 
redevelopment  were  covered  by  the  following  scale: 
already  complied  with  {1);  no  significant difficulty  or 
cost  (2);  effort  required:  the  whole  team  for  a  week 
{3);  a  month  {4);  a  year  (5);  more  than  a  year  {6);  cf. 
op.  cit.  p  425.  The  scale of  the  additional  annual 
operating data protection costs amounts  to:  additional 
costs  0%  {A);  1%  to  2%  {B);  3%  to  5%  {C);  6%  to  10%  {D): 
11%  to  20%  (E);  more  than  20%  (F);  cf.  op.  cit.  p  426. 
4-40 general  conclusions  can  be  drawn,  but  only  as  a 
background  against which  to  understand  the  considerable 
individual  variations  of  each  case".l) 
The  most  important  cost factors  for  the  various 
organisations  investigated. can  be  seen  in  table  4.2. 2) 
The  costs  incurred  in  connection with  the  passing  of 
information  to  data  subjects  are  particularly striking: 
particularly the  generally high  postal  charges,  but 
also  the  costs  of  administration  and  the  cost  of 
stationery etc.  Many  organisations  expect  quite 
considerable  data  protection costs. 
Apart  from  a  few  cases,  the  study  shows  smaller 
software  development  costs  (new  programs,  data 
processing staff, modification of  data  files,  etc.) 
than  had  been  expected. 
Additional  hardware  was  generally  not  considered 
necessary.  In  a  few  cases  however,  need  for  additional 
printers  was  indicated  in  order  to  cope  with  the 
presumed  extensive duties of  informing  data  subjects. 
The  most  important cost determinant  factors3) 
So  far  as  the  cost determinants  are  concerned,  it seems 
particularly  interesting  that  the  technical  design  of 
l)  PACTEL  1977,  p  2. 
2)  Source:  PACTEL  1977,  p  3;  see  also  Committee  on 
Data  Protection 1978,  pp  443-444. 
J)  Cf.  in  this  connection  op.  cit.  pp  444-445. 
4-41 ~  z 
c( 
z 
i 
II: 
w 
1-
w 
0 
0  z 
c( 
~ 
w 
!: 
~ 
u 
II: 
j 
P•m•n·JIIIun .111ndwo:J 
PtlUO:J JIUIOllft:J .IIJnBiy 
JtlftdWO:J WOij  WIP~S 
jO JMOWIIf IJq!IIOtf 
11!1110 JOU!ftiU!PIOH 
UO IUO!ltlnBiy  jO PtdWI 
UO!lft!UtiJO jO 
UO!lftq!J11!0 lt:l!lldtJiot9 
lllll!tdWO:J 
IOJifqtliW!,l 
IUO!liJftlty U! lpJ03111 
Jt:IUif:J jO  UOfSftJ3UI 
Q31!qnStltQ 
JO  UO!l!U!JIO 
W!l!P"V 
IIIIIIIAS 
.\a!JII"S 
ta!IAII.t 
lUIIIIdtnii:J 
8tll)ndWt:JMIN 
uOttt:I!J!lUfPI ,'"!qns 
ttJnaJnJJs 
lf!:flutAJ!POW 
IIIJ!,LJtlftdWO:J 
UOIIt:l!f!PON 
IJIMJJOS 
ltJnpt30ltf 
MIN lutt211J:J 
A.lluO!tllS 
Table  4.2: 
,...  ...  ..  .. 
N 
Major  cost  items  and  determinants  (PACTEL  study) 
4-42 the  system,  (e.g.  large  computer  installation using 
magnetic  tapes  or  a  disc-oriented  small  computer)  is 
not  the  decisive  factor.  Two  exceptions  must  however 
be  mentioned:  the  extensive  use  of  terminals  increases 
data  security costs  in  comparison  with  centralised 
systems,  and  where  there  is extensive distribution of 
data  files  among  several  systems,  the  cost  of  passing 
information  to  the  data subjects  is  increased. 
As  in  the  basic  scenario  only  the  automatic  processing 
of personal  data  was  covered,  the  question  of  the 
definition of  automatic  data  processing  is  necessarily 
a  cost-determining  factor. 
Furthermore,  the  study  ascertained  that  the  (additional) 
data protection cost  incurred  by  a  certain organisation 
is also  dependent  on  how  far  the  organisation  in 
question  is already subject  to  regulations  or  to 
supervision. 1>  Already-established  business 
principles  and  practices anticipating  or  facilitating 
security-orientated  and  other  data  protection  measures 
result  in similar effects. 2>  The  study  also 
identifies  as  a  further  cost-determining  factor,  the 
question whether  the  data  processing  user  has  a  direct 
or  indirect  or  a  continuous  and  regular  or  sporadic 
contact with  the  data subject. 
l)  Cf.  for  example  the  Consumer .Credit Act  in 
relation  to  credit  reporting  agenc1es. 
2)  Cf.  for  instance  the  security  standards  in  the 
bank  sector. 
4-43 Besides  other  factors,  reference  is  made  in  conclusion 
to  the  particular  importance  of  flexibility  in  timing  · 
the  introduction  of  the  data  protection  regulations. 
The  relative cost  in  relation  to  the  6  fundamental  aims 
is  given  in  table  4.3.1)  Once  more  the  particularly 
high  costs  for  passing  information  to  data  subjects  is 
very striking.  It  is  no  less  remarkable  that  the 
#  • 
majority  of  the  organisations  questioned  do  not  expect 
any  appreciable  additional  system  security  costs.  For 
the  rest,  the  PACTEL  study  comes  to  the  not  very 
surprising  conclusion  that  the  data  protection  costs  in 
general  depend  essentially  on  the  strictness  of  the 
requirements  of  the  data  protection  regulations,  and 
that  each  of  the  organisations  investigated  has  its  own 
special  and  individual  sensitivity  curve  in  relation  to 
the  strictness  of  the  particular  data  protection 
regulations.  This  result  is  clearly  shown  in  table 
4.4. 2) 
l)  Source:  PACTEL  1977,  p  8~  cf.  also Committee  on 
Data _Protection  1978,  pp  445-446. 
2
>  PACTEL  1977,  p  11.  Although  this  table  can  only 
be  adequately  interpreted  in  conjunction  with  the 
original  questionnaire,  it is  reproduced  here  as 
it illustrates  very  vividly  the  considerable 
differences  in  the  sensitivity  curves;  cf.  also 
Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  pp  446-448. 
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 Evaluation 
Obviously  the  concrete  features  of  the  basic  scenario 
adopted  and  the  individual  assumptions  and  conditions 
on  which  it is  based  are  of  very  decisive  significance 
for  the  results  of  the  whole  investigation.  It is  not 
possible  to  repeat  here  the  whole  scenario  as  well  as 
the  assumptions  and  conditions  adopted  as  a  basis. 
However,  in  addition  to  the  reference  to  the  reprint  in 
the  report  of  the  DPCl)  it is  perhaps  worth  while 
making  the  following  comments  on  this  scenario. 
In  particular,  regarding  the  duties  of  informing  data 
subjects,  the  basic  scenario  imposed. very  extensive, 
strict and  inflexible  requirements  on  users,  which 
inevitably  led  to  high  cost  estimates,  without 
corresponding  to  actually  expected  legislation.  Thus 
very  short  information  time  limits,  and  a  probably  far 
too  high  estimated  proportion  of  requests  for 
information,  viz.  1%  or  even  10%  of  the  total  number  of 
data  subjects,  were  stipulated.  Furthermore,  the 
assumptions  regarding  the  necessity  of  special  postal 
notifications  and  information  seem  to  be  very much  on 
the  high  side. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  data  security  requirements  were 
not  formulated  with  sufficient precision  to  give  the 
various  organisations  under  investigation  the 
possibility of  assessing  what  measures  need  or  need  not 
l)  Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  pp  422-442. 
4-47 be  taken  as  required  for  data  protection  in  their 
concrete  case.  So  far  as  can  be  seen,  however,  no 
systematic  attempt  was  made  by  PACTEL  in  relation  to 
the  data  security  estimates  of  the  organisations 
questionned  to  separate  the  costs  required  for  data 
protection  from  those  costs  which  would  have  to  be 
borne  on  other  accounts  (e.g.  compensation  of  a 
general  secur~ty deficit,  orderlines  of  data 
processing).  Users  have  a  tendency,  due  to  lack  of 
appreciation  of  such  other  elementary  requirements,  to 
ascribe  data  security  costs  excessively  to  data 
protection  requirements,  as  they  are  often  compelled  to 
carry out  measures,  some  of  which  are  overdue,  as  a 
result  of  a  newly  introduced  data  protection  law.  In 
addition  to  the  banks,  the  credit  agencies  are  a  good 
example  of  the  view  expressed  here,  as  they  have 
already  been  compelled  by  the  British  Consumer  Credit 
Act  to  carry  out  certain  measures  relevant  to  data 
protection. I) 
As  regards  British  cost-consciousness  and  the 
recommendation  of  the  DPC  in  favour  of  the  adoption  of 
a  flexible  procedure,  it can  be  pointed  out  in  brief 
that  the qualitative  cost  assessments  of  the  PACTEL 
study  lie  probably  on  - and  even  above  - the  upper 
limit  of  those  costs  which  a  possible  future  data 
protection  legislation will  actually  cause. 
l)  Cf.  in  this  connection,  op.  cit.  p  444. 
4-48 4.3.1.3.1.4  Conclusions  of  the  DPC 
The  DPC  was  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  hthe 
information  provided  (by  the  organisations  questionned) 
was  based  on  the  best  estimates  they  could  give,  not  on 
precise  figures".!) 
The  conclusions  drawn  by  the  DPC  from  PACTEL's  study of 
costs  were  accordingly  cautious  and  very  generalised: 
"The  information  which  we  have  illustrates  that  any 
attempt  to  apply  a  simple  universal  requirement  would 
be  fraught  with  difficulty  and  could  lead,  in  some 
cases,  to  disproportionate  effects."2) 
Furthermore:  "The  evidence  also  shows  that,  if  a 
sufficiently flexible  approach  were  adopted,  it would 
be  possible  to  devise  a  system  of  control  by  which  each 
of  the  very different organisations  included  in  our 
study  could  meet  reasonable  data  privacy  requirements 
at moderate  costs".3> 
"From  the  cases  we  studied  there  is  support  for  the 
general  proposition  that  if high  costs  look  likely, 
there  is  either  a  serious  deficiency  in  the  current 
practices  of  the  organisation  in  question,  or  the 
specification  of  privacy  regulations  to  which  it is  to 
conform  is  inappropriate  and  could  be  improved."4) 
1)  Op.  cit.  paragraph  22.05,  p  207. 
2)  Op.  cit.  paragraph  22.05,  p  207. 
3)  Op.  cit.  paragraph  22.06,  p  207. 
4) 
~. cit.  paragraph  22.07,  pp  207-208. 
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• The  DPC  also  found  that  future  data  protection 
legislation,  especially  in  the  area  of  informing  the 
data  subjects  by  the  data  processing  user,  would  cause 
considerably  less  costs  than  the  scenario  on  which  the 
study  was  based  (e.g.  non-permissibility  of  unspecific 
"what  do  you  know  about  me"  requests  etc.).l) 
Moreover,  the  report  of  the  DPC  briefly states  the  most 
important  results  of  the  cost  study  of PACTEL  and  then 
comes  to  the  following  three  conclusions  regarding  user 
costs.2
> 
1.  "Our  study  strongly supports  the  flexible  approach 
to  data  protection,  based  on  Codes  of Practice." 
2.  "The  circumstances  of  users  are  so  variable  that  it 
is  most  important  that  they  or  their 
representatives  should  be  involved  with  the  DPA  in 
devising  Codes  of Practice  so  that  adequate 
provisions  are  made  both  to  fulfil  privacy 
requirements  and  to  moderate  the  cost  and  effort 
required  from  users." 
3.  "A  DPA  acting  in  this  man~er  need  not  impose 
inordinate  costs  on  users." 
l)  Op.  cit.  paragraph  22.08,  p  208. 
2
>  Op.  cit. paragraph  22.11,  p  208. 
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The  written  comments  submitted  to  the  DPC  tended  to 
advocate  the  charging  of  access  fees.  Fees  of  SOp  to 
£2.50  were  proposed.  As  well  as  purely  economic  aspects 
of  covering  costs,  the  argument  of  the disincentive 
effect  with  regard  to  "frivolous  requests"  was 
especially put  forward.  The  DPC  refers  also  (besides 
various  practical  examples  from  the  public  sector),  as  a 
precedent,  to  the  Consumer  Credit Act  of  1974,  which  in 
accordance  with  section  158  provides  for  a  fee  of  25p. 
The  DPC  is  accordingly of  the  opinion  "that  the  argument 
about  frivolous  requests  is  sensible  and  it would  be 
reasonable  for  a  charge  to  be  made  for  the  work 
involved."  2> 
It therefore  recommends  "that  each  Code  of Practice 
should  specify  the  circumstances  under  which  users  may  be 
allowed  to  charge  a  reasonable  fee  if  they  wish  to  do 
so."  3> 
In  the  opinion  of  the  DPC,  "reasonable  fee"  can  mean  that 
in  some  cases  no  fee  at all will  be  charged,  whilst  in 
other  cases  the  full  information  costs  will  be  charged. 
1)  Cf.  op.  cit.,  pp  213-215 
2)  Op.  cit.,  paragraph  22.33,  p  214 
3)  Op.  cit., paragraph  22.34,  p  214. 
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about  the  cost of  making  an  enquiry  could  be  a  major 
disincentive  for  the  data  subject."  l)  In  the  opinion 
of  the DPC,  any  access  fee  to  be  paid  should  therefore  be 
known  at  the  time  of  the  request  for  access.  The  basic 
principle for  the  approval  of  the  amount  of  any  access 
fees  by  the  Data Protection Authority  should  therefore  be 
that suitability for  the  data subject  is  given  a  higher 
priority than  any  disadvantages  to  the  users,  so  that  the 
aims  of data  protection are  not  frustrated  by  unsuitable 
fees. 
4.3.1.3.3  Registration  fees  of  the  Data  Protection Authority 
On  the  basis  of  traditional pragmatism  and  a  sense  of 
mistrust  of  bureaucratic  tendencies,  the  question  of 
function,  duties  and  material  set-up of  a  future  data 
protection authority  was  always  an  especially  important 
point  in  the  British discussion  on  data protection.  In 
this  context  the  variously stressed  demand  that  the  DPA 
(if it should  come  to  that)  "should  pay  for  itself"  2) 
is  a  specific  feature  of  the  British discussion  on  data 
protection if an  international  comparison  is  made.  The 
question  of  any  registration  fee  or  other  fees  to  be  paid 
to  the data protection authority will  therefore  be  of 
1)  Op.  cit.,  paragraph  22.34,  p  214. 
2)  Cf.,  for  example,  Home  Office  (Cmnd  6353)  1975a 
paragraph  38,  p  11:  "The  objective,  whatever  choice 
is finally  adopted,  will  be  to  make  the  Authority 
financially  self-supporting." 
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costs arising  for  the  users. 
The  DPC  associated  itself with  the  approach  of  the 
comment  by  the  British Computer  Society l)  in 
accordance  with  which  the  total  annual  budget  of  the  data 
protection authority  would  be  provided  in  the  form  of 
annual  (licence or  inspection)  fees  charged  to  the  DP 
users  (per  installation). 
On  the  basis  of  estimates  (regarded  by  itself as 
speculative)  the  committee  calculated  an  average  fee  of 
£26  in  the  case  of  a  general  registration of  20,000 
applications with  an  assumed  annual  budget  of  the  data 
protection  authority  of  £520,000.  In  the  case  of  a 
selective registration of  10%  of  the  applications  this 
fee  would  be  £260  per  application.  A single  user  can  be 
liable  to  registration  in  respect  to  several 
applications.  In  view  of  the  principle  that  those  who 
create  the  risk  should  pay,  the  9ommittee  does  not  regard 
such  fees  as  excessive.  2) 
The  British  Computer  Spociety  has  rated  an  annual  fee  of 
£50  (per  installation,  however)  as  "reasonable".  J) 
1)  British Computer  Society  1976,  pp  26-27,  Cf.  also 
Committee  on  Data  Protection 1978,  paragraph  22.25 
p  212. 
2)  Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  paragraph  22.26 
p  212. 
3)  British Computer  Society  1976,  p  27. 
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considered  by  the  committee  to  be  indeed  simple  and  cheap 
to  handle,  but  as  perhaps  unjust.  It therefore  advocated 
variable fees  according  to application,  the  amount  of 
which  depends  on  the  number  of  users  concerned  and  the 
cost which  the  data protection authority  has  in 
developing  the  specific  code  of  practice.  l)  If  the 
authority supplies additional  advisory  or  other  services 
to  the  users  it would  be  able  to  charge  the  special  costs 
arising  through  this.  2> 
4.3.1.4  Summary 
It can  be  stated  basically  that  future  British 
legislation,  insofar  as it adopts  the  flexible  approach 
of  the  DPC,  will  cause  no  unreasonable  and  in  general  no 
heavy  costs,  whether  for  the data subjects,  the  DP 
users,  or  the  public purse.  3> 
Of  special  significance  in  this case will  be  the  flexible 
formulation  of  legislation with  regard  to  the  transition 
time  and  also  to  the  obligations  of  notification  and 
information.  The  problems  of  notification  and 
1)  Committee  on  Data  Protection 1978,  paragraph  22.27 
p  212. 
2)  Op.  cit.,  paragraph  22.31,  p  213. 
3}  Thus  also  the  estimation  by  the  committee  itself: 
"We  have  concluded  that,  if  implemented  in  accordance 
with  our  recommendations,  the  scheme  of  regulation 
which  we  propose  need  not  impose  unreasonable  costs 
on  anyone  - users,  data  subjects  or  the  public 
purse."  Op.  cit.,  paragraph  26,  p  iii. 
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than  the  committee  assumes.  Apart  from  a  few  special 
situations,  the  users  find,  as  practical  experience 
shows,  methods  and  procedures  which  enable  them  to  fulfil 
these  obligations  at  absolutely marginal  costs.  As 
opposed  to  first  appearances  and  corresponding  state-
ments  l),  especially  in  the  case  of  automatic  systems 
and  periodic  direct  contact  with  the  data  subject,  the 
annual  routine  notification  or  giving  of  information  to 
all  data  subjects  can  be  the  less  expensive  solution; 
which  in  addition  can  also  have  certain positive  side-
effects  (public  relations  etc.). 
Even  with  regard  to  access  fees  a  more  liberal  attitude 
justifies itself.  This  is  so,  on  the  one  hand,  because 
with  regard  to  the  (as  experience  shows)  generally  low 
number  of  information  requests  there  is  hardly  the 
necessity  of  disincentive  for  "frivolous  requests".  On 
the  other  hand,  the  true  costs  of  collecting  the  access 
fees  (which  for  political  and  legal  reasons  should  in  any 
case  be  as  low  as  possible)  usually  exceed  the  amount  of 
the  fees.  2>  Characteristically,  the  majority  of 
German  companies  waive  such  fees  although  these  can  be 
set  considerably  higher  in  accordance  with  the  German 
Federal  Data  Protection Law. 
1)  Cf.  (for  example)  Ellison  1977,  p  2. 
2)  Cf.  the  proposals  made  by  the  Committee  on  Data 
Protection  for  fees  between  SOp  and  £2.50. 
Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  paragraph  22.32, 
p  213. 
4-55 Even  the  concept  proposed  by  the  DPC  with  regard  to  a 
fully self-financing data protection authority  by  means 
of  annual  registration  fees  which  vary  by  sector  seems 
worth  reconsidering.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the 
concept  of  an  annual  fee  similar  to  a  data  protection  tax 
appears  to  be  unusual  and  possibly  is  not  acceptable  to 
the  users,  the  putting  into  practice  of  this  concept 
brings  up  various  practical  and  legal  problems.  The 
Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board,  due  to  such  reasons  and 
experience,  tends  towards  a reduction  if  not  an 
elimination  of  such  registration  or  licencing  fees.  In 
any  case,  it gives  basic  priority  to  a  low  lump  sum 
which  is not  necessarily dependent  on  costs. 
It must  be  noted  at  least  at  this  point  that  the 
licensing  system  turned  down  (inter  alia)  by  the  British 
DPC,  mainly  due  to  cost  reasons,  appears  to  be  quite 
practicable  without  any  unreasonable  costs  as  the  Swedish 
experience  shows.  l) 
Above  all,  it seems  worth  mentioning  in  this  connection 
that,  within  the  framework  of  the  British  discussion  on 
data  protection,  the  practical  usefulness  of  a  licensing 
system which  goes  beyond  mere  registration  is  recognised 
to  a  certain  extent  by  those  engaged  in  the  field.  An 
essential  argument  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  general 
1)  Cf.  also  the  positive  evaluation  of  British  Computer 
Society 1976,  pp  15  ff  and  also Douglas  1975, 
pp  36-37. 
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security  which  a  licence,  similar  to  a  trade mark,  gives 
to  clients  and  other  business  partners,  quite  apart  from 
the  security  in  the  sense  of foreseeability  which  arises 
for  the  company  seeking  licensing  itself.  l) 
With  regard  to  a  future  data  protection  authority  and  the 
costs  caused  by  it,  the  proposal  of  the  DPC  that  such  an 
authority  should  prepare  about  50  different codes  of 
practice and  then  monitor  their  application  is  of  special 
importance.  There  is  the  fear  that  in  this  aspect  the 
practicable flexibility expressly  aimed  at  by  the 
committee  is  turned  into costly complication.  The  notion 
that  one  and  the  same  user  in  certain  circumstances  with 
regard  to  different  applications  (but  using  the  one  and 
the  same  computer  and  operating  team)  would  be  subject  at 
the  same  time  to  different  codes  of  practice  prompts  the 
impression  that  there  must  be  simpler  and  cheaper 
possibilities  of  practicable  data  protection  both  at  the 
level  of  the  data  protection  a~thority and  the  DP  user. 
(Sweden  seems  to  have  found  such  a  way.)  At  any  rate, 
the  critical  reaction  to  this  by  the  Law  Society,  as 
1)  See  especially Benjamin  1978a,  pp  5-7,  where,  amongst 
other  things,  the  special  value  of  "security 
certification"  by  the  licensing  data  protection 
authority  for  service  computer  centres  is  stressed. 
Correspondingly  and  partly with  the  same  wording  -
European  Computing  Services Association  1978, 
pp  5-6. 
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the  misgivings  expressed  here.  l) 
The  points  of  criticism expressed  against  the  report  of 
the  DPC  cannot  be  developed  further  at  this  point  since 
this  would  exceed  the  boundaries  of  the  subject  dealt 
with  here.  They  have  solely  the  purpose  to  show  at  this 
point  that  future  British  legislation with  suitable 
formulation  would  cause  rather  less  effort  and  costs  than 
the  DPC  forecast.  And  yet  in  this  connection  it still 
remains  unconsidered  that  certain  measures  required  by  a 
future  data  protection  law  (not  only  in  the  sphere  of 
data  security)  would  have  to  be  taken  mainly  due  to  other 
reasons,  and  that  in  addition  data  protection  measures 
would  partly  bring  on  considerable  and,  in  certain 
circumstances,  even  over-compensating  positive effects 
for  the  specific  user. 
The  problem  of  possible  distortion  of  international 
competition due  to data protection  is  basically merely 
mentioned  by  the  DPC  as  also  in  general  in Britain.  In 
this  respect  it is  only  the  most  striking  cases  which  are 
treated,  in  which  certain  international  processing  of 
1)  Computer  Talk,  27.6.79,  p  5:  "Although  the  (Law) 
Society's  preliminary  report  on  the  proposals  (of  the 
DPC)  agrees  with  the  recommendations  of  the  committee 
it finds  that  they  are  too  complicated  to  be 
practical  in  the  UK  legal  system  ••••  The  Law 
society  •••  argues  that  the  large  number  of  proposed 
codes  of  practice  and  the  possible  overlaps  between 
them  lead  to  legal  confusion." 
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especially  because  there  exists  no  data  protection 
legislation  in  the  specific  country  which  corresponds  to 
that  of  the  country  of  origin.  l) 
That  these  are  causes  of  distortion  of  international 
competition  due  to  data  protection  is  obvious.  And 
relevant  associations  such  as  the  Business  Equipment 
Trade Association  (BETA)  and  the Computing  Services 
Association  (CSA)  insisted  in  their  comments  that  future 
British  legislation  be  harmonised  with  that  of  other 
countries  and  international  agreements.  2) 
However,  signs  or  even  only  fears  that distortions  of 
international  competition  caused  by  data  protection  costs 
which  are  of  practical  significance  can  occur  cannot  be 
clearly  seen  from  the  report  of  the  British DPC. 
Obviously  such  fears  have  not  been  expressed,  or  at  least 
not  substantiated,  either  in  the  comments  of  the  British 
industry  to  the  committee. 
1)  In  this  case  it is  a  question  of  the  continually 
quoted  few  decisions  of  the Swedish  Data  Inspection 
Board  not  to  permit  certain  processing  of  Swedish 
data  in  England  or  the  export  of  personal  data  from 
Swedish  subsidiary  companies  to  foreign  parent 
companies.  Cf.  Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978, 
paragraph  4.58,  p  34~  paragraph  4.58,  p  34J  paragraph 
27.08,  p  246~  also  paragraph  27.16,  p  248  where  in  a 
footnote Transnational  Data  Report,  vol  1,  no  3  June 
1978,  p  4  is  given  as  the  source. 
2)  Cf.  Committee  on  Data  Protection  1978,  paragraph 
27.22,  p  249. 
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Although  the  USA  does  not  have  general  legislation 
encompassing  both  the  public  and  the  private  sector,  the 
American  data protection and  data security debate,  as 
well  as  experience  in  various  sectors,  have  given 
essential  insight  into  the  question  of  data  protection 
costs.  The  following  statements  cannot  therefore  cover 
the  American  discussion  and  the  various  experiences  in 
their  full  breadth. 
We  shall  therefore  in  the  main  dispense  with  going  into 
the  individual  cost  estimates  which  private  industry  and 
its  representatives  made,  especially  in  the  numerous 
parliamentary hearings  on  various  data  protection  laws. 
In  this  respect  reference  is  made  to  the  evaluation  of 
the  corresponding  statements  in  Britain  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany. 
The  various  sector  or  individual  state  legislations  (such 
as  the Fair Credit Reporting  Act,  for  example)  cannot  be 
gone  into either.  This  lack  seems,  in  the  main,  however, 
not  to  be  serious.  On  the  one  hand  (as  far  as  can  be 
seen)  there  are  no  comprehensive  representative  figures 
etc.  available  anyhow,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  certain 
pertinent  statements  and  experience  have  been  integrated 
into  the  considerations  presented  here.  The  value  and 
representativeness  of  the  statements  made  here,  which  are 
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to  be  basically assured. 
4.3.2.1  Data  security debate 
By  international  comparison,  the  American  data security 
debate,  which  has  already  been  in progress  for  some  years 
together  with  its  ramifications  in  areas  such  as  computer 
crime,  military security,  electronic funds  transfer, 
cryptography etc.  seems  to  be. especially  broad.  l)  To 
the extent  that data security is to  be  regarded  as  part 
of data  protection  and  costs  aspects  are  touched  upon, 
the  American  data  security debate  is  in principle  of 
interest within  the  scope  of  the  considerations  presented 
here.  2> 
Insofar  as  the  various  contributions  to  this  debate  are 
not  too  technical  and  do  not  have  mathematical,  software 
or  engineering  approaches  as  their  theme  ("data  security 
engineering"),  3)  their essential merit with  regard  to 
cost  aspects  lies  in  a  general  analytical  structuring  of 
data security efforts  and  the  corresponding  costs.  4> 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Cf.,  for  example,  the  various  publications  by  Turn 
and  the  publications quoted  in  them.  Cf.  also-siOwne 
1976. 
Cf.  in  particular Turn  1973;  Turn  1976a;  Turn/Shapiro 
1972;  Turn  1974a;  Turn  1974b;  IBM  1974; 
Woodward/Hoffmann  1974;  Chastain  1973;  Nielsen  1975; 
Nielsen/Ruder/Brandin 1976;  Anderson  Company  1976; 
Hennings  1976. 
Cf.,  for  example,  Turn  1974a. 
Cf.,  for  example,  Turn  1976a,  pp  248-250;  Turn  1974b, 
pp  63-69,  pp 101-lra:-
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low-cost  security strategies.  l)  Often  concepts  such 
as  "cost of  safeguard~",  "value  of  the  (endangered) 
information  for  the data  bank  holder  or  the  intruder", 
"likelihood of intrusion"  are  used  without  a  precise 
definition,  going  beyond  structuring  and  rough  appraisal, 
being  attained  through  this.  2) 
Accordingly,  only  a  few  solitary partial  estimates  are 
made  which  do  not  in  any  way  permit  appraisal  of  the 
entire  data  security costs  - quite  apart  from  the  fact 
that  in  the  abstract  and  in  general  it is  not  possible 
anyhow.  3) 
1)  Cf.,  for  example,  the  Protector-Intruder  Interaction 
Model  of Turn/Shapiro  1972. 
2)  Cf.  IBM  1974,  pp  101-118. 
3)  Turn/Shapiro  1972,  pp  442-443,  on  the  basis  of  other 
sources  gives  the  following  information:  Cost  of 
software  implementation  of  (relatively  sophisticated) 
access  controls  in  operating  systems: 
Main  memory  requirements:  10-20%,  programming  time 
5%,  operating  systems  code:  10%,  recurrent  CPU  time: 
5-10%. 
Computing  time  requirements  for  applying 
(substitution  type)  privacy  transformations  to  10-bit 
characters  in  a  CDC  6600  computer  (percent  of 
databank  operating  system  overhead):  One-time  Vernam 
ciphering:  0.66%,  Vigeu~re ciphering  (table  lookup): 
3.5%  Vigeuere  (table  lookup):  6.3%. 
Chastain  1973,  p  116  comes  to  the  result,  "security 
software  should  not  degrade  performance  by  more  than 
5-10%".  He  adds,  "the  determination  of  the  actual 
effect  of  security  software  may  be  a  complex  and 
costly  job."  And  Anderson  Company  1976,  p  1  comes  to 
the  conclusion,  "After  reviewing  the  availability  of 
data  that  could  be  used  in  determining  costs  of 
computer  security,  it was  concluded  that  it would  be 
impossible  to  obtain  comprehensive  cost  data  for 
every  item  that  might  contribute  to  computer  security 
cost." 
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is of  indicative  value  here.  It shows  how  carefully  the 
cost estimates presented  by  interested parties with 
regard  to  data protection in  general  and  to  data security 
in particular  have  to  be  regarded.  If  in  the  field  of 
data security,  i.e.  a  rather  technical  field  where 
mathematical  precision is  expected  by  the  outsider,  it is 
practically  impossible  to  arrive  at  a  general  or  at  least 
specific definition  or  even  an  approximately  precise 
appraisal  of effort  and  costs,  then  this will  be  probably 
less possible  in  the  more  comprehensive  field  of  data 
protection. 
A  further  important  aspect  in  this  connection  concerns 
the question  of allocation  of  data security costs  to data 
protection  in general.  In  this  case it can  be  clearly 
stated  that  the  American  data  security  and  computer 
security research  and  debate  in  their  coming  into  being 
and  also  in  their  further  course  are  fully  separated  from 
the  data protection aspect.  The  prime  motivating  aspects 
include  (apart  from  the  military  sphere)  in particular: 
protection against general  computer  crimes  (fraud, 
sabotage,  espionage  etc.) 
protection  of  the  technical  data  processing  and 
telecommunications  equipment  as  the  vital 
infrastructure 
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goods,  or  as  the  essential basis  for  the  activities of 
private  and  public  organisations. 
The  driving  force  behind  the  constantly  increasing 
endeavours  to  protect  computer  and  telecommunication 
equipment  and  the data is quite  obviously  not  personal 
data  protection  but  the  general  need  of private  and 
public organisations  to protect,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
economic  values  concerned  and·,  on  the  other  hand~  their 
action capability.  In  view  of  the  lack  of  data 
protection  legislation  in  the  USA  which  is generally 
obligatory for  the  private sector,  the  intensive  interest 
and  the  multifarious  activities with  regard  to  computer 
security can  only  be  explained  by  this.  l) 
4.3.2.2  Analys~, of  the Goldstein  privacy  estimation 
model 
One  of  the  probably  most  comprehensive  systematic  studies 
on  the cost effect of data protection  is  the  "privacy 
cost estimation model"  which  was  developed  by 
Robert  C Goldstein  in  the  form  of  a  mathematical  computer 
simulation  model  and  used  for  estimating  the  cost effect 
1)  Cf.,  for  example,  the  report  by  Pantages  1976  on  a 
"Computer  Security Conference"  of  the  Computer 
Society Institute. 
2)  The  following  analysis  of  the  Goldstein  model  is  a 
revision of Hogrebe  1979,  pp  492-503. 
4-64 of  a  number  of different data protection  regulations  on 
the  personal  data  information  systems  of  six selected 
data processing  users.  l) 
4.3.2.2.1  Structure  and  function  of  the  model 
Since  the  original  purpose  of  the Goldstein  "impact 
model"  consists  in evaluating  the  cost  effects of 
specific· alternative data protection  laws,  20  individual 
data protection  "regulatory  requirements"  were 
formulated,  in  the  course  of  analysis  of  a  large  number 
of  various  (American)  data protection  laws  which  had  been 
proposed  or  already  passed,  in  such  a  way  that  supposedly 
each  of  the  data protection  laws  considered  can  be 
regarded  as  a  definite  combination  of  these  20  regulatory 
requirements.  2>  These  requirements  contained  in  this 
way  in  the  "impact  model"  form  (condensed  in  each  case) 
the  list given  in table  4.5. 
1)  Cf.  Robert  C Goldstein  l975a:  The  Cost  of Privacy: 
Operational  and  Financial  Implications  of  Data  Bank 
Privacy  Regulation,  150  pp. 
Cf.  also  the  brief  summaries  in Goldstein  1975c, 
Goldstein  1975b,  Goldstein/Nolan  1975  and  Lobel 
1975. 
2)  There  are,  however,  data protection  laws  in  existence 
or  conceivable  which,  particularly  from  the  point  of 
view  of  costs,  do  not  completely  appear  as  a 
combination  of  these  20  requirements.  For  this  see 
also  the  criticism of  the Goldstein  "impact  model" 
below. 
4-65 .  .  1) 
Proposed  Privacy  Requirements 
The  operator  of  ~ Personal  Data  System  shall: 
Subject  Access  Requirements 
Record  Existence  Notification /5/: 
Notify  annually  each  subject  of  the  existence  and  content  or  his  record. 
Record  Existence  Inquiry  /6/: 
Respond  to  inquiries  from  data  subjects  concerning  the  exi$tence  and 
aontent  of  their  records. 
- Record  Uses  Inquiry /7/: 
Respond  to  inquiries  from  data  subjects  concerning  the  uses  of their 
records. 
- Data  Ac_curacv  Inquiry  /10/: 
Respond  to  complaints  from  Jata  subjects  concerning  the  accurancy  or 
their·  records. 
Subject  Control  Requirements 
Data  Su~  Obligatory  Notification  /1/~ 
Notify  each  subject  whether·  he  is obliged  to  provide  data. 
Consent  for  Additional  Uses  /2/: 
Obtain  the  "'-'nsent  of the  Jata subject  for  each  use  of  the data. 
- Consent  to Transfer  Data  /1~/: 
Obtain  the  consent  of  the  data  subject  before  transferring data  to  a  less 
protected  system. 
Data  Usage  Requirements 
•  Check  Usage  Authorization /3/: 
Check  the  author! !at  ion  of  each  request  for  data. 
- Maintain  Usage  Log  /4/: 
Maintain  a  log  of all  accesses  to  personal  data. 
- Subject  Claim  Dissemination  /12/: 
Include  tile  data  subj•ct 's statement  with  any  release  of disputed  data. 
- Retroactive  Claim  DisSemination  /131: 
Send  the  subject'  a  .statement  to  all  past  recipients  of  disputed  data. 
- Record  Transmission  /14/: 
Assure  that  any  system  to  which  data  is  transmitted  wUl  provide 
ade~uate protection. 
- Legal  Process  Not1ficltion  /16/: 
Notify  the  subject  before  data  is  released  in  compliance  with  legal 
process. 
Operating  Procedure  Req.!!.!_re_ments 
Data  Accuracv  181: 
Assure  the  a~~uracy and  completeness  of  the  records. 
- Additiondl  Data  /9/: 
Include  any  ddJitional  data  needed  to  give  a  fair  picture. 
Subject  Claim  Storage  /11/: 
Store  a  subject's  statement  of  dispute  with  his  record. 
Ph y s 1  c a 1  Sec'.!! i t y  /17  I : 
Protect  against  threats  and  hazards  to  the  security of  the  data. 
- Employee- Tr3.~..!]_1ng  /18/: 
Train  all  users  in  appropriate  privacy  procddur~s. 
System  Assurance  /19/: 
Assure  that  his  system  meets  all  of  the  requit'ements. 
Public  Note  ;20/: 
Publish  a  descr·ipt ion  of  his  system where  it  wi 11  be  seen  by  most  data 
subjects. 
Table  4.5  Individual  privacy  requirements  taken  into 
consideration in  the Goldstein  Impact  Model. 
1)  The  condensed  wording  given  here  and  the  division  into 
C
fofur  c
1
ategories  are  taken  from  Goldstein 1975c,  p  68 • 
•  a  so  Goldstein  1975a,  pp  32-100. 
4-66 After  the  (hardware,  software  and  orgware)  micro-
operations  required  in  each  case  had  been  specified  for 
'  ' 
each  of  the  data protection  requirements,  the  type  and 
volume  of  the  corresponding  system  resources  required  by 
the  micro-operations  were  defined  for  each  individual 
requirement  by  means  of  a  differentiated empirical 
survey.  In  combination  with price  information with 
regard  to  the  various  resources,  the  model  can  in  this 
way  determine  the  entire cost  impact  of  the  individual 
requirements.  l)  The  system  resources  (also  called 
"functional  elements"  by  Goldstein)  required  when  doing 
this  are  divided  into  five  main  categories within  the 
framework  of  the  impact  model  2> : 
manpower 
data storage 
computer  processing 
data  transmission 
capital. 
Each  of  these  categories  is further  subdivided  in  order 
to  take  into ?Ccount  the  differences  in performance  and 
cost  between  the  individual  resources.  In  addition,  the 
1)  For  this  see Goldstein  197Sa,  pp  17-18,  and  also 
Lobel  1975,  p  938. 
2)  Goldstein  1975a,  p  19.  This  division  is contrary  to 
the  usual  division of natural  cost categories  which 
differentiates  between  labour  costs,  material  costs, 
capital costs,  outside  service  costs  and  taxes;  it 
appears  here,  however,  to  be  fairly  adequate.  For 
the  usual  division  of  cost categories  see Mellerowicz 
1973,  pp  36-42. 
4-67 model  differentiates  between  one-time  conversion costs  (5 
functional  elements)  and  operating extra costs due  to 
data protection  (11  functional  elements). 
In  theory it is possible  that  each  of  the  individual 
regulatory  requirements  can  use  any  combination  of  the  16 
functional  elements.  Which  one  is actually  required  by 
a  certain  individual  requirement  and  to  what  extent  is 
determined  by  the  impact  model  (as  already  implied) 
depending  on  the  characteristics  (differently described 
by  means  of  29  "system attributes")  of  the  information 
system considered  in  each  case.  l) 
4.3.2.2.2  Application  of  the  model 
The  impact  model  was  tested  on  a  group  of  six existing 
data  banks  which  were  selected  in  such  a  way  that with 
regard  to  the  whole  of  the  (large  automated)  data  banks 
carrying personal  data  a  relatively high  degree  of 
representativity was  attained. 
The  six systems  are  characterised  in outline  as 
follows:- 2> 
1)  For  the  individual  "system attributes"  see Goldstein 
197Sa,  p  23.  See  also  in  general  the  brief 
description of  the  model  in Goldstein  1975c; 
pp  68-69. 
2)  Cf.  with  the  characteristics of  the  six  systems 
studied,  Goldstein  197Sa,  pp  29-31. 
4-68 System  1  with  stored  treatment  records  for  approx.  1 
million persons  is  operated  for  a  large  network  of 
hospitals.  Batch  operation,  data  (between  3000-4000 
million  characters)  on  magnetic  tapes:  weekly  processing 
for  updating  and  a  large  variety  of  reports:  almost 
exclusively  aggregated  statistical outputs  for  management 
reports  and  planning;  data  on  individual  persons  is  very 
~arely called  up. 
System  2  is operated  by  a  state government  agency  as  an 
on-line  system  for  identifying  about  1.5 million persons 
arrested  in  the  state  in  question  and  can  be  called  up  by 
all police  organisations  of  the  state  and  partly  by 
neighbouring  states.  Connected  to  the  National  Crime 
Information  Centre  (NCIC)  and  to  the  National  Criminal 
History  System  (NCHS)  of  the  FBI. 
System  3  is  a  state  law  enforcement  system with  on-line 
data files  on  all car  registrations  and  driving  licences 
of  the  state_ (about  18  million)  and  also  a  data  file  of 
approx.  30,000  outstanding arrest warrants  and  car  theft 
notices.  Each  policeman  of  the  state  can  either  have  the 
data  base  searched  for  a  stated car  registration 
indirectly via  fixed  terminals  or  himself  search  directly 
via mobile  terminals. 
System  4  is  operated  by  a  large  consumer  credit 
information organisation.  The  credit  information 
supplied  by  the  subscribing  retail  firms  is  stored  in  an 
4-69 on-line  system  and  can  be  called  up  by  telephone  via  a 
terminal  operator  or  directly via  a  small  terminal  in  the 
store. 
System  5  is  an  on-line personnel  information  system 
covering  10,000  employees  which  enables  the  interactive 
calling  up  of  information  concerning  individual 
employees.  Current  function:  payroll  and  similar  work; 
also planned  for  the  future:  personnel  evaluation  and 
capability  inventory. 
System  6  is an  on-line  system operated  by  a  large 
casualty  insurance  company  and  contains  financial,  legal, 
medical  and  general  descriptive data  on  3.3 million 
policy holders  (mainly  car  insurance)  which  can  be 
interactively called  up  by  branch  offices distributed 
throughout  the  country. 
The  structurally most  important  results  are  listed  in 
extract  form  in  table  4.6  in  such  a  way  that  both  the 
individual  main  resource  costs and  the  cumulative 
financial  total  burden  due  to all  the  individual 
regulatory  requirements  outlined  above  are  visible  for 
the  individual  systems.  In  this  connection  the  values  of 
the  cumulative  total  burden  can  be  basically  understood 
as  being  the  upper  cost  limit.  However,  great  caution  is 
required  in  interpreting this  information,  as  will  be 
shown  in  more  detail  below. 
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Notes  to  table  4.6 
1  Source:  Goldstein  1975a,  p  31,  figure  3  (columns  1-7  102,  figure  39 
(columns  8-9};  p  115,  figure  46  (columns  10-13};  the  figures  in 
brackets  in  columns  2,  5  and 9; columns  14-18 are  our  own 
calculations  on  the  basis  of  the  figures  of  figure  39,  p  102. 
a}  designates,  for  figure  3,  p  31,  deviating  figures  which  are 
obviously errors  and  have  been  corrected  in  accordance  with  the 
figures  on  pp  30  and  113  respectively. 
b)  designates,  for  figure  39,  p  102,  deviating  figures  which  are 
obviously  errors  and  have  been  corrected  in  accordance  with  the 
figures  on  pp  108,  111  and  113  respectively. 
c)  designates,  for  figure  46,  p  115  deviating  figures  which  have 
been  given  as  45%  and  22%  and  are  obviously  errors,  and  have 
been  recalculated  in  accordance  with  information  from  figure lr 
p  31  and  figure  39,  p  102.  Goldstein 1975b,  p  16,  himself 
corrects  the  value  for  system  no  2  and  gives  222%. 
d)  designates  such  information  from  figure  46,  p  115  which  does  not 
agree  with  the  specific  information  in  figures  40-45,  pp  105-
112,  given  for  the  six  individual  systems;  the  values  found  by 
our  own  recalculations  are  merely  added  in  brackets  since  they 
are  based  only  on  the  value  already  rounded  off  in  columns  2,  5 
and  9  and  are  therefore  not  necessarily more  exact  in  every 
case. 
2  This  value  (as  also  the  corresponding  value  for  the  annual  extra 
costs}  is unusually  high  since  the  information  system  in question 
was  still new  and  had  only  a  limited operating  volume.  57%  of  the 
also  relatively very  high  one-time  costs  (cf.  columns  6,  8  and  10} 
are attributable  to  the  data security measures  required  by  the 
special  sensitivity of  the  data. 
3  This  relatively  low  percentage  is explained,  amongst  other  things, 
by  the  fact  that  this  system  has  especially  high  data  security 
costs,  personnel  training  costs  and  similar  costs.  This  also 
explains  the  high  values  for  the  system  in  columns  12  and  13  (in  the 
case  of  the  latter value  the  low  number  of  data  subjects,  column  2, 
plays  a  role}. 
4  This  relatively  low  percentage  is also  explained  by  an  especially 
high ·proportion  of  data  security costs  of  various  categories. 
5  The  large difference  between  this  value  and  corresponding  value  for 
system  6  (despite practically identical  data  volume  and  transaction 
volume}  amounting  to  0.67  is explained  by  the  fact  that  the  credit 
information  organisation  in  contact with  the  data  subjects  has  very 
high  additional  postage  costs  which  do  not  arise  for  the  insurance 
company  due  to  its continual  normal  postal  contact with  the  data 
subjects.  With  regard  to  the  residual  difference  see Goldstein 
1975a,  p  115.  The  same  applies  for  the  high  annual  extra  costs 
(column  11}. 
6  This  high  percentage  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  58%  of  the  one-
time  conversion  costs  (column  8}  was  charged  for  training  since  the 
system  has  an  unusually  high  number  of  potential  users.  These  costs 
could,  however,  be  passed  on  to  a  large  extent  to  the  organisations 
employing  the  users  to  be  trained. 
4-72 
·,  <~; With  regard  to notification,  information,  correction 
requests  etc.  by  the  data  subjects  the  following 
parameter  values  are  taken  as  the  basis:  l) 
annual  "record  existence"  notification requests 
= 1%  of  the  records  of  a  data  bank 
"record  usage"  enquiries  =  50%  of  the  record 
existence  notification  requests  (=  50%  of  the 
records) 
cases of dispute  =  50%  of  the  record  usage 
enquiries  (=  0.25%  of  the  records) 
unresolved  and  stored  cases of dispute  =  10%  of  the 
total  cases  occurring  (=  0.025%  of  the  records). 
4.3.2.2.3  Evaluation  and  results  of  the  study 
A  brief evaluation  of  the Goldstein  impact  model 
including  its test application  is  undertaken  in  the 
following  statements.  Without  wanting  to  belittle  the 
essentially positive overall  judgement  with  regard  to 
the  differentiated  systematic  approach  and  careful 
empirical  application with  explicit declaration  of  the 
basic  assumptions  and  limitations,  a  few  brief points 
of criticism and  comments  are  given  here  which  with 
regard  to  the  evaluation  of  the Goldstein  study  are  of 
importance  for  the  wider  considerations  to  be  presented 
here. 
1)  Cf.  with  the  basic  assumptions  of Goldstein  1975a, 
pp  103-104. 
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carried  out  and  which  have  been  pointed  out  repeatedly  by 
Goldste~n himself,  the  necessity  of  a  number  of 
methodological  extensions  and  improvements  of  the  basic 
approach  is  to  be  taken  into consideration  when  carrying 
out  evaluation. 
•- A basic  problem  for  the  evaluation  of  the  test results 
of  the Goldstein  study  for  the  international  data 
protecti~n debate  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  20 
modular  basic  regulatory  requirements  do  not  represent 
every existing or  discussed  data  protection  law. 
A  further  essential point  of  criticism is .formed  by 
the still unsolved  problem  of  comparability  of  the 
cost  burden  determined  for  systems  of  different 
users,  i.e.  in particular  to  what  extent  the  cost 
differences  determined  by  the  impact  model  do  not 
only  rest  on  different  evaluation principles of  the 
basic  costing.  l) 
The  impact  model  does  not  sufficiently differentiate 
between  data protection  costs  in  the  stricter sense 
and  costs  which,  due  to  various  miscellaneous  aspects, 
motivations  and  obligations  (especially data  security 
1)  Thus  Goldstein  1975a,  p  48,  himself  states:  "The 
cost differences,  which  may  be  either  real  or  the 
result of  different  accounting  conventions,  may 
significantly affect  the  apparent  impact  of  a 
requirement." 
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own  benefi~),  arise  anyhow  for  the  DP  user  or  are 
(over-)compensated  by  corresponding  benefits.  Thus, 
numerous  regulatory  requirements  analysed  as  to  cost 
encompass  data  security  elements  which  are  not  due  to 
data protection  in  the  stricter  sense. 
In  general,  Goldstein  (1975a)  shows  certain 
incoherencies  and  calculation errors  in various 
figures.  Thus,  divergences  arise  between  different 
tables  and  also  in  comparison  with  the  figures  stated 
in  the  text.  Apart  from  printing errors,  rounding 
errors  and  mis-calculations,  certain divergences  are 
explained  by  the  fact  that  apparently  figures  from 
different development  phases  of  the  computer  model  are 
used.  Characteristically,  frequent  deviations  of 
varying  magnitude  between  the  figures  in Goldstein 
1975a  and  the  subsequent  statements  by  Goldstein  can 
be  listed.  l) 
In  addition  to  these  aspects  of  method,  and  apart  from 
the  basic problem  of  transferability of  base  data  and 
1)  To  preserve  some  coherency  the  figures  from  Goldstein 
1975a  have  been  taken  as  the  basis  in  the  main. 
Obvious  errors  have  been  cautiously corrected  on  the 
basis  of  these  figures.  Since  these  figures  have, 
however,  the  indicated defects,  no  overall  claim  to 
precision  is  made  here.  Certain  divergences  from 
other  figures  stated  by  Goldstein,  partly corrected 
(and  partly also,  diverging  from  each  other)  in 
other  works  are  unavoidable  but,  in  the  main,  are  not 
decisive.  Cf.  in particular  the  tables  in  Goldstein 
1975c,  pp  66-67;  Goldstein  1975b,  pp  15-16; 
Goldstein/Nolan  1975,  p  66. 
4-75 result data  related  to  American  conditions,  there  arises 
a  special  problem  when  interpreting  the  test  results  of 
the  impact  model  in  regard  to  the  empirical  basis: 
Due  to  the  narrow  empirical  basis  with  regard  to  the 
future  behaviour  of  the  data  subject  and  the 
possibilities of  absorbing  costs  caused  by  data 
-protection  by  ~eans of  adaptation  of  management  policy 
and  by  means  of  technological  progress,  the  dynamic 
aspect of  the  cost-relevant effects  of  future  data 
protection  is clearly  neglected.  Accordingly,  the 
forecasting  value  of  the  specific results  is  reduced. 
However,  although  the  impact  model  cannot  give  any 
general  or  even  any  specific  answer  to  the  question  of 
precise  costs  of  data protection,  it does  give  valuable 
service  in  the  sense  of  "sensitivity analyses".  l) 
1)  The  possibility of  using  the  ••impact  model"  for 
carrying  out sensitivity analyses  becomes  clear  in 
comparison  with  the  result data  from  Goldstein  1975 
analysed  here  and  listed  in  table  4.6  and  with  those 
from  Go~dstein 1975c,  pp  66-67.  There  a  report  is 
made  on  a  simulation  run,  carried  out  with  regard  to 
the  same  six  information  systems,  which  determines 
the  cost  effect of  the  "privacy  requirements"  which 
are  defined  by  the  Federal  Privacy Act  of  1974  which 
is,  however,  basically applicable  only  to  the 
American  Federal  agencies.  In  spite  of  a  few,  partly 
quite significant,  differences,  this  simulation  run 
confirms  the  results  analysed  here  with  regard  to  the 
basic  trend  and  also essential details. 
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can  be  obtained  from  the  specific application  of  the 
' 
"impact  model"  to  the  six  personal  data  banks  are  now 
evaluated  below  with  regard  to  their  basic  consequences 
for  the  different points  of  view  of  the  legislator,  the 
computer  (hardware  and  software)  industry  and  those 
responsible  for  data  banks. 
4.3.2.2.3.1  Data protection cost structure 
The  impact  model  can  (with  the  limitations  imposed) 
assist  the  legislator  insofar  as  it enables  the 
individual  data  protection  requirements  under 
consideration  to  be  arranged  in  accordance  with  their 
cost  intensity,  and  in  this  way  the  discussion  carried 
out  up  to  now  intuitively about  the  economic  expenditure 
connected  with  certain data  protection  regulations  is  put 
on  a  rational  basis.  Thus,  by  using  the  model,  the 
considered  individual  requirements  which  only  cause 
1 )':  "nominal  costs"  can  be  identified.  These  include 
check  usage  authorization/3/ 
maintain  usage  log/4/ 
date  accuracy/8/ 
additional data/9/ 
subject  claim storage/11/ 
subject  claim dissemination/12/ 
data  transfer  consent/15/ 
public  notice/20/ 
1)  With  regard  to  the  specific  percentage  share  of  each 
individual  regulation  in  the  total  data protection  costs  of 
each  system  see Goldstein  1975a,  figure  9,  p  48;  11,  p  53; 
19,  p  69;  20,  p  72;  24,  p  78;  27,  p  81;  31,  p  83;  and  pp  99-
~.  - - - -
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The  most  surprising  thing  in  the  case  of  this  relatively 
comprehensive  list is  the  appearance  of  the  "maintain 
usage  log"  requirement,  i.e.  the  obligation  of  keeping  a 
record of all accesses  and  processing  operations  with 
regard  to data  relating to persons.  Whilst  other  voices 
regard  usage  logging  as  so  expensive  "that it must  be 
regarded  as  the  ultima  ratio  of  the  control  of  observing 
data protection provisions"!),  Goldstein states: 2> 
"Most  striking  is  the  low  cost  of  maintaining  a  usage 
log.  This  is potentially one  of  the  most  useful  of 
the  proposed  regulations  because  it provides  a  lot  of 
information  to  data subjects  and  also provides  a  way 
for  data  system  operators  to  inhibit  improper 
activities  by  their  own  employees.  The  low  cost 
stands  out  because  this  requirement  initially appeared 
quite expensive. 
The  cost  analysis  of  Figure  11  confirms  that  this 
requirement  does  not  impose  a  serious  burden  on  any  of 
the  systems.  The  two  systems  that  show  relatively 
large  unit costs  for  maintaining  a  usage  log  are  those 
with  the  smaller  number  of  subjects.  Usage  log 
maintenance  costs  are  nearly  constant  for  all  the 
systems,  so  it appears  to  be  a  relatively greater 
burden  for  the  small  ones." 
1)  Zimmermann,  0.1976,  p  206 
2)  Goldstein  1975a,  pp  52-53. 
4-78 Percentage  of Total  Annual  Cost 
Privacy  Costs  per  Subject 
System  Conversion  Annual 
1 
2  $  0.20 
3  1%  3% 
4  9%  1)  $  0.60 
- 2)  5  15% 
6  2%  1% 
Table  4.7:  Cost  analysis  - maintaining  usage  log 
Source:  Goldstein  1975a,  figure !!, p  53. 
Given  the  narrow  empirical  basis,  a  final  comment  is  not 
possible  here.  However,  it is  expedient  in  any  case  not 
to exclude  the  logging  obligation  too  quickly  from  the 
area  of potential  data  protection  regulatory  provisions. 
Of  the  regulatory  requirements  tested,  three  provisions 
cause,  in  general,  high  one-time  (conversion)  costs. 3
> 
1)  This  value  is given  in Goldstein 1975a,  figure  43,  p  110 
as  10%:  the.difference  is  probably  due  to  different 
rounding  off. 
2)  This  value  is  given  erroneously  in Goldstein  1975a, 
figure  44,  p  112  as  23%;  for  this  see  also  above  the 
remark  lb),  to  system  5  in  table  4.6. 
3)  For  this  see Goldstein 1975a,  pp  118-120. 
4-79 One-time  costs 
(a)  "data  supply obligation notification"/!/: 
This  provision  causes  high  conversion  costs  since  it 
makes  existing data  acquisition  forms  obsolete.  A 
suitable period  between  the passing  and  the  corning 
into  force  of  a  corresponding  law  would  defuse  this 
problem  to  a  great extent. 
(b)  "physical  security"/17/: 
The  costs  arising  through  this provision  are  the 
highest  of  the  one-time  costs  for  the  reason  that 
many  DP  users  have  neglected  data  security  up  to 
now.  Since,  however,  the  data  bases  are  of  such 
value  for  the  users  that  increased  data  security  is 
necessary  in  any  case  in  their  own  best  interests, 
the  inclusion  of  the  total data  security  costs 
constitutes  a  great distortion  for  data  protection 
costs. 
(c)  "employee  training"/18/: 
Data protection training  costs  can  vary  greatly 
depending  on  the  specific situation:  in  the  initial 
phase  in particular  they  tend  to  be  very 
considerable.  In  the  frequent  cases,  in  which  many 
users  are  not  employees  of  the  organisation 
operating  the  data  bank,  the  costs  can,  in  certain 
circumstances,  be  partly passed  on  to  outside  users 
and  organisations. 
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(a)  "(annual)  record  existence notification"/15/: 
(b) 
Since  this provision has  been  recognised  from  the 
very start  as  being  very  cost-intensive,  the  "record 
existence  inquiry"  provision was  tested at  the  same 
time,  which  as  expected  did  not  fall  within  the  very 
costly  measu~es. 
"record  uses  inquiry"/7/: 
This  provision  can  lead  to  high  costs  in  the  case  of 
large  transaction-intensive  systems  (here:  credit 
information  system  and  insurance  information  system) 
since  larger  and  larger  records  have  to  be  searched. 
If  one  does  not  wish  to  dispense  with  this  provision 
due  to  the  special  importance  for  the  data  subjects 
(for  these  this  is  the  only  means  to  find  out  who 
has  access  to  their  data  and  why),  then  one  could 
consider  passing  on  the  cost,  at  least partly,  from 
the  owners  of  the  system.  Since  in  accordance  with 
the  impact  model  this  type  of  "record  uses  inquiry" 
costs  between  25  and  30  dollars,  a  total  passing  on 
of  the  costs  to  the  inquiring  data  subjects  would, 
however,  have  a  prohibitive effect.  Apart  from 
different  mechanisms  for  passing  on  costs,  a 
reduction  of  these  costs  by  improvement  of  the 
technology  is  therefore  of  special  importance. 
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The  decisive  cost  element  is  the  personnel  cost  of 
dealing  with  complaints.  However,  this  could  at  the 
same  time  give  the  system  operator  a  greater 
incentive  to  improve  the quality of  the  data. 
(d)  "physical  security"/17/  and 
(e)  "system  assurance"/19/: 
These  measures  represent,  on  a  percentage  basis, 
very  high  data protection cost  elements  for  the 
small  systems  no.3  and  no.S,  since  it is  essentially 
a  question  of  costs  which  do  not  correlate with  the 
size of  the  specific  data  bank. 
4.3.2.2.3.2  Industry  aspects 
The  conclusions  which  arise  for  the  computer 
industry  show  data protection  to  be  a  great 
challenge  and  opportunity for  the  development  and 
sales of  new  products  relevant to data protection. 
The  most  important  potentia~ developments  include  l) : 
user  and  terminal  identification equipment 
larger  a'nd  quicker  direct  access  memories 
computers  with  secure  access-checking  devices 
computer  assistance  in  data  protection  training 
automatic  notification systems  and  interactive 
information  systems  for  direct  use  by  data  subjects. 
1)  Cf.  Goldstein  1975a,  pp  122-124. 
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products,  it can  be  reliably expected  that  some  of  the 
data  protection  measures  studied  here  will  clearly  be  able 
to  be  fashioned  less  expensively  in  the  future  than  it 
appears  at  the  present  time. 
4.3.2.2.3.3  User  aspects 
The  fact  that  fairly  effective data  protection  can  to  some 
extent  in  a  specific situation bring  about  considerable 
burdens  for  person-related  data  banks  is  certainly 
unavoidable.  However,  the Goldstein  study  also  shows  a 
few  important  possibilities  for  the  operators  of  data 
banks  to  reduce  the  specific cost  burden  by  data  protection. 
Thus,  after  the  coming  into  force  of  a  data  protection  law, 
the  users will  certainly  be  able  to  an  increasing  degree  to 
call  on  cost-reducing  new  developments  relating  to data 
protection  in  the  field  of  hardware  and  software  products  of 
the  DP  industry.  Goldstein  points  out,  for  example,  that  the 
one-time  conversion  costs  arising  for  programming  in  the  case 
of  systems  which  use  a  data  management  package  are  probably 
considerably  less  than  those  of  other  systems. 
System 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Table  4.8 
Data  Mgmt.  Package?  Programming  Cost  (1000's) 
No  $  180 
No  $  117 
Yes  $  19 
No  $  477 
Yes  $  9 
Yes  $  73 
Impact  of  using  a  data management  package 
Source:  Goldstein  1975a,  figure  50,  p  126. 
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and  business  policy  relating  to  data protection,  will  further 
contribute  to  limiting  the  cost.  For  example,  flexible  and 
fair  dealing with  individual  requests  for  information, 
notification,  blocking  and  erasure  can  in  certain 
circumstances  prove  to  be  a  cheaper  solution.  A  further 
important  element will  be  the  exhausting  of  the  possibilities 
of  any  transferring or  passing  on  of  costs  to  the data 
subjects,  to  other  direct  or  indirect  system users  and  also, 
in principle,  to prices. 
In  addition,  there  is,  technically  in  terms  of  figures,  an 
essential  reduction  of  the  data protection  cost  estimates  by 
observing  the  causation principle of  costing.  The  impact 
model  is not  able  to differentiate  to  what  extent various 
measures  are  to  be  costed  to  data  protection  or  to  what  extent 
they will  (should)  be  taken  in  any  case  in  the  best  interests 
of  the  specific organisation  in  accordance  with  the  principles 
of  orderly data processing  (which  go  far  beyond  mere  data 
security  aspects)  or  with  regard  to  other  aspects,  i.e.  they 
are  not  caused  only  by  data  prot~ction,  and  therefore  cannot 
(to  the  full  amount)  be  regarded  as  costs  of  data  protection. 
To  what  extent  a·  differentiating costing  can  and  must  reduce 
data protection  costs  in  this  case  in  terms  of  figures  (to 
define  a  realistic decision  basis  for  the  legislator)  is 
already  shown,  for  example,  by  the  considerable  proportion  of 
the  costs  (which  can  be  seen  in  table  4.9)  attributable alone 
to  physical  data  security  measures  ("physical  security")  out 
of  the  total  costs  calculated  by  the Goldstein  impact  model. 
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'  t System  Percentage  of  Annual  Cost 
Total  Privacy  Costs  Annual  per Subject 
Conversion 
1  20% 
2  57%  9%  $  0.07 
3  38%  19%  $  1.35 
4  8% 
•  1)  5  81%  30%  $  1.20 
6  35% 
Table  4.9  Cost  analysis  - physical  security 
Source:  Goldstein  1975a,  figure 1!1  p  92. 
A  large  part  of  just  such  security  measures  is,  if  it does 
not  already exist  anyway,  to  be  taken  in  the  best  interests 
of  the  user  (protection  of  the  DP  equipment,  business  data 
etc.)  or  due  to  reasons  other  than  data  protection.· 2 > 
1)  This  value  is  given  erroneously  in Goldstein  1975a, 
figure  44,  p  112  as  46%~  for  this  cf.  also  the  remark 
2)  on  table  4.7  and  lb)  on  system  5  in  table  4.6. 
2)  In  this  connection  see Anderson  Company  1976,  p  2: 
"Goldstein's  study  is  not  especially  useful  even  in 
regard  to  physical  security  because  it assumes  that 
there  was  no  physical  security  before  and  provides  no 
-standards  on  which  to  relate  the  estimated  one-time 
costs  for  securing  a  site." 
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Due  to  various  methodological  and  practical  reasons  the 
Goldstein  results,  as  shown,  cannot  even  be  evaluated  as 
a  fairly  exact  calculation  of  the  data  protection  costs 
actually arising.  The  results generated  by  the  model 
are,  however,  suitable  in  certain  circumstances,  i.e. 
especially  in  the  specific checking  of  the  correctness 
and  significance  of  the  basic  assumptions,  in  the 
specific situation in  the  sense  of sensitivity analyses 
of  a  low  cost data protection strategy at  the  level  of 
the  DP  user.  l) 
The  cautious  evaluation  made  here  of  the  results  of  the 
Goldstein studies  is also  backed  up  by  the  qualifications 
which  Goldstein  himself  has  made  in  the  meantime  with 
regard  to  the  significance of  his  model.  2> 
1)  For  this  see Goldstein  1978,  pp  7-14  and  also  the 
corresponding  review  1n  Data  Processing  Digest,  no.8 
1979,  p  11:  "Because  of  the  many  unproven  assumptions 
in  this  model,  there  is little reason  to  believe  that 
the  specific  cost  figures  produced  will  be  accurate 
for  any  particular organization.  The  real  value  of 
the  model  lies  in  using  it to  compare  alternatives  of 
various  kinds." 
2)  Cf.  the  report  of  Edith  Myers  1977,  pp  240-242: 
"It was  meant  for  comparative  purposes.  The 
comparisons  were  good,  but  the  numbers  it could 
generate  in  an  actual  run  were  not."  And  also  a  new 
modified  model,  "still won't  be  good  enough  to  set  a 
privacy  compliance  budget  with,  but  it will  compare 
alternative  costs  and  be  an  aid  to  improving 
strategies.  Comparisons  will  be  good,  not  the 
numbers!" 
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protection costs  cannot  be  defined  by  means  of  his  model, 
but  decision  aids  for  the  specific  situation  can  be 
prepared  for  defining  a  low-cost data  protection  strategy 
at  user  level.  l) 
1)  Cf.  the  report  of  Edith  Myers  1979b,  pp  79-81: 
"The  use  of  a  model  tends  to  lend  credence  to 
conclusions  reached,  and  as  is  often  said  of 
statistics,  it is possible  to  produce  almost-any 
desired  result  by  proper  manipulation  of  the  input 
data  and  assumptions.  'Different  approaches  will 
result  in  different  costs',  Goldstein  said.  'Just  as 
it is possible  to  use  the  model  to  identify  low  cost 
compliance  technique  for  actual  implementation,  it 
could  also  be  used  to  find  cost  techniques  for 
lobbying  purposes.  For  example,  it will  nearly 
always  be  true  that  'add-on'  compliance  measures will 
cost  more  than  ones  that  have  been  designed  into  a 
system  initially.'  But  models  do  have  their  place  in 
estimating  privacy  compliancy  costs  in Goldstein's 
estimation.  He  believes  that  they  can  be  put  to  good 
use  to  minimize  cost  of  compliance.  This  is  a  valid 
and  potentially very productive  use  of  the  model. 
While  it cannot  be  depended  on  to  give  correct  cost 
estimates  for  specific situations,  it can  be  used  to 
test strategy alternatives  to  see  what  their  relative 
impact  on  costs  would  be.  We  can  also  identify  the 
regulatory  provisions  that  account  for  large 
proportions  of  the  total cost.  Attention  can  then  be 
focused  either  on  achieving  modification  of  those 
provisions  or  on  developing  better  technological 
approaches  to  comply  with  them." 
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the  Goldstein  study  on  the  total burden  due  to data 
protection,  on  the  basis  of  various  stated  reasons  and 
considerations,  are probably  in general  to  be  corrected 
downwards  in  the  main.  In  this  connection  it cannot  be 
denied  that certain interested circles  of  private 
industry  and  their  lobbies  make  out  the  Goldstein  model 
to  be  not  applicable  and  even  dangerous  since,  according 
to  these  voices,  important  cost  factors  have  not,  or  not 
sufficiently,  been  taken  into consideration  and  therefore 
unrealistic,  i.e.  considerably  too  low,  data  protection 
cost estimates  have  been  arrived at.  l) 
4.3.2.3  Experience  with  the  Privacy Act 
In  view  of  the  various,  more  or  less  realistic,  and 
substantially unsystematic  speculations  about  costs  which 
arise  in  certain circumstances  for  private  industry  on 
the  basis  of  existing  or  future  data  protection 
legislation,  the practical experience  of  the American 
Federal  Administration  in  the  ap~lication of  the  Privacy 
Act  is of  special  importance. 
1)  Cf.,  for  example,  the  statement  of  Robinson, 
representative  of  the  Metropolitan  Insurance  Company 
in  Edith  Myers  1976,  pp  181-182: 
"We  tried  to  use Goldstein's  model,  he  said.  It 
didn't work.  He  sees  a  potential  danger  in wide 
distribution  of  the  model  in  that  it could  lead  to 
cost  figures  lower  then  are  realistic  and  could 
refute  industry's  stand  that cost figures  are  almost 
impossible  to get!" 
4-88 4.3.2.3.1  Cost  survey  of  the Office  of  Management  and  Budget 
This  is particularly  true  because  the  results  are 
available  of  a  comprehensive  survey  of  the  Office of 
Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  ori  the  one-time  conversion 
costs  and  operating  costs  which  were  incurred  by  the 
Federal  Administration  up  to  the  summer  of  1976  due  to 
the  application  of  the  Privacy Act. 1> 
Interestingly,  Federal  administration agencies  were 
requested  by  the OMB  within  the  framework  of  a  survey  in 
the  summer  of  1974,  i.e.  before  the  Privacy  Act  was 
passed,  to  draw  up  cost  estimates.  This  survey  was, 
however,  discontinued  due  to  the  following  reasons:  2) 
"preliminary  returns  indicated  that  the  lack  of  agency 
experience  in  implementing  such  legislation precluded 
making  realistic estimates" 
"the  nature  of  the  legislation  being  considered  by 
Congress  was  still evolving" 
"there were  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the 
operational  implications  for  any  given  bill". 
The  OMB  .then  made  a  cautious  rough  estimate  of  the 
application  costs  of  the  then  draft  of  the  law  (H.R. 
16373,  93rd  Congress).  J) 
1)  OMB  1977a;  OMB  1977b,  pp  22-23.  Cf.  also  Privacy 
PrOtection stUdy  Commission  1977b,  pp  39-41. 
2)  OMB  1977a,  p  1. 
3)  According  to  OMB  1977a  there  are  no  considerable  cost 
differences  between  this draft  and  the  Privacy  Act. 
4-89 It was  estimated  in  this  connection  that  "the  cost  of 
implementing  H.R.  16373  would  be  in  the  order  of  $200  to 
$300  million  per  year  over  the  next  four  to  five  years, 
with  an  additional  one-time  start-up cost  of  $100  million, 
which  would  be  expended  within  the  first  two  years  (but 
that)  a  year's operating experience will  be  necessary 
before  greater  precision  in  the  cost  estimates  can  be 
achieved".  1) 
The  survey of  the  OMB  carried  out  in  1976  after  about  one 
year's experience with  the Privacy  Act  arrived,  however,  at 
essentially  lower  cost  estimates.  According  to  these,  the 
one-time  conversion  costs  (start-up costs)  (since  the 
passing  of  the  law  on  1  January  1975)  came  to  only  about 
$29.5 million for  the  Federal  Administration,  whilst  the 
first-year  operating  expenses  came  to  only  about  $36.6 
million.  2)  3> 
1)  OMB  1977a,  p  2  and  appendix  I, ·p  2. 
2)  Cf.  Table  4.10  in  OMB  1977a,  p  S7  cf.  also  OMB  1977b, 
p  23  and  Privacy  Protection Study  Commission-1977, 
pp  39-40. 
3)  It is pointed  out  that  these  figures  are  also  only 
educated  estimates.  The  OMB  made  no  attempt  to  check 
the  basic  figures  of  the  individual  agencies.  OMB 
1977a,  p  3,  itself carefully  shows  the methodological 
inadequacies  and  weak  points of  the  cost  estimates 
submitted,  in particular:  inadequacy  of  the  cost 
accounting  system,  limited  experience  with  the  Privacy 
Act,  difficulty of  including  cost  savings  due  to  data 
protection. 
4-90 T
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 4.3.2.3.2  Analysis  of  the  results 
The  anlysis  of  the  cost survey  covering  85  Federal 
agencies  l)  permits  a  number  of  interesting 
observations  to  be  made:  2> 
The  publication requirements of  the  Privacy  Act  are  by 
far  the  largest proportion  of  the  one-time  conversion 
costs  ($13.5 million  or  8%).  This  corresponds  on 
average  to  about  $2,000  per  system.  The  expense  of 
preparing  and  publishing  the  appropriate  rules  is 
included  in  these  costs.  $4.4 million,  or  12%  of  the 
total  operating  costs,  were  estimated  for  the 
operating  costs  of  the  publication  requirements. 
Data  protection  training costs  (for  internal  measures 
such  as  attending  courses  of  the  Civil  Service 
Commission)  formed  the  second  largest proportion  of 
the  conversion  costs  ($6.8  million or  23.6%). 
The  general  administration costs  (including  the 
various  reporting  requirements)  were  the  third largest 
proportion  of  the  conversion  costs  at 12.7%  and 
represented  11%  of  the  operating  costs. 
The  largest proportion  of  the  operating  costs  was 
formed  by  the  granting  of  information  to  data  subjects 
(granting  individuals  access)  ($10.7  million  or  29.2%). 
1)  Cf.  table  4.11  taken  from  OMB  1977a,  appendix  III,  pp 1-2. 
2)  Cf.  OMB  1977a,  pp  4-8 
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I  pp.  1-2. 
.  ,  .. ... :  ·-~~  ........  ,  ........... However,  the  recording  of disclosure of data  (keeping 
records  to  account  for  disclosure)  came  to  nearly  the 
same  amount  at  $9.4  million  or  25.7%,  and  therefore 
this proportion  was  considerably  higher  than 
expected. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  costs  for  additional data 
security measures  were,  contrary  to  expectations,  only 
~.4%  {$2.1  million)  of  the  conversion  costs  and  indeed 
only  3.7%  ($1.3 million)  of  the  data protection 
operating  costs.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  fact 
that  some  agencies  with well  run  systems  had  to  take 
only  minor  additional  security  measures  at  merely 
marginal  costs whilst  other  agencies,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  not  yet  adequately  met  the  data  secuity 
requirements  of  the  Privacy  Act. 
The  cost savings  shown  in  the  survey  due  to  the 
reduction  of  personal  data  maintained  by  Federal 
agencies  caused  by  date  protection  are  not 
significant.  This  may  be  explained,  on  the  one  hand, 
by  the  difficulty  of  determining  whether  and  to  what 
extent  systems  were  reduced  or  not  set  up  at all  due 
to  the  Privacy Act.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
administration agencies  concentrated  at  the  start more 
on  their  publication  obligations  and  less  on  the 
reduction  of  the  amount  of  personal  data  maintained.  l) 
1)  OMB  1977a,  p  6;  cf.  also  OMB  1976,  p  12. 
4-95 In  the  subsequent  period  {1975-1976),  however,  a  slight 
net  reduction  by  34  million  records  occurred. ·  This 
reduction  is,  however,  to  be  estimated higher  looked  at 
relatively  in  view  of  the  general  trend  to  increase data 
volume,  especially  since  in  the  same  period  the  number  of 
Federal  agencies  has  increased  by  11  and  the  number  of 
personal  data  systems  of  the  Federal Administration  has 
increased  by  30.  l)  The  same  tendency  is  to  be  found 
for  1977.  The  partly  considerable  reductions  in  a  few 
large agencies  were  somewhat  more  than  compensated  for  by 
growth  in  the  case  of  other  agencies.  2> 
Apparently  it can  be  assumed  that  in  this  respect  there 
is still a  very  high  potential  for  further  reductions  of 
data maintained.  Thus  also  Bert  Lance,  Director,  Office 
of  Management  and  Budget:  3> 
"While  I  believe  the  Act  has  served  to  improve  the 
administration  of  personal  record  keeping,  I  question  the 
Government's  need  to maintain  more  than  6,700  personal 
data  systems  containing  almost  3.9 billion  records. 
Therefore,  I  have  initiated a·project  to  reduce  the 
number  of  personal  data  systems  maintained  by  agencies, 
the  number  of· individuals  on  whom  records  are  maintained 
and  the  amount  of  information  maintained  on  each 
individual."  4> 
1)  OMB  19 7 7  b ,  p  2 • 
2)  OMB  1978,  pp  2,  4  and  7. 
3)  OMB  19  7 7 b,  p  111 • 
4)  With  regard  to  corresponding  specific efforts  by 
various  agencies  see  Privacy  Protection Study 
Commission  1977b,  pp  51-55. 
4-96 In  addition  to  these  overall  results,  a  comparative 
analysis  of  the  data  protectio~ cost  estimates  of  the 
individual  administration  agencies  is  very  instructive. 
The  basis  for  this  is table  4.12  in  particular,  which 
gives  (broken  down  into  the  individual  agencies 
concerned)  the  data  protection  cost  figures  for  21  "major 
record-keeping  agencies"  summarised  in  table  4.10.  This 
shows  (as  also  from  table  4.13,  4.14  and  4.15)  a  quite 
• 
exceptional  concentration on  a  very  small  number  of 
agencies  both  from  the  aspect  of  the  number  of  personal 
data  systems  and  volume  of  data  maintained,  and  also  from 
the  aspect  of  data protection costs  and  in  particular  the 
amount  of  information  requested  by  data  subjects.  In  the 
following,  only  a  few  of  the  most  striking  elements  are 
discussed: 
48%  of  the  total  operating  data  protection  costs  of 
all connected  agencies  fall  to  the  Department  of 
Defense,  which  operates  about  one  third  of  personal 
data  systems.  This  is attributed  to  the  geographical 
dispersion  of  the  operations  of  the  Department  of 
Defense  and  to  the  characteristics  of  the  data  subject 
(i.e. military  and  civilian personnel,  who  know  and 
can  e~sily look  after  their  rights  on  information), 
whereas  other  agencies  have  very  centralised  data 
banks,  whose  data  subjects  are  less  aware  of  the 
Privacy Act.  l) 
1)  OMB  1977a,  p  6. 
4-97 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
T
a
b
l
e
.
4
.
1
2
 
C
o
a
t
 
o
f
 
I
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
 
t
h
e
 
P
r
i
v
a
~
 
A
c
t
 
o
f
 
1
9
7
4
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
2
1
 
M
a
j
o
r
 
R
e
c
o
r
 
-
K
e
e
p
i
n
g
 
A
g
e
n
c
i
e
a
 
S
t
a
r
t
-
U
p
/
 
A
J
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
D
e
f
e
n
s
e
 
C
a
n
a
l
 
l
o
n
e
 
l
n
t
e
r
l
o
~
 
.
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
C
O
n
n
e
r
c
e
 
H
E
W
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
$
1
 
5
,
1
9
8
 
$
1
9
5
,
2
7
9
 
$
t
,
s
o
o
,
9
6
6
 
$
1
6
6
,
6
8
8
 
$
1
,
1
8
6
,
3
8
8
 
$
1
7
,
 
l
l
l
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
$
8
1
,
4
8
3
 
$
1
4
,
1
2
1
 
$
2
,
3
4
4
,
4
9
0
 
$
5
,
6
1
6
 
$
4
7
1
,
2
2
4
 
$
3
4
,
1
4
1
 
T
r
a
l
n
i
n
q
 
1
2
7
,
9
2
0
 
6
7
,
4
7
6
 
2
,
0
6
3
,
0
3
6
 
2
0
,
1
4
9
 
7
2
1
,
0
1
2
 
3
5
5
,
1
5
4
 
5
2
,
2
0
5
 
1
0
,
2
6
3
 
1
,
9
6
5
,
1
7
7
 
9
0
1
 
4
2
3
,
4
1
3
 
5
2
,
1
'
7
1
 
C
r
a
n
t
l
n
q
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
1
1
,
6
3
4
 
1
1
,
8
7
6
 
1
3
2
,
6
9
7
 
5
0
 
3
2
9
,
6
2
6
 
3
,
2
9
4
 
3
9
,
6
4
1
 
2
8
,
8
7
1
 
3
,
1
0
5
,
8
8
4
 
2
4
,
1
8
7
 
7
5
5
,
0
7
1
 
1
1
,
2
1
5
 
.
,
:
:
.
.
 
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
a
 
1
,
5
7
7
 
1
0
,
7
2
8
 
1
0
0
,
6
7
9
 
0
 
3
7
,
8
2
1
 
1
,
0
3
5
 
I
 
"
"
 
3
,
5
0
0
 
1
5
0
 
1
,
7
0
6
,
6
7
2
 
8
,
2
9
1
 
6
2
,
0
0
9
 
1
,
1
'
7
1
 
c
o
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
~
1
 
2
0
,
9
2
0
 
1
1
,
8
6
0
 
5
7
5
,
7
7
6
 
·
4
,
5
0
5
 
3
6
2
,
8
7
0
 
7
5
,
3
3
0
 
9
,
1
0
3
 
1
2
,
1
9
2
 
3
3
8
,
0
3
4
 
'
'
'
 
4
8
6
,
7
1
1
 
1
1
,
0
4
5
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
1
,
9
7
5
 
4
,
0
5
1
 
-
2
2
8
,
4
2
6
 
0
 
1
1
0
,
2
4
1
 
2
,
2
,
2
 
D
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
 
1
0
,
5
0
7
 
,
 
.
.
 
5
,
8
6
3
,
]
0
0
 
1
,
1
1
3
 
5
2
4
,
1
7
0
 
1
0
,
1
2
2
 
.
.
 
•
U
e
w
 
D
a
t
a
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
9
,
1
6
7
 
1
,
7
7
1
 
0
6
1
,
5
6
6
 
0
 
5
1
,
1
4
1
 
1
3
,
1
2
6
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
7
,
2
4
9
 
1
,
0
0
0
 
1
,
2
4
3
,
5
2
5
 
1
1
,
0
2
'
 
7
1
,
1
9
7
 
·
3
,
1
1
0
 
A
l
l
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
1
0
,
9
8
0
 
l
l
l
,
J
7
]
 
9
1
t
,
l
8
8
 
2
,
5
1
1
 
l
,
t
i
O
,
l
&
O
 
,
,
,
,
,
o
 
5
8
,
4
5
5
 
2
1
1
,
2
2
1
 
9
1
7
,
4
6
7
 
1
,
,
4
,
,
 
1
,
5
0
4
,
7
1
3
 
6
1
,
4
3
4
 
R
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
r
o
.
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
 
-
9
6
0
 
-
1
,
0
0
0
 
0
 
0
 
-
4
,
7
0
1
 
-
2
5
 
S
y
s
l
~
l
b
l
l
 
-
4
0
 
-
4
,
5
4
4
 
-
2
1
,
6
6
3
 
0
 
-
3
,
5
0
0
 
~
s
o
 
E
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
-
1
0
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
.
.
l
t
 
0
 
-
1
0
0
 
-
5
 
.
.
.
 
4
1
,
3
3
1
 
•
3
2
0
 
-
a
o
o
 
-
2
0
 
T
O
T
I
\
t
.
S
 
$
3
6
9
,
0
1
1
 
$
5
1
2
,
4
2
8
 
$
1
2
,
4
4
8
,
0
3
4
 
$
1
9
5
,
9
8
0
 
$
4
,
3
4
4
,
7
3
2
 
1
6
0
6
1
5
7
9
 
$
2
6
1
,
4
0
3
 
$
2
7
1
,
9
5
7
·
 
$
1
7
,
4
2
0
,
5
5
5
 
$
7
6
,
0
5
1
 
$
4
,
2
9
4
,
1
7
8
 
1
9
4
,
1
1
2
 .
.
 
-
-
-
-
·
.
 
~
-
.
.
.
 
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
.
-
-
-
~
 
.
.
.
.
 
d
 
-
-
-
-
-
·
-
-
-
·
-
-
.
.
o
.
t
-
t
-
.
&
·
-
:
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
_
_
_
_
 
_
 
.
 
-
-
·
 
~
~
,
 
.
.
.
 
_
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
_
_
 
.
.
.
.
,
.
_
_
_
_
.
_
_
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
.
.
 
~
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
~
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
-
-
-
.
.
.
 
-
-
-
.
 
,
 
S
t
a
r
t
 
U
p
/
 
J
u
s
t
i
c
e
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
C
I
A
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
T
r
e
a
a
u
p
 
o
a
r
 
o
a
:
~
e
x
:
a
t
 
I
 
D
I
J
 
.
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
$
2
5
9
,
4
1
1
 
$
6
7
,
8
8
1
 
$
5
,
4
0
0
 
s
l
9
o
,
o
o
o
 
$
S
7
9
,
l
S
 
s
l
o
3
,
1
1
9
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
$
1
4
,
3
3
1
 
$
1
4
,
1
4
5
 
$
1
,
4
0
0
 
$
1
6
,
0
0
0
 
,
$
2
9
5
,
1
8
0
 
$
1
0
5
,
0
2
1
 
•
r
r
a
l
n
l
n
9
 
·
 
1
1
6
,
6
2
4
 
6
8
,
8
7
3
 
1
4
,
0
0
0
 
•
3
7
,
0
0
0
 
1
9
1
,
4
1
5
 
2
2
5
,
1
1
5
 
.
 
$
1
9
,
0
7
8
 
1
7
,
9
0
6
 
2
,
0
0
0
 
6
,
4
0
0
 
1
4
1
,
9
1
l
 
l
l
,
t
t
l
 
G
r
a
n
t
i
n
g
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
1
3
,
6
7
3
 
2
;
7
6
0
 
0
 
2
,
5
0
0
 
2
4
5
,
2
0
4
 
5
0
,
2
1
2
 
$
3
,
3
8
4
,
0
4
0
 
1
3
,
5
4
4
 
6
3
0
,
0
0
0
 
1
7
1
,
5
0
0
 
9
7
3
,
4
2
1
 
6
l
,
S
l
t
 
~
 
l
 
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
a
 
5
,
5
2
9
 
,
,
9
2
9
 
0
 
3
,
0
0
0
 
1
6
,
2
3
0
 
2
1
1
,
2
1
C
 
\
0
 
$
1
2
,
6
8
5
 
5
5
0
 
1
0
0
 
8
0
0
 
1
5
2
,
7
4
8
 
7
6
,
1
7
&
 
\
0
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
7
7
,
8
0
6
 
5
2
,
9
8
0
 
5
0
0
 
5
,
2
5
0
 
4
9
,
3
9
2
 
1
9
1
,
6
7
0
 
$
3
0
,
2
3
7
 
1
8
,
5
1
2
 
4
0
0
 
0
 
1
4
2
,
1
7
8
 
9
0
,
t
1
1
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
i
 
n
9
 
f
o
r
 
2
1
,
0
5
6
 
3
9
4
 
4
0
0
 
0
 
1
1
7
,
6
8
8
 
.
,
,
,
.
,
 
D
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
 
$
3
3
5
,
1
7
0
 
6
,
1
3
2
 
4
,
1
0
0
 
6
5
0
 
6
9
0
,
8
0
5
 
1
5
2
,
t
]
l
 
N
e
w
 
D
a
t
a
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
6
6
9
 
6
8
0
 
5
0
 
4
0
0
 
1
9
,
8
1
0
 
J
7
,
5
2
5
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
0
 
1
,
0
1
1
 
0
 
9
0
0
 
1
S
,
7
1
l
 
5
,
,
.
,
2
 
A
l
l
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
4
7
,
9
0
5
 
1
,
5
7
1
 
0
 
l
l
,
O
O
O
 
8
'
7
,
4
3
1
 
1
5
0
,
5
1
7
 
$
2
6
0
,
0
4
4
 
5
,
0
6
0
 
1
0
,
6
0
0
 
4
5
,
1
0
0
 
O
l
t
9
1
9
 
1
5
.
2
,
0
1
1
 
R
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
r
o
a
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
 
0
 
0
 
0
-
0
 
(
4
5
5
)
 
(
J
,
'
7
0
0
)
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
&
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
(
5
,
1
5
1
)
 
E
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
-
1
,
.
4
3
8
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
-
1
5
,
1
7
1
 
-
2
1
 
0
 
-
2
0
0
 
-
3
,
1
0
2
 
-
4
0
0
 
T
O
T
A
L
S
 
$
5
4
1
,
3
1
5
.
 
$
2
0
2
,
0
6
8
 
$
2
0
,
3
5
0
 
.
2
6
t
,
l
5
0
 
$
2
,
0
0
1
,
0
1
'
 
S
l
,
O
i
t
,
4
0
0
 
$
4
,
0
3
9
,
9
1
4
 
$
1
6
,
8
3
1
 
$
6
4
9
,
3
0
0
 
$
2
4
1
,
1
5
0
 
$
2
,
4
9
1
,
1
0
0
 
$
1
2
f
,
4
t
l
 -
~
~
-
~
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
~
·
-
~
~
-
·
-
·
-
-
~
~
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
 
S
t
a
r
t
-
U
p
/
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
G
S
A
 
H
U
D
 
V
A
 
A
C
f
i
O
N
 
e
s
c
 
r
c
c
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
$
)
4
9
,
3
0
0
 
$
1
2
9
,
7
9
3
 
$
6
2
4
,
7
9
3
 
$
5
1
,
3
0
5
 
1
8
4
,
1
0
3
 
S
7
s
,
4
1
s
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
$
1
7
0
,
2
0
0
 
$
1
,
9
5
1
 
$
1
7
8
,
7
4
4
 
$
6
,
0
0
0
 
$
1
0
1
,
5
6
5
 
$
1
9
,
4
4
4
 
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
q
 
2
9
2
,
1
0
0
 
8
0
,
6
4
9
 
7
2
8
,
1
2
8
 
9
,
6
3
2
 
2
2
6
,
6
0
7
.
 
9
,
0
2
&
 
4
3
,
2
0
0
 
1
0
,
6
9
2
 
2
0
2
,
0
3
1
 
.
.
 
1
0
,
9
4
2
 
2
1
,
6
9
9
 
1
,
7
4
2
 
G
r
a
n
t
i
n
q
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
1
2
,
0
0
0
 
5
,
4
0
8
 
'
,
0
2
.
9
 
2
4
6
 
5
3
,
3
4
3
 
,
,
 
2
6
,
2
0
0
 
7
,
2
7
8
 
8
8
4
,
2
3
1
 
2
5
,
9
4
7
 
3
2
9
,
3
6
6
 
1
,
4
0
2
 
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
n
q
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
a
 
1
,
1
0
0
 
6
1
 
5
,
2
0
0
 
0
 
1
1
,
5
2
5
 
7
1
1
 
~
 
5
,
2
0
0
 
1
8
3
 
9
,
2
5
8
 
0
 
3
2
,
6
5
7
 
1
3
4
 
I
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
4
1
,
3
3
1
 
9
8
,
0
2
4
 
5
,
8
0
5
 
1
3
1
,
6
5
7
 
2
,
6
4
1
 
0
 
1
3
1
,
2
0
0
 
0
 
2
5
,
7
0
0
 
7
4
 
3
1
,
&
9
7
 
1
3
0
 
4
0
,
2
5
5
 
s
o
o
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
D
i
e
-
1
5
,
5
0
0
 
.
1
,
2
8
0
 
1
,
2
2
1
 
5
1
 
4
,
8
6
4
 
1
 
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
 
1
3
,
2
0
0
 
l
,
'
l
0
5
 
1
,
5
3
1
,
7
8
9
 
2
,
0
2
2
 
4
,
1
5
1
 
1
2
t
 
H
e
v
 
D
a
t
a
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
2
2
,
3
0
0
 
3
1
6
 
5
9
 
0
 
8
5
,
0
5
0
 
7
,
7
1
7
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
1
1
,
3
0
0
 
2
4
]
 
3
4
,
1
3
7
 
0
 
1
8
,
0
5
0
.
 
0
 
A
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
1
0
5
,
6
0
0
 
2
5
,
1
1
4
 
5
2
,
8
2
7
 
0
 
3
1
,
4
0
9
 
0
 
8
5
,
2
0
0
 
6
5
,
4
6
1
 
5
3
,
3
1
8
 
1
,
3
1
1
 
3
3
,
9
1
4
 
J
S
O
 
R
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
r
o
•
 
-
1
2
,
3
0
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
S
y
a
t
e
 
.
.
.
 
E
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
-
3
0
0
 
-
l
t
2
 
-
3
0
0
 
0
 
-
1
,
9
1
9
 
0
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
-
2
0
 
0
 
0
 
~
4
4
 
-
2
2
,
4
4
6
 
0
 
-
1
6
4
 
-
s
o
 
T
O
T
A
L
S
 
$
9
1
6
,
8
0
0
 
$
2
8
3
,
9
6
0
 
$
1
,
5
1
1
,
2
8
1
 
$
&
7
,
0
3
9
 
$
7
4
0
,
5
3
1
 
$
9
5
,
7
3
]
 
$
)
7
9
,
9
0
0
 
•
•
 
,
,
7
5
1
 
$
2
,
9
0
2
,
5
2
9
 
$
t
6
,
.
3
5
t
 
$
5
7
9
,
5
1
1
 
$
2
9
,
8
5
1
 -
-
-
·
-
.
 
-
-
·
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
-
-
-
-
~
 
.
.
 
~
~
-
~
·
w
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
S
t
a
r
t
 
U
p
/
 
P
o
s
t
a
l
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
S
E
C
 
S
B
A
 
'
r
O
'
l
'
A
L
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
0
8
,
0
4
4
 
8
,
8
5
1
 
1
1
0
,
0
0
0
 
1
2
,
6
2
1
,
4
2
1
 
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
1
·
5
,
1
2
5
 
1
,
4
6
9
 
5
0
0
 
4
,
1
5
1
,
3
6
2
 
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
C
J
 
2
6
1
,
5
9
2
 
2
5
,
1
3
5
 
0
 
6
,
 
3
4
1
,
3
9
3
 
1
0
8
,
5
8
5
 
1
1
,
8
1
2
 
0
 
3
,
1
4
1
,
3
9
6
 
G
r
a
n
t
i
n
g
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
·
 
0
 
3
2
5
 
0
 
8
8
0
,
9
5
3
 
2
1
,
3
5
0
 
1
,
4
2
0
 
0
 
1
0
,
5
0
1
,
1
3
7
 
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
0
 
2
,
0
0
0
 
0
 
4
7
2
,
4
0
1
 
o
l
:
:
l
o
 
1
6
,
1
5
0
 
8
0
0
 
0
 
2
,
0
9
0
,
6
4
7
 
I
 
~
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
1
4
,
1
5
7
 
3
5
8
.
 
0
 
1
,
9
3
8
,
1
1
2
 
0
 
4
,
7
5
0
 
8
0
0
 
0
 
1
,
2
1
5
,
1
3
2
 
~
 
1
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
3
,
3
1
5
 
3
,
0
4
5
 
0
 
6
3
3
,
1
7
7
 
1
 
D
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
 
1
5
4
,
0
2
0
 
-
1
1
,
5
5
2
 
0
 
9
,
3
1
9
,
4
3
3
 
N
e
w
 
D
a
t
a
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
0
 
4
,
8
0
0
 
0
 
1
,
1
1
6
,
9
4
4
 
·
t
 
-
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
0
 
6
,
5
4
0
 
0
 
1
,
4
9
0
,
9
]
2
 
!
 
A
l
l
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
2
0
0
 
1
4
,
6
8
'
 
0
 
3
,
2
3
3
,
5
1
6
 
3
7
,
2
1
5
 
2
1
,
9
0
1
 
1
1
,
5
0
0
 
3
,
6
3
4
,
8
7
1
 
R
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
r
o
•
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
•
2
3
,
1
4
8
 
R
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
S
y
s
t
e
-
0
 
0
 
0
 
-
3
8
,
1
6
6
 
E
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
-
1
,
5
7
7
 
-
3
,
2
1
4
 
0
 
0
 
-
9
0
 
2
4
5
 
T
O
T
A
I
~
S
 
$
]
8
7
,
3
0
1
 
$
5
9
,
2
0
0
 
$
1
1
0
,
0
0
0
 
$
2
7
,
2
1
3
,
4
9
2
 
$
)
5
4
,
6
3
1
 
$
5
6
,
3
0
0
 
$
1
2
,
0
0
0
 
$
3
5
,
4
5
2
,
4
9
9
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
O
M
B
 
1
9
7
7
a
,
 
a
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
I
I
 
I
,
 
p
p
 
1
-
2
 Table  4.13 
Summary  of Changes  in Personal  Recordkeeping  by Agency 
Agency  No.  of Systems 
l976  1977 
Dept.  of Defense 
Dept.  of  HEW 
Dept.  of the Treasury 
Dept.  of the Interior 
Dept.  of Transportation 
Dept.  of Agriculture 
Dept.  of Justice 
Canal  Zone  Government/ 
Panama  Canal  Company 
Dept.  of Energy* 
Dept.  of Labor 
Securities  & Exchange  Comrn. 
Dept.  of Commerce 
Small  Business Admin. 
General  Services Admin. 
Postal Service 
Fed.  Communications  Comm. 
ACTION 
2,219 
693 
910 
274 
263 
235 
175 
133 
97 
99 
95 
80 
91 
"71 
Central  Intelligence Agency 
Dept.  of Housing  & Urban  Dev. 
Veterans Administration 
69 
61 
57 
58 
52 
Subtotals 
Remaining  agencies 
Grand  Totals 
5,732 
1,021 
6,753 
2,150 
714 
571 
261 
265 
234 
184 
133 
112 
100 
99 
99 
85 
77 
74 
70 
61 
58 
53 
52 
5,452 
972 
6,424 
No.  of Individuals' 
Records 
(in m1.l I 1.ons) 
1976  1977 
321.3 
1,313.0 
990.1 
15.0 
25.0 
28.5 
181.5 
2.5 
23.3 
2.7 
446.8 
2.6 
3.4 
107.7 
9.2 
.9 
.1** 
27.2 
156.3 
3,657.1 
332.7 
3,989.8 
296.7 
1,345.1 
1,006.1 
15.3 
27.4 
31.9 
188.4 
2.4 
7.2 
28.5 
2.7 
432.2 
2.6 
1.6 
97.6 
9.2 
.a 
.2** 
23.1 
159.2 
3,678.2 
337.3 
4,015.5 
*  The  Department of Energy,  created during 1977,  adopted  systems 
of records  from  the Energy Research and  Development Administra-
tion,  Federal  Energy Administration,  Federal  Power  Commission 
and parts of the Department of 'the Interior.  · 
**  The  number of individuals  in many  CIA  systems is classified. 
Source:  OMB  1978,  p  9 
4-102 Table  4.14 
REgUESTS  FOR  ACCESS  TO  RECORDS 
Total  Granted in 
Other!!  Agency  Name  Received  Full or Part  Denied 
Office of Technology Assessment  NRY  NR  NR 
Copyright Office  0  0  0 
Council  on  Environmental  Quality  0.  0  0 
Council  on  Wage  &  Price Stability  0  0  0 
National Security Council  NR  NR  NR 
Office of Management  and  Budget  11  0  0  11 
Office of Special Representative 
for Trade  Negotiations  0  0  0 
Office of Telecommunications  Policy  NR  NR  NR 
Inter-American Foundation  1  0  1 
Overseas Private  Investment Corp.  0  0  0 
Agency  for  International Develop.  NR  ~R  NR 
Department  of  Agricultur~  NR  NR  NR 
Department  of Commerce  4,679  4,620  ~9 
Department  of Defense  258,471  257,108  32 
Panama  Canal  Co./Canal  Zone  Gov't.  697  692  5 
Dept.  of Health,  Education  & Welfare  149,277  127,498  124 
Department  of the  Interior  494  491  3 
Department  of Justice  37,618  19,145  336 
Department  of Labor  2,023  2,017  6 
Central  Intellige~ce Agency  3,621  714  124 
Department  of State  1,093  NR  NR 
Department  of the Treasury  2,780  2,544  178 
Department of Energy  90  56  14 
Environmental  Protection Agency  NR  NR  NR 
Department  of Transportation  17,210  17,203  7 
General  Services Administration  5,290  5,286  4 
Dept.  of Housing  & Urban  Develop.  100  96  4 
Nat'l Aeronautics &  Space  Admin.  42  41  1 
Veterans  Administration  922,811  907,3083/  2,210 
ACTION  170  152  19 
Adminis.  Conference of the U.S.  · NR  NR  NR 
Advisory Committee  on  Federal  Pay  NR  NR  NR 
Adv.  Council  on  Historic Preservation  NR  NR  NR 
American  Battle Monuments  Commission  0  0  0 
U.S.  Arms  Control  &  Disarmament  Agency  5  5  5 
Board  for  International  Broadcasting  NR  NR  NR 
Civil Aeronautics  Board  NR  NR  NR 
U.  S.  Civil  Service Commission  2,352  2, 329  23 
Commission  of Fine Arts  2  1  1 
U.S.  Commission  on  Civil  Rights  46  19  27 
Cttee for  Purchase  from  the  Blind  & 
Other  Severely Handicapped  0  0  0 
Commodity  Futures  Trading Commission  4  0  0  4 
4-103 Total  Granted in 
Other1/  Agency  Name  Received  Full or Part  Denied 
Community  Services Administration  35  32  3 
Consumer  Product  Safety Commission  NR  NR  NR 
Equal  Employment  Opportunity Comm.  8  2  2  2 
Farm  Credit Administration  1  0  0  1 
Federal  Communications  Comm.  1  1  0 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corp.  19  18  0  1 
Federal  Election Commission  8  8 
Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  NR  NR  NR 
Federal  Home  Loan  Mortgage  Corp.  NR  NR  NR 
Federal  Labor  Relations Council 
and  Service  Impasses  Panel  0  0  0 
Federal Maritime Commission  NR  NR  NR 
Federal  Mediation &  Conciliation 
Service  0  0  0 
Federal  Reserve  System  51  so  1 
Federal  Trade  Commission  302  298  0  4 
Foreign Claims  Settlement  Comm.  0  0  0 
Harry S.  Truman  Scholarship Found.  0  0  0 
Japan-U.S.  Friendship Commission  0  ·o  0 
Advisory Comrn.  on  Intergovernmental 
Relations  NR  NR  NR 
International  Boundary  and  Water 
Commission  - U.S.  and  Mexico  0  0  0 
International·Trade Commission  0  0  0 
Interstate Commerce  Commission  1  1  0 
Marine  Mammal  Commission  0  0  0 
Nat'l Advisory Council  on  Economic 
Opportunity  NR  NR  NR 
Nat'l Capital  Planning Commission  so  so  0 
Nat'l Center for Quality &  Pro-
ductivity of Working  Life  NR  NR  NR 
Nat'l Credit Union  Administration  23  23  0 
Nat'!  Foundation  on  the Arts  and 
the Humanities  1  1  0 
National  Labor  Relations  Board  112  112  0 
National  Science  Foundation  "Few"  NR  NR 
Nat'l Transportation Safety Board  0  0  0 
Nat'l Transportation Policy Study 
Commission  NR  NR  NR 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  125  124 
Joint  Board  for Enrollment  of 
Actuaries  IS  NR  NR 
Occupational  Safety &  Health 
Review  Commission  0  0  0 
Penn.  Avenue  Development  Corp.  0  0  0 
Postal Service  NR  NR  NR 
Postal  Rate  Commission  0  0  0 
Railroad Retirement  Board  NR  NR  NR 
Renegotiation  Board  0  0  0 
4-104 Total  Granted  in 
Other11  Agency  Name  Received  Full or Part  Denied 
Securities &  Exchange  Commission  54  20  1  33 
Selective Service System  .7,200  7,199  1 
Small  Business  Administration  182  172  12 
President's Commission  on  Personnel 
Interchange  NR  NR  NR 
President's Commission  on  White 
House  Fellowships  NR  NR  NR 
Tennessee  Valley Authority  27  27  0 
Internat'l Communication  Agency  60  NR  NR 
U.  S.  Railway Association  NR  NR  NR 
Water  Resources  Council  NR  NR  NR 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation  6  6  0 
Export-Import  Bank  46  46  0 
TOTALS  1,417,214  1,355,~15  3,203 
!f "Other"  includes requests wi thdr_awn,  cases where  no  record was  fot.md, 
requests still pending at the  end  of 1977,  and  requests returned for 
additional  information,  such  as proof of identity and  not  continued by 
the requestor. 
2/  NR  = Not  Reported 
3/  Includes  amendment  requests. 
Source:  OMB  1978,  pp  26-28 
4-105 Tab.  Lt.15.:  Summary  StHtistics  on  Reaue~t tor Access 
to  Records 
Number  of Total Requests  Number  of Agencies 
·Received 
>  100.000  3 
5 
10.000  - 100.000  2 
1.000  - 9.999  8 
16 
100  - 999  8 
20  ...  99  11 
. - 1  - 19  13 
"  -
"Few"  1  70 
0  20 
Not  reported  25 
. 
Totals:  1.417.2111  91 
. 
Source:  Calculations  on  the  basis  of  table  4.14 
4-106 Costs  for  providing  information  arising  in  only  six 
agencies  (Departments  of  Treasury,  Defense,  Justice 
and  of  Health,  Education  and  Welfare,  the Veterans' 
Administration and  the Central  Intelligence Agency) 
accounted  for  26.5%  of  the  total  operating  data  protection 
costs  of all agencies  and  93%  of  the  total  current 
information  costs.  l)  An  even  higher  concentration 
accrued  in  1977:  more  than  97%  of  the  information  requests 
were  in  respect  of  only  five  agencies  (Departments  of 
Defense,  Justice,  Transportation,  Health,  Education  and 
Welfare,  and  the  Veterans'  Association).  2> 
This  high  concentration of  information  requests  is, apart 
from  the  number  and  size  of  the  affected  systems  and  the 
volume  of  the  data maintained,  in particular  conditioned 
by  the  sensitivity  and  the  general  significance  of  the 
data  for  its subjects.  These  agencies  have  thus  a 
clientele,  a  sort  of  "natural  constituency"  which  is  not 
only  numerous  but  also very  active  in  making  requests  for 
information.  In  the  case  of  the  Department  of  Defense, 
these  are  for  instance  the  mi+itary  and  civilian 
personnel,  while  the  Federal  law  enforcement  agencies 
count  criminals  among  their  "information  clients".  J) 
1)  OMB  1977a,  p  7. 
2)  OMB  1978,  p  25. 
3)  See  Comptroller  General  1978b,  cover  page:  "The  most 
dominant  category  of  requests  identified  by  many  of  the 
agencies  was  individuals  who  have  been  or  are  subjects  of 
Federal  Investigations  by  the  agencies.  Some  of  these 
requesters  were  also  identified  by  agencies  as  being 
criminals. 
4-107 The  number  of  amendment  requests,  on  the ·other  hand, 
is  relatively  small  and  is concentrated  on  only  a  few 
agencies.  These  requests  were  in  the  main  complied 
with  (see  table  4.16). 
4.3.2.3.3  Conclusions 
The  following  conclusions  which  can  be  drawn  from  the 
experience  of  the  Federal Administration with  the Privacy 
Act,  and  particularly  from  the  cost  survey  of  the Office 
of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB),  apply  basically also  to 
private  industry: 
Prior  estimates of data protection costs  can  hardly  be 
more  than  speculative  and  should  be  assessed with 
appropriate  caution.  Because  of  considerable 
methodological  problems,  even  subsequent cost 
calculations  remain  more  or  less  accurate  estimates. 
The  authorities did  not  come  across  insurmountable 
difficulties  in  the  application  of  the  Privacy Act. 
There  were  in general  relatively small  costs.  In  a  few 
agencies  (21)  there  were  quite  remarkable  data 
protection  costs  amounting  on  average  to $1.3 million 
for  conversion,  and  $1.7 million  operating  costs,  per 
agency.  Considering  the  special  characteristics  (scope, 
contents)  of  the  data  bases  in question,  even  those  costs 
appear  rather  as  relatively trifling,  and  in  any  case  as 
reasonable.  The  majority  of  the  authorities  (64) 
recorded  insignificant costs, .averaging  $35,000  for 
conversion  and  $18,000  for  operating .costs  per  agency. 
4-108 • 
Tab.  ~.16:  Summary  Statistics  on  Reauest3  for  Amendments  1977 
(Selection) 
Number  of  Requests  for  Amendments 
Agencies 
Department  of Defense 
Department  of Health, 
Education  and  Welfare 
(Public  Health Service) 
~eterans Administration 
Department  of Transpar-
~ation 
Civil Service  Commission 
Department  or  State 
Peneral  Services 
1Admini3tration 
[
epartment  of  Justi~e 
modiy  FBI  investiga-
ive  records} 
~3 2 
other  agencies 
h  further  a~encies 
I 
Source:  ONB  1978,  p.  308. 
Received 
15.048 
7.295 
102 
3.780 
514 
135 
42 
28 
197 
926 
4-109 
:aranted 
jin  full 
f 
14.939 i 
98 
I 
I 
505 
75 
38 
16 
8 
?ranted I  Denied 
1.n  part 
I 
43  l  64 
l 
i  ~  I  , 
i 
! 
! 
I 
j 
I 
58  131 
P~ndin~ For  all  agencies  {with  consideration  of  the 
applicability of  the  findings  to  the private  sector) 
it must  be  emphasised  that  the  obligations  of 
publication,  which  basically do  not  arise  in  the 
private sector,  account  for  46%  of  total  conversion 
costs  and  12%  of  the  total  operating  costs  of  all 
agencies. 
The  information  and  amendment  requests  do  not  appear 
to  be  the  formidable  problem  that  they  are  often made 
out  to  be.  l)  (Misuse  is  virtually  not  recorded.) 
Seventy  agencies  received  less  than  100,  i.e.  a 
negligible  number  of  such  requests;  sixteen 
authorities  received  a  more  or  less  substantial  number 
of  information  requests  and  only  5  an  extremely 
substantial  number,  without  this  appearing  to  be 
unreasonable  in  the  specific  cases  in question. 
The  relatively minute  number  of  amendment  requests  can 
in  practice  be  disregarded  as  a  cost  factor,  the  more 
so  since  these  requests  are  predominantly  complied 
with,  which  suggests  that  the  positive effect  of  the 
improvement  in quality of  the  data  base  prevails  even 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  agencies. 
1)  See  for  instance  the  speculations  by  Golding  1974. 
4-110 
','(. It is  very  likely  that American  data  protect'ion 
regulations  for  the  private sector  have  or  will  have 
basically  the  same  rather  limited  effects  on  costs. 
Experience,  not  only with  the  Fair Credit Reporting  Act, 
points  in  this  direction.  l)  Any  comment  coming  from 
private  industry  and  suggesting  high  data protection 
costs  is,  apart  from  lobbying,  mainly  attributable  to  an 
inaccurate  assessment  in various  aspects.  2) 
1)  See  e.g.  Whieldon  1979,  p  56: 
"William O.Bailey,  president of  Aetna  Casualty  & 
Surety  Co.,  Hartford,  and  a  member  of  the  Federal 
Privacy Protection Study  Commission  has  found  it hard 
to  identify  any  explicit costs  for  his  company  in 
providing privacy protection of  the  kind  that will  be 
reflected  in  the  draft bill that  the  Carter 
Administration will  soon  send  to  the  Congress.  (Among 
other  things,  that  bill would  grant  individuals  the 
right  to  see  and  correct  insurance  records  and  would 
compel  insurors  to  inform  individuals  about  adverse 
decisions.)  That  company,  with  annual  revenues  of 
$2.599  billion,  simply  inco·rporated  nearly all  the 
privacy provisions  into  changes  that it was  planning 
to  make  over  a  year  or  so.  As  a  result,  the  cost  was 
relatively small  and  even difficult  to  pinpoint." 
2)  See  on  this  Whieldon  1978,  p  56: 
"Another  expert who  believes  that  the  cost  of 
conforming  to  privacy  legislation  and  regulations  may 
be  exaggerated  is Dr.  Lance  Hoffman,  associate 
professor  in  the Department  of  Electrical Engineering 
and  Computer  Science at George  Washington  University, 
washington,  DC.  'A  lot of  the  additional  cost  isn't 
really associated with  privacy  itself but,  rather,  is 
the  cost  of  putting  procedures  in  place  where  none 
existed  before.  Those  procedures  might  already  be  set 
up  in  a  well-managed  shop.' 
Hoffman,  who  also  heads  the  Committee  on  the  Right  to 
Privacy  in  the  American  Federation  of  Information 
Processing Societies  (AFIPS),  insists  that privacy 
considerations  have  been  responsible  for  only  a  small 
amount  of  extra  overhead  cost. 
4-111 , 
As  for  the  danger  of  obstacles  and  incteased  costs ·caused  by 
different national  data protection  regulations,  there  are 
several  realistic  rather  soothing  comments  from within  the 
American  industry,  which  regard  such  problems  as  normal 
conditions of  doing  business  internationally.  l) 
(continuation of  footnote  1  overleaf) 
Supporting.Hoffman,  D.  Willis  ware  says  there's  more 
than  one  reason  that managers  are  concerned  about 
privacy  laws  and  regulations.  'It's clear  that  no  one 
will  be  able. to  respond  to privacy  requirements  ufiless 
he's  completed  the  security  job first,  buttoning  up  the 
computer  room,  understanding  how  people  there  behave  and 
putting controls  on  the  system.  What  you  find  is  that  a 
lot of people  talking  about  the  cost of  privacy  are 
including  in  their  estimates  the  cost  of  security. 
Security  safeguards  should  be  funded  on  their  own 
merits,  I  believe.' 
Another  reason,  he  contends,  that  concern  may  be 
exaggerated  is that  'company managers  haven't  studied 
the  details of  proposed  legislation  and  haven't  thought 
through  carefully what  they'll  be  required  to  do. 
They're  shooting  from  the  hip.'" 
Cf.  furthermore  in this connection Whieldon  1978,  p  58: 
"As  Richard  P.  Cooley,  a  counsel  for  the Travelers 
Insurance  Col.,  Harford,  observes  'Access  is  the 
problem,  not  record  keeping  and  record  protection.'" 
To  this  the  further  comment  has  to  be  added  that 
experience  has  already  shown  that  even  the  right  of 
access  is  no-t  ·the  formidably  expensive  problem  it is 
often  thought  to  be. 
1)  Barna 1978,  p  37: 
"According  to  the  Citibank  spokesman,  'Any  bank  that 
operates multinationally is confronted  with  a  lot of 
these  kinds  of  issues •••  We  will  encounter  varying 
degrees  of  operational difficulty,  but  that's 
unavoidable  if  we  want  to  do  business  in  a  number  of 
countries.'  •••  'From everthing  we•ve  looked  at,  we 
can't see  any  particular  problems',  (Lynn)  Brown 
(Director  of  data  communications  research  and 
engineering  for  the  $1.5  billion  company)  says." 
4-112 .) 
4.3.3  Sweden 
Experience  under  the  Swedish  data  legislation  is,  in  cost 
terms,  of  special  importance  for  two  reasons.  Firstly, 
the  Swedish  Data  Act  has  been  in  effect  since  1973  and  is 
thus  the  oldest data protection legislation at national 
level.  It can  therefore  be  described  as  positive 
experience.  Secondly,  the  Swedish  data protection  model, 
along  with  the  primarily self-control-oriented German 
Data  Protection Law,  and  with  the still more  liberal 
British  tendency  for  simple  professional  codes  of 
conduct,  serves  sometimes  as  the  archetype  for 
restrictive bureaucratic data protection.  In  the 
international debate,  data protection  licensing  systems 
like  the  Swedish  are  regarded  (especially  from  American 
comments)  as  unwieldy,  over-bureaucratic  and  (for  the 
private  organisations  concerned)  as  unnecessarily 
expensive.  In  reality the Data  Inspection  Board 
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  DIB)  is  certainly,  on  the 
contrary,  quite  unbureaucratic  and  efficient.  1) 
4.3.3.1  Licensing  fees 
The  DIB  levies  licence  fees  on-holders  of  data  files  but 
they are  in  most  cases  extremely  low.  Thus  for  the 
simplified  licences  (1972-1978  14,869  cases)  a  minimal 
1)  The  following  comments  concerning  Sweden  are  based  in 
the  main  on  extensive  discussions  which  were  carried  out 
within  the  framework  of  various  conversations  with 
members  of  the  DIB  (especially  the  Director General  Jan 
Freese  and  the  Administrative  Director  Rabbe  Wrede)  and 
also  with  leading  representatives  of  the  Federation of 
Swedish  Industries. 
See  also  e.g.  Freese  1978  and  Westman  1978. 
4-113 lump  sum  of  only  Sw.  Kr.  200  (less  than  £2S)  is  levied 
per  data file,  and  less if several  applications  are  dealt 
with  together.  Otherwise  the  DIB  levies  charges  on  the 
basis of  a  rate  of  Sw.  Kr.  175  per  man  hour  (1973-1978: 
5,333  cases  of  regular  licences  and  1,023  cases  of 
modifications).  Higher  fees  (up  to  now  not  more  than 
Sw.  Kr.  20,000)  are  due  only  in  the  case  of  extensive  and 
complex  systems  in  the public sector. 
In  any  case  the  DIB's  fees,  especially  for  the  private 
sector,  evidently offer  no  stumbling  block. 
It can  be  said  in  passing  that  where  lumpsum  fees  for 
simplified  licences  do  not  apply,  the  DIB  raise  such 
cost-based  fees  with  reluctance. 
Its corresponding  efforts vis-a-vis  the  government, 
especially with  the  Ministry  of Justice,  have  certainly 
not yet  had  the  hoped-for  success.  The  DIB  is  aware  of 
the  fact  that  fees  based  on  hourly  rates  can  lead  to 
unfair  and  unequal  treatment. ·  So  when  the  processing  of 
a  non-typical  case  arising  for  the  first  time  requires  a 
great amount  of  work,  it is faced  with  correspondingly 
high  fees,  while  a  subsequent  similar  case  can  be 
processed  at  a  considerably  lower  cost  as  the  preparatory 
work  has  already  been  done. 
Moreover  the  flexible  and  extremely pragmatic  approach 
\ 
of  the  DIB  has  the  effect  of  keeping  down  c9sts  to  a 
I 
large  degree,  as  it reduces  the  (poten~ially 
/ 
considerable)  conversion  costs  to  a(rninirnurn. 
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 4.3.3.2  Requests  for  access 
The  danger  of  the  occurrence  of  excessive  costs  through 
extensive  notifications  and  giving  of  information  is 
already  reduced  from  the  start  in  Sweden.  The  Swedish 
Data  Act  has  no  obligations for  the  general  (automatic) 
notification  of  data  subjects  e.g.  on  initial  storage. 
In  the  case  of  Sweden,  dispensing with  such  an  obligation 
was  possible  without  reckonable  loss  of  data  protection 
control  by  the  individual,  as  the  licensing  system  of  the 
DIB  exercises  centrally  a  fundamental  and  continuous 
oversight  on  the  automatic personal  data  files  to  which 
the  individual  applying  through  the  DIB  can  refer. 
4.3.3.2.1  Volume  of  the  requests  for  access 
Although  keepers  of  personal  data  files  must  without 
charge  give  to  the  data subject  once  within  12  months 
information  on  the  relevant  data,  the  number  of 
information  requests  is  by  no  means  excessive.  In  fact 
the  total  of  all  such  requests  for  Sweden  as  a  whole  for 
the first five  years  since  the  qata  legislation  came  into 
force  is  estimated  to  be  only  about  50,000.  1) 
In  this  the  public sector  is more  affected  than  the 
private  sector.  The  National Statistics Authority 
constitutes  the  most  prominent  case.  After  a  campaign  in 
the  press  it was  deluged  with  about  15,000  requests  for 
1)  Bayer  1979,  p3.  According  to  the  DIB  a  slowly 
rising  trend  is  recorded. 
4-116 information.  This  case  is,  however,  regarded  by  the  DIB 
as  most  exceptional,  but surely,  in  view  of  the  large 
number  of  comprehensive  personal  data  files  of  the 
Authority,  not  disproportionate. 
Another  case  of  wholesale  information  requests  (about 
10,000)  concerned  t~e Swedish  company  of Readers  Digest. 
Publications  of  the  press  had  been  against  the  use  by 
Readers  Digest  of  an  address  record  of  the  whole  Swedish 
population  for  advertising  purposes. 
These  cases  are,  however,  quite exceptional  in  their 
extent  and  it appears  impossible  that  DP  applications 
involving  personal  data  bring  about  a  large  number  of 
requests.  In  extreme  cases  moreover  the  DIB  may,  in 
accordance with  art.  10,  para.  4  of  the  Data  Act,  grant 
exemption  from  the  obligation  on  information.  It can 
also concede  extended  information periods.  Special 
authority  for  the  levying  of  information  fees,  in 
accordance with art.  10,  para.  2  of  the  Data  Act,  offers 
a  further  possibility  to  clear  such  extreme  cases. 
The  generally  small  number  of  information  requests, 
especially  in  the  private  sector,  is  probably 
attributable  (apart  from  a  general  co-operative  climate 
of  trust  of  the  open  Swedish  society)  to  the  general  fact 
that  the  population  has  confidence  in  control  through  the 
licensing  system  exercised  by  the  DIB.  Moreover  big 
private data  file  keepers  especially  have  pursued  an 
active data  policy of  creating  or  maintaining  confidence. 
4-117 Thus  firms  have  kept  trade  unions  informed;  published 
appropriate  information  in  company  news  sheets  and,  as  a 
matter  of  routine,  and  without  the  prompting  of 
information  requests,  apprised  external  interested 
parties  (bank  customers,  insurance  policy holders,  etc). 
The  traditional  fear  of  irregular exploitation of  data 
protection  information  rights  is  not  borne  out  in  Swedish 
experience. 
4.3.3.2.2  Costs  of  granting  access 
According  to  the  assessments  of  the  DIB,  the 
organisations  granting  access  are  involved  in  costs  at  a 
statistical average  of  barely  Sw.  Kr.  1.- for  each 
instance.  This  extremely  low  average  figure  is,  in  the 
main,  explained  by  the  fact  that  big private undertakings 
especially  (banks,  insurance,  etc),  within  an  active 
policy of  data protection,  inform  the  data  subjects  (own 
personnel,  customers,  etc)  from  time  to  time  as  a  matter 
of  routine,  by  using  automatic procedures  or  by  taking 
advantage  c;>f  regular  personal  and  postal  contact. 
4.3.3.2.3  Access  fees 
According  to  art.  10,  para.  2  of  the  Data  Act  there  is 
normally  no  fee  for  the  information.  In  special  cases, 
however,  the  DIB  can  allow  the  levying  of  access  fees  -
based  on  the  sum  of  the direct costs  of  granting  access. 
Accordingly,  the  DIB  approves  the  levying  of  information 
charges  especially  in  cases which,  on  request  from  data 
subjects,  information  is  given  which  normally  is  given 
4-118 only  on  payment.  Hence  the  DIS  allows  credit  information 
bureaux,  for  example,  to  charge  about  Sw.  Kr.  20  to  25 
for  data  protection  information. 
It is conceivable  that the  DIB  approve  even  considerably 
higher  information  charges  in  special  cases.  It should 
be  stated  that,  especially  in  the private  sector  in  the 
relatively  few  cases  in  which  information  is  sought  more 
than  once  in 12  months,  the  levying  of  a  charge  is 
generally waived.  This  is  probably  in  the  main  as  the 
small  information  costs arising are  not worth  the 
collection expenses.  Usually  information  costs  are 
regarded  as public  relations  costs  - particularly  by  the 
firms  who,  as  a  routine,  give  out  information  which  has 
not  been  asked  for. 
4.3.3.3  Data  security measures 
Even  from  the  aspect  of  data  security measures  for  data 
protection,  such  costs  can at most  be  regarded  as 
marginal.  The  DIS  sees  itself here  as  a  partner,  who  on 
the  basis  of  accumulated  specia; data security  know-how 
makes  firms  and  administrations  aware  of  their  own 
security  needs  and  indicates cost  favourable  solutions. 
In  the  experience  of  the  DIB,  reviews  of  security measures 
in cases,  already  in  hand,  of general  security  needs, 
e.g.  in  the  banking  sector,  generally call  for  no  or  few 
additional  measures.  These  often lie  in  the  orbit of 
small  organisational  changes  which  in  practice  cause  no 
additional  costs.  When  in  individual  cases  more  or  less 
4-119 considerable  security measures  are  needed,· as  a  general 
rule  the  affected organisations accept  that such  measures 
are  probably  only  to  a  small  degree  directly  for  data 
protection  and  not  for  other  needs.  The  Swedish  National 
Statistics Authority,  for  instance,  introduced  additional 
security measures  at a  cost of  about  Sw.  Kr.  1,000,000, 
on  the  advice  of  the  DIB  in  recognition  of  data 
protection  as  well  as  various  other  needs. 
Above  all,  the  fact  that  the  DIB  has  so  far  had  no  kind 
of  complaint  of  excessive data security  requirements 
shows  most  clearly  that  data  security  expense  for  data 
protection  is  not  really  a  problem.  The  lack  of  controversy 
in  this matter  can  probably  then  be  taken  as  an  indication 
that data security  costs purely  for  data protection are small. 
4.3.3.4  Opportunity  costs 
The  opportunity  costs  of  the  Swedish  Data  Act,  i.e.  the 
loss of  benefit  by  virtue of  the  law  as  explained,  is 
generally  not  assessible,  but  shows  up  in  a  highly 
anecdotal  way  in  individual  ca~es.  A large Swedish 
service  bureau  was  obliged,  through  a  decision  of  the 
DIB,  to  stop  the  use  of  a  data file  covering  the  whole 
population  for  direct  advertising,  which  had  up  to  then 
generated  an  annual  business  turnover  of  about  Sw.  Kr. 
1,000,000 with  a  high  profit margin.  In  the  estimation 
of  the  DIB,  this activity has  been  since  its  inception 
a  misuse  in  the private sector.  The  decision  of  the  DIB 
is seen  rather  as  a  correction of  an  irregular practice. 
There  may  well  be  other  similar  sensational  cases. 
4-120 4.3.3.5  Positive effects  of  the  Data  Act 
The  DIB  sets great store,  not  only  by  the  generally  small 
data  protection  costs  and  by  the  fundamentally  conflict-
free  co-operation  and  its special  value  to  the 
organisation,  but  by  the  assertion  that private  firms  by 
the  advice  of  the  DIB  in carrying  out  their  data duties 
bring  about,  in part,  appreciable  positive effects  and 
special  economies. 
The  licensing  system  compels  the  firm to analyse  as  a 
whole  the  data  banks  and  information  systems,  which  over 
the  years  may  have  grown  in  a  more  or  less  unco-ordinated 
form.  In  this  way,  through  the  know-how  which  has 
increased  in  the  meantime,  it is often possible  so  to 
advise  the  organisation that its systems  work  more 
effectively,  reliably  and  cheaply.  The  positive effects 
are especially  the  avoidance  and  the  use  of  obsolete  data 
and  the  multiple  recording  and  processing  of  data  within 
a  firm,  and  the  general  reduction of  irrational 
uncontrolled  growth  of  data  banks  and  information 
systems. 
The  model  example  of  the  DIB  is  that  of  a  large 
department  store  chain,  covering  the  whole  country,  which 
through  direct advertising  distributed  bonus  savings 
certificates.  Within  the  framework  of  a  data  processing 
system  established  in  the  early 1960's,  all  former 
customers  since  1959  were  recorded,  and  directly 
approached  three  times  per  annum.  Coincidentally with 
the processing  of  the  authority,  in  accordance  with  the 
4-121 Data Act,  it was  pointed  out  to  the  firm  that details of 
former  customers  can  be  stored only  up  to  three years. 
The  DIB  gave  an  adjustment  period  of  18  months.  After 
only  five  months,  however,  the  firm  announced  its 
completion.  In  the  estimation  of  the  firm  annually  about 
Sw.  Kr.  500,000  is  now  saved,  as  not  only  were  the 
storage  needs  quite  considerably  reduced  through  the 
deletion of  old  customer  details,  but  a  correspondingly 
smaller  number  of  the  public  were  approached  three  times 
annually  by  direct advertising.  An  analysis  of  customer 
behaviour  had  shown  that  only  a  small  proportion  of  the 
very old  customers  entered  into  new  agreements.  The 
bonus  savings  business,  which  hitherto  had  made  a  loss  of 
about  Sw.  Kr.  250,000  had  in  the  meantime  been  sold  to  a 
bank  and  should  now  for  the  first  time  make  a  profit  of 
Sw.  Kr.  250,000. 
Furthermore,  the  guidance  from  the  DIB  often  results  in 
increased accessibility and  generally less  complexity  of 
information  systems.  There  have  already  been  cases  in 
which  the  DIB  was  able  to point  to  existing  information, 
research  etc  which  obviated  expensive  duplication  of 
work.  So  gen~rally the  application  of  data protection 
regulations  and  the  advisory  assistance  of  the  DIB  often 
lead  to  the  start of  a  comprehensive  coherent  internal 
control  of  information on  company  level. 
4.3.3.6  International distortion of  competition 
The  Data  Act  has  understandably  also  effects 
internationally.  Up  to  now  there  have  been  relatively 
4-122 few  cases  in  which  the  DIB  has  imposed  re~trictive de-
cisions  in  respect  of  international data  processing.!) 
The  DIB  refused  the  Swedish  Siemens permission  to  pass 
on  personal  data  to  the  German  parent  company. 
The  district administration office of Jonkoping  was 
not  allowed  to  send  to  England  a  magnetic  tape  holding 
the  identity  and  addresses  of  its population.  With 
the  help  of  this  tape,  patients'  plastic  identity 
cards  were  to  have  been  provided. 
In  another  case  the publishers Albert Bonnier  were  not 
allowed  to  send  to  England  a  magnetic  tape,  which  was 
to  serve  as  the  basis for  a  printing  of  a  register  of 
taxpayers. 
In  this  connection  the  case  concerning  the  large 
American  credit  information  bureau  Dunn  & Bradstreet 
was  probably  one  of  the  most  serious.  Dunn  and 
Bradstreet  owned  100%  of  one  of  the  ten  leading 
Swedish  credit  information  bureaux,  but  had  to  dispose 
of it,  as  it was  decided  that  in  view  of  the  extremely 
sensitive  nature  of  credit  information,  a  credit 
information  bureau  operating  in Sweden  should  not  be 
in  foreign  hands. 
These  and  other  cases  are  however  individual  instances 
of  international  restrictions  from  which  no  fundamental 
structural distortion  of  international  competition,  for 
reasons  of  data protection,  can  be  inferred.  Any  future 
international data protection conventions,  etc.will 
probably  lead  to  fewer  restrictive decisions. 
1)  See  Vinge  1975,  pp  57-58. 
4-123 Above  all  in  practice  there  is  no  reason  from  the  cost 
aspect  (which  is  here  the  main  consideration)  in  the  case 
of  the  Swedish  Data  Act  for  distortions  of  international 
competition arising  from  increased  data protection costs, 
because,  as  pointed  out,  such  costs  are  completely 
irrelevant. 
Jan  Freese,  Director  General  of  the  DIB,  stands  on 
principle against what  he  sees  as  a  less  than  strong 
argument  on  the  question  of  distortion,  through  data 
protection considerations,  in  international  competition. 
He  points  out  that  not  only  has  there  been  distortion  of 
competition  internationally  in  related field  in  many 
forms,  but  that  these  are  intensively exploited  by  firms. 
For  example,  the  intensive  international postal 
advertising business  of Holland,  England  and  Spain  is 
mainly attributable  to differences  in  national postal 
charges,  i.e.  to  international  distortion  of  competition. 
Similar  and  even  more  disturbing distortions  are 
recorded,  in  part  through  quite  large  differences  of 
charges  for  the  use  of data  tra~smission networks. 
4.3.3.7  International  harmonisation  of  data  protection 
Apart  from  the  fact  that suitable  international 
harmonisation  of  data  protection  would  be  accompanied  in 
part  by  considerable  general  simplification  (e.g. 
international  action  or  national  data  protection 
licenses),  from  the  Swedish  viewpoint,  as  there  are  no 
more  than  marginal  data  protection  costs,  there  can  be  no 
expectation  of  further  sizeable cost  reductions  by  such 
harmonisation  measures. 
4-124 4.3.3.8  General  viewpoint  of  the  Swedish  Federation  of 
Industries 
The  Swedish  Federation of  Industries  (Sveriges 
Industriforbund)  looks at the question  of data protection 
costs,  which  internationally  and  (before  the  passing  of  the 
Swedish  Data  Act)  also  in Sweden  has  been  regarded  by  private 
industry  as  very  problematic,  rather  as  a  minor  problem. 
Because  data protection costs  in Sweden  have  b~en marginal, 
there  have  been  no  efforts  so  far  in  assessing  or  even 
estimating  them.  Since  the  existence  of  the  Swedish  Data 
Act,  i.e.  since  1973,  protection  costs  have  never  been  a 
matter  for  discussion,  and  the  Federation of  Industries  in 
particular  has  had  no  occasion  to  occupy  itself with  the 
cost aspects  of  data protection.  Data  protection  costs 
appear  negligible  from  the  viewpoint  of  Swedish  private 
enterprise,  especially when  compared  with  the  costs  relating 
to  Government  bureaucracy.  This  is  true  also  for  the 
(generally  small)  number  of  requests  for  information. 
In  a  very  enlightened  and  far-sighted  way,  the  Swedish 
Federation  of  Industries  sees data protection  and  the  small 
cost it causes  as  a  social correlative  to  the  continually 
increasing use  of  data processing.  To  this extent data 
protection  is  looked  upon  as  means  of  avoiding  social 
conflict.  If  the  Federation of  Industries  speaks  out,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  favour  of  an  early harmonisation  of  data 
protection  and  laments  the  delay  so  far,  it is  not  because  of 
cost  considerations  or  fears  about  distortion  of  competition 
caused  by  data protection,  but  because  of  the  general  need 
for  uncomplicated  and  foreseeable  international  business 
conditions. 
4-125 4.3.4  Federal  Republic  of Germany 
4.3.4.1  Estimation  of  costs  before  the  coming  into  force  of 
the  Federal  Data  Protection  Law 
In  relation  to  the  extraordinary flood  of  publications 
dealing  generally  with  data  protection  which  were 
produced  in Germany  before  the  passing  and  corning  into 
effect of  the  Federal  Data  Protection Act,  th~ very  small 
number  of  systematic  and  positive contributions  on  the 
problems  of  data  protection  costs  is  surprising. 
Without discussing  those  contributions  in  details 
h~re
1 >  it can  be  stated generally  that  the  Germany  data 
protection debate  has  basically  taken  the  same  course  as 
in  other  countries,  especially Great  Britain  and  the 
USA.  Thus  various partial estimates  and  projections  of 
costs  were  encountered,  which  were  made  by  private 
industry as  part of  public enquiries  launched  by  the 
Federal  Government  or  the  Federal  Parliarnent.2> 
Drawn  up  on  the  basis  of  the  most  diverse possibilities 
for  data  protection  regulations,  interpreted  in  an 
arbitrary or  even  exaggerated  number,  cost  estimates  with 
an  extraordinary  large  scatter  resulted,  sometimes  ~ntering 
the  realms  of  fantasy: 
1)  For  details  on  the  German  debate  on  data  protection 
costs  see  Hogrebe  1979,  pp  482-511. 
2)  See  especially Deutscher  Bundestag,  Innenausschuss 
1976a,  1976b,  1976c  and  for  example  Capital  1976  p  61; 
Suddeutsche  zeitung  1977,  p  36;  Wirtschaftswoche  1976, 
pp 12-17 etc. 
4-126 German  insurance  companies  for  example  reckoned  with 
DM  50,000,000  of  additional personnel  expenses  alone. 1> 
A credit  information organisation covering  the  Federal 
Republic  foresaw  additional data protection costs  of 
DM  40,000,000  on  a  total  annual  expenditure  of 
DM  35,000,000  to  40,000,000  previously. 2> 
The  data  protection  costs  arising  for  the  whole  economy 
were  estimated,  depending  on  the  source,  at  "a  few  billion 
Marks"  or  up  to  "about  20  billion Marks". 3> 
Even  for  data  protection costs expressed  in  percentages, 
there  was  a  big  spread  somewhere  between  1%  and  30%  of  the 
total data  processing  costs of  the  organisation  in 
question. 4> 
One  of  the  few  systematic  cost  studies  came  to  the  result 
that  by  making  certain assumptions  additonal  data 
protection  costs  on  average  do  not  exceed  about  1%  of  the 
data processing costs  of  the  affected  firms.  The  official 
advisor  of  the  Federal  Ministry  of  the  Interior  on  the 
Federal  Data  Protection  Law,  who  had  asked  for  the  study, 
accepted  this  result  as  his  own  estimate.5
>  This  estimate 
• 
1)  Sliddeutsche  Zeitung  1977,  p  36. 
2)  Suddeutsche  Zeitun9  1977,  p  36. 
3)  See CaEital  1976,  p  61. 
4)  See  for  similar  examples  of  percentage  estimating 
Sabirowsky  1977;  Futh  1976,  p  237. 
5)  See  Angermann/Schmidt/Thome  1976,  p  50  and  following 
this  Auernhammer,  in ComEuter-Zeitung  31.3.  1976,  p  2; 
a  similar  tendency  is  shown  by  Hogrebe  1979,  p  503. 
4-127 of  costs  appeared .all  the  more  realistic  because  estimates 
derived  from  private  industry were  available  at  a  very 
early  stage  according  to  which  the  small  additional data 
protection and  data security costs  were  more  than  covered  by 
savings  effected  by  suitable  measures  at  least  in  large 
computer  installations.1> 
4.3.4.2  Cost-related  experience  with  the  Federal  Data 
Protection  Law 
The  observer  of  the  German  data  protection  scene  after  the 
passing  of  the  Federal  Data  Protection  Law  must  see  that  the 
catastrophes  prophesied  by  some  in  respect  of  data 
protection costs  have  obviously  not materialised. 
Indeed  the  law  (once  proclaimed  as  the  law  of  the  century) 
has  led  in  the  meantime  to  an  impressively  feverish,  much 
inflated doubt-ridden  data  protection  community  complaining 
about  the difficulties  and  burden  of  applying  the  law. 
However,  substantiated  complaints  of  excessive data 
protection costs  have  not  appeared.  One  gets  the  impression 
that  this  is  due  on  the  one  hand  to  the  pressure  of  the 
private sector  and  its representatives  applied  during  the 
law-making  process,  sometimes  heavily  and  certainly 
.. 
successfully,  in  favour  of  a  data protection  law  sympathetic 
to  users.  On  the  other  hand,  it can  probably  be  assumed 
that  the  data protection costs arising  in  fact  generally 
remain  well  below  earlier  extreme  estimates.  In  this 
connection it does  not  matter  whether  some  of  the  original 
1)  See  the  practical  experience  of  Obelode/Windfuhr  1974, 
p  236. 
4-128 cost  estimates,  following  the  logic  of  the  lobbyists,  were 
more  or  less deliberatly exaggerated,  or  whether  th~y arose 
from  false  assumptions  or  inadequate  analysis  of  the  actual 
data protection expense.  And  it seems  revealing  that,  apart 
from  a  few  itemised  estimates,  there  are  no  systematic 
representative data  cost calculations  (or  even  estimates) 
similar  to  the  survey  of  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget.!) 
Consequently  it is proposed  to  evaluate  the  cost  intensity  of 
the  Federal  Data Protection  Law  in  the  following  paragraphs 
mainly  by  qualitative considerations  under  different  aspects, 
bearing  in  mind  the  inadequate  data available  and  the 
limiations  of  the  study.  The  general  starting point  is  the 
fundamental  fact  that  the  various,  and  in  some  cases  very 
strict and  extensive,  obligations  and  limitations  of  earlier 
data protection proposals  either  do  not  appear,  or  only  in 
such  a  hollow  form  that,  already  on  the  passing  of  the  Act, 
interested experts  on  data protection called  for  an  amendment. 
In  fact  the  Federal  Data  Protection Law  is  so  studded  with 
general provisions,  which  to  a  large  degree  make  it possible 
for  users  to  evade  expensive  or  even  inconvenient 
1)  Various  statements  on  the  theme  of  data  costs protection 
are  confined  to  the  repetition  of  old  estimates  made 
before  the  enactment  or  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
law,  in  their  own  abstract  speculations  on  cost  or  only 
in  summarising  data protection measure  generally 
affecting  cost etc.,  or  by  repeating  the  USA-developed 
pseudo-accurate  approaches  to determining  optimum 
stragegies  on  data  protection  and  security.  See  in 
general  Pougien  1977;  Bode/Drews  1977;  Leib  1978;  Nagel 
1979b. 
4-129 data  protection obligations,  that  experts  state:  "The  Federal 
Data  Protection  Law  is  as  full  of holes  as  a  Swiss 
cheese". I) 
Furthermore,  whole  branches  of  industry  interpret  certain data 
protection  regulations  so  broadly,  e.g.with  reference  to 
initial automatic  notifications,  that  there  is  already  talk  of 
effectively by-passing  the  Data  Protection  Law. 
Taken  all  in  all,  despite  all  complaints  of  users  about  some 
aspects of  the  law,  the  Federal  Data  Protection Law  basically 
cannot  be  called  burdensome  or  particularly costly.  One  of 
the  best  illustrations of  this  is  the  fact  that  the  credit 
trade  today  willingly  accepts  the  "omnibus  law",  bitterly 
opposed  earlier,  and  votes  now  against  the  introduction of  a 
data  protection  law  with  application  to  specific  fields  and 
adapted  to  the  special conditions  of  particular  trades. 2
> 
4.3.4.2.1  Data  protection  commissioners  and  data  protection 
training 
According  to  estimates,  there  are  company  data  protection 
commissioners  in  about  12,000  German  firms.  Because  of 
special  professional  requirements  (knowledge  of  data 
processing,  organisation,  data  prot~ction law,  etc.},  the 
high  hierarchical  ranking,  with  responsibility directly  to 
top  management,  and  the  consequent  special  qualification 
required  for  data  protection  commissioners,  sometimes  heavy 
costs  in  respect  of  data protection  personnel  are  incured.  It 
1)  See  Spiegel  1979,  p  52. 
2)  see  Rodl  1979,  p  10. 
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is evident,  however,  that  the  great  majority  of  data 
protection  commissioners  appointed  in  the  private  sector  do 
not  work  full-time  in  this  function. 1>  Apart  from  the  fact 
that full-time  data protection commissioners  generally  attend 
to  other  tasks,  the  proportion  of  full-time  data  protection 
commis$ioners  among  the  total  number  {especially  those  in 
smaller  and  medium-sized  firms)  lies  considerably  below  15%. 
To  this extent  the  full-time data protection  commissioner  is 
quite  the  exception.  Additional  tasks  lie especially  in  the 
following  area: 2> 
protection  of  the  company's  important  internal  data 
general  data  security 
training 
coordination  of  DP  activities  among  other  companies 
internal audits,  etc. 
Practically  no  data  protection  commissioners  have  been  newly 
recruited.  They  are  recruited  by  and  large  internally  from 
the  fields  of  data  processing  and  organisation  (the  greater 
part),  accounting,  law,  personnel,  auditing,  purchasing  or 
marketing. 3> 
1)  According  to  a  survey  by  Jamin  1978,  p  66  there  are  fewer 
than  33%.  According  to  another  survey  which  covered  100 
of  the  500  biggest German  firms,  only  15%  of  the  appointed 
date protection  commissioners  carry out  this  function  on  a 
full-time  basis;  see Online-ADL-Nachrichten  No.  12,  1977, 
p  995. 
2)  Jamin  1978,  p  66. 
3)  Jamin  1978,  p  66;  Spiegel  1979,  p  52. 
4-131 It is  often  even  the  head  of  data  processing  and  organisation, 
or  the  head  of  personnel  who  additionally  takes  on  the 
function  of  data  protection  commissioner.  The  resulting 
conflict of  interests,  contrary  to  the  fundamental  idea  of  the 
data  protection  law,  is  especially criticized  by  the  public 
supervisory authorities.  Furthermore,  groups  of  firms  take 
advantage  of  the  possibility of  appointing  one  suitable  data 
protection commissioner  for  all  the  firms  in  the  group.1> 
In  this  case,  as  in  that  of  appointing  an  external  data 
protection  commissioner,  the data protection personnel  costs 
for  the  individual  firms  are  considerably  r~duced,  and  in 
any  case,  it seems  unrealistic  in  the  light of  prevailing 
practice  to  count  the  full  salary of  a  highly  qualified 
full-time  employee  as  data protection personnel  costs of  the 
individual  company.  One  estimate,  for  example,  assesses  the 
burden for  one-time  conversion  measures  at  one  to  three  man 
months,  and  the  permanent  workload  at  only  one  to  three  man 
days  per  month. 2> 
The  other  personnel  costs,  which  arise  in  part  from  the 
initial and  continuous  training  and  briefing  of  the  data 
protection  commissioner  himself  (seminar  and  congress  visits, 
'  . 
association dues,  literature,  etc.)  and  to  some  extent 
through  the  general  data  protection  training  of  other 
employees  handling  personal  data,  could  especially after  the 
initial phase,  be  classed  as  generally  marginal,  too. 
1)  40%  of  the  100  data protection commissioners  in  the 
enquiry alredy  mentioned  carried  out  this  function 
for  several  associated sister  companies.  See  Online-
ADL-Nachrichten  No.  12,  1977,  p  995. 
2)  Po th  s  19  7 7 ,  p  2 4. 
4-132 4.3.4.2.2  Obligation  to  notify 
The  obligation  to  notify data  subjects  automatically when 
data concerning  them  is first  recorded  or  transmitted  (art. 
26,  para.  1  or  art.  34,  para.  1  - Federal  Data  Protection 
Law)  appears  in  fact  virtually not  to  exist  in practice,  in 
any  case  the  obligation  to  notify  can  in  practice  be  ignored 
as  a  cost  factor.  In  the great majority· of  instances  of 
storing  or  transmitting  there  are  direct  connections  between 
the storing,  transmitting or  receiving  office  and  the  data 
subject,  so  that  the  notification  is  not  necessary,  as  the 
data subject gets  knowledge  of  the  storing or  transmitting 
in  another  way.  Because  of  the  very  broad  interpretation, 
even  in  some  areas  in which  this  knowledge  cannot  be  assumed 
without  further  considerations  (e.g.  the  area  of  the  address 
vending  and  direct advertising),  the  obligation  to  notify 
has  in  practice  been  set aside  in  a  dubious  way. 
Furthermore  it should  not  be  lost sight  of  that  even  with 
due  observation  of  the  obligation  to  notify,  provided  "other 
knowledge•  is sufficient,  virtually  no  additional  costs 
arise  if the  contact  with  the  data  subject  can  be 
established directly or  indirectly via  third parties within 
the  framework  of  routine  procedures.&  • 
This  is,  however,  almost  always  the  case,  or  achievable  with 
a  little organisational  creativity.  To  this  extent  the 
problem of  notification,  even  for  credit  information 
agencies  and  address  vendors  etc.,  shows  itself at  least 
from  the  legal  aspect  as  a  by  no  means  over-burdensome  one 
of  changeover.1> 
1)  See  Hogrebe  1979,  pp  507-508. 
4-133 4.3.4.2.3  Requests  for  access 
4.3.4.2.3.1  Volume  and  costs of  requests  for  access 
On  the  matter  of  the  rather  easily answerable  question  about 
the  volume  of  requests  for  access  so  far,  no  representative 
figures  are  available.  The  most  diverse  opinions,  however, 
are  largely  in  agreement  that  "the  big  rush  of data  subjects 
has  not  materialised"  and  that  "only  in  exceptional  cases 
has  use  so  far  been  made  of  the  right of  access  in  business 
practice".l) 
Even  the  biggest  companies  with  intensive  personal  data 
files  (Insurance,  Banks,  Mail  Order,  etc.)  have  apparently 
recorded  virtually  no  requests  for  access. 
While  there  is  some  increase  among  credit  information 
organisations  etc.  the  question  of  volume,  and  with  it also 
the matter  of  information costs  in practice,  has  nowhere 
given  rise  to  cost  problems  of  any  practical  importance.  Up 
to  now  it seems  generally  to  be  a  "non-problem". 
4.3.4.2.3.2  Access  fees 
Against  this,  and  to  a  certain  degree  qualified  by  the 
missing  rush  of  requests  for  access,, the  question  o~ access 
fees  levyable  following  the  Federal  Data  Protection  Law  is 
being  discussed  quite  intensively.  According  to  the  Federal 
Data  Protection Act  (art.  26,  para.  3;  art.  34,  para.  3), 
private agencies  can  "charge  a  fee  for  the  information  which 
may  not  exceed  the  costs directly attributable  to  the 
provision of  information". 
1)  See  e.g.  Online-ADL-Nachrichten  No.  3,  1978,  p  145; 
Datenschutz-Berater  1978b,  p  149. 
4-134 In  the  provision  the  legislator  is  aiming  not  only  at 
financial  compensation,  but  also at deterring  grumblers, 
persistent questioners  and  frivolous  requests  for 
information.  It is  not  surprising  therefore  that, 
especially  in  areas  in  which  the  law  was  received  with 
special scepticism  and  in which  great fears  existed  about 
the  number  of  enquiries  to  be  expected, .relatively very  high 
enquiry-deterring fees  were  fixed  to protect  against  the 
mistrusting  citizen  and  his  endless  requests.  Thus, 
especially  in  such  areas  as  credit  information,  charges  of 
DM  25  and  more  were  discussed.  Such  prohibitive  fees  were 
strongly criticised.  Because  of  the  considerable  negative 
publicity,  and  particularly  because  information  fees  in  the 
public sector  were  mostly  between  DM  4  and  DM  20,  so  far  in 
the  private  sector  also,  no  charges  exceeding  DM  20  are 
apparently  being  made. 
In  this  connection  the  Federal  Data  Protection Charges  Order 
of  22.12.1977  l)  is especially worthy  of  mention. 
According  to  this,  within  the  area  of  Federal  Administration 
the  access  fee  amounts  to  DM  10  per  unit  as  a  matter  of 
principle.  Oral  or  simple  written  information,  however,  can 
be  given  out without  cost.  Even  such  a  charge  as  DM  10  is, 
however,  regarded  by  data  protection  experts  and,  among 
others,  the  Federal  Data Protection  Commissioners  as 
prohibitive. 
1)  Bundesgesetzblatt I,  77,  p  3153. 
4-135 With  due  note  of  the  small  number  of  information  enquiries, 
the  Federal  Data  Protection  Commissioner  advocates  a  general 
renunciation  of  all  charges  and  payments  for  information  to 
the data subject.1> 
Significantly,  the  Federal  Interior Minister  in  a 
recommendation  of  summer  1979  has  in  the  meantime  urged  the 
highest  federal  authorities  to  rescind  all  acc~ss fees. 
Furthermore  a  large  number  of  private  firms  are  refraining 
from  exacting  payment.  Apart  from  public  relations 
considerations,  the  main  reason  is probably  the  expenditure 
which  the  establishment,  calculation  and  collection  of  such 
fees  would  cause. 2> 
The  inappropriateness  on  many  grounds  is  shown  by  the  German 
experience  of  access  fees.  The  very  small  number  of 
requests  for  access  shows  that  the  deterrent  function  of  the 
fees  is superfluous.3>  Moreover,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  legal  policy,  it seems  fundamentally  extremely dubious  to 
burden  or  even  hamper  the  citizen with  charges  in  the 
legitimate  exercise  of  his  data  protection  rights,  which  are 
based  on  the  constitutionally guaranteed  law  on  personal 
rights:  charges  which  were  conscientiously  conceived  with  a 
• 
1)  Bundesbeauftragter  fUr  den  Datenschutz  1979,  pp  51-52 
and  Bull  1978,  p  575. 
2)  See  e.g.  Gola  1978,  p.  4;  and  Datenschutz-Berater  1978b, 
p.  149. 
3)  It appears  to  be  undisputed  that  in  the  case  of  the 
German  Data  Protection  Law  the  small  volume  of  requests 
for  access  is  not  just  a  consequence  of  the  existing 
control  of  charges,  but  a  lack  of  knowledge  among  the 
population  and  a  very  limited  interest  in  such 
information. 
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view  to  deterring  the  isolated,  wrongful  or  even  merely 
inconvenient exercise  of  rights.  (It  seems  more  appropriate 
to  abolish  motor  cars  from  the  evidence  yearly  of  thousands 
of  wounded  and  dead  from  traffic accidents.)  If access  fees 
must  be  retained  for  other  reasons,  such  fees  should 
therefore  have  a  fixed  upper  limit of  certainly not  more 
than  DM  10,  and  preferably  below  that. 
4-137 It can,  however,  be  repeated  that  there  is  no  need  to 
calculate variable  charges  related  to direct costs.  More 
strictly it  can  be  said  that  only. a  (small)  lump  sum  unit 
charge  (if  any)  makes  sense.  It is  unnecessary  here  to  go 
into  the  various  conceptual  absurdities  and  practical 
difficulties  which  are  connected  with  what  at first sight 
might  seem  to  be  a  plausible  idea,  i.e.  the  concept  that  the 
access  fee  should  not  exceed  the direct  cost  arising  from 
the  giving  of  information.1> 
1)  The  idea  of  access  fees  covering  the  direct  information 
costs is,  in  data protection,  a  gross  misconception. 
With  correct  business  accounting,  such  a  charge  leads 
usually  to merely  small  minimal  charges,  originally 
probably  not  intended  by  the  legislator:  see  Hogrebe 
1979,  pp  508-510.  The  inclusion of  the  personnel 
expenses  (for  the  permanent  staff  involved)  might  be 
inconsistent with  the  business  concept  of  direct  costs. 
This  is  generally  not  appreciated:  see  e.g.  Ehrich/ 
Kirchherr/Pusch  1978,  p  82,  Bohm  1977,  p  79  and 
Ausschuss  fUr  Wirtschaftliche-Yerwaltung  in Wirtschaft 
und  offentlicher  Hand  (AWV)  1977,  pp  29-30.  Also 
Kargl/ Reinermann/Schmidt/Thome  1979,  p  16. 
On  the  other  hand  in certain situations quite  heavy  and, 
in  effect,  unfair  cost  fluctuations  arise,  which  can 
lead  to  horrendous  charge  rates.  So  computing  costs 
even  for  a  costly enquiry  cannot. be  brought  to  qccount 
per  charge  since  they  are  normally  invariably  fixed  or 
lump  sum  costs,  if it involves  a  firm's  own  (i.e. 
purchased,  leased  or  rented)  computer  installation.  The 
same  processing  through  a  computer  bureau  would, 
however,  be  variable direct costs  for  the  firm,  possibly 
in  the  form  of  very  high  charges.  Generally  the  direct 
costs  depend  to  a  large degree  on  the  structure  and 
efficiency of  organisation  and  procedures:  see  Bohm 
1977,  p  80  and  Gola/Humrnerich/Kerstan  1977,  p  2s:--It 
can  be  mentioned  that  there  is  no  certainty  of  the 
necessary predictability of  the  access  fee  with  the 
charge  calculation  depending  on  variable  expenditure. 
4-138 The  cost  of  calculating  and  collecting  small  access  fees 
will probably  exceed  the  revenue,  so  that  the  argument  of 
compensation  (at  least  in  part)  does  not  apply  and  only  the 
deterrent motive  remains. 
It should  finally  be  stated  that  the  feat  of  excessive 
requests  for  information  implies  a  patho~ogical attitude 
which  is  not  necessarily  found  in  those  making-requests  for 
information.  The  real  problems  appear  to lie on  the  level 
of  an  understanding  of  modern  democracy,  of  the  concept  of 
an  open  and  transparent society,  i.e.  more  in  the  attitude 
of  the  holder  of  the  information.  Only  in _quite  exceptional 
individual  cases  of  wrongful  exercise  of  information  rights 
should  exemption  (either  administratively  through  the  data 
protection supervisory authority,  as  in  Sweden,  or 
judicially)  be  given  to  the  organisation  concerned. 
General  limitation of  the  right of  access,  by  fees  or 
frequency  etc.,  appear  to  be  unsuitable  in  principle  and 
unnecessary  in practice. 
4.3.4.2.4  Data  security  measures 
No  coherent  information exists even  on  the  costs  of  data 
-
security measures.  Generally it is  assumed  that  there  is  a 
special  burden  of  cost  for  (technical  and  organisational) 
security of  data.  This  is  probably  only  relative  to  the 
very  small  costs  of  notifying,  or  requests  for  access,  and 
of part-time data  protection  commissioners,  who  generally 
have  litle work  to  do  on  data  protection. 
4-139 In  absolute  numbers,  however,  data  security  costs  can  in 
practice  be  ignored.  Indeed  the  ten-item list  in  the  annex 
to  article  6  of  the  Federal  Data  Protection Law  concerning 
technical  and  organisational  data  security measures  appear 
very  impressive  and  involved.  It  should  not  be  overlooked, 
however,  that it is  not  a  catalogue  or  measures  but  of  aims. 
Practice  in  data  security  is,  however,  firstly determined  by 
the  double qualification of  article 6,  para.  1~  to  the 
effect  that  security measures  are  to  be  taken  only  in  as 
much  as  they  are  "necessary"  and  "their  cost  is  in  suitable 
relation  to  the  sort of  protection which  is  being striven 
for".  Secondly,  the  interpretation of  "necessary"  and 
"suitable relation"  is  made  by  the  data  processing 
organisations  themselves,  a  practice which  has  hitherto 
continued  almost  without  check  by  supervisory  authorities 
and  other  third parties.  It is  not  surprising  that  there 
are  no  ·complaints  about  intolerable  or  even  high  data 
security expenditure. 
As  for  suitable  security  measures  taken  under  the  data 
protection  law,  these  cannot properly  be  regarded  as  purely 
data  protection  costs,  because  they  benefit  the  organisation 
which  processes  the  data  and  have  been  taken  (or  should  have 
been)  taken  for  other  needs  and  obligations.  This  is  today 
widely  recognised  in  the  German  data  protection debate  and  is 
indeed  not  seriously disputed  by  any  organisation.  Other 
reasons  for  effecting  technical  and  organisational  security 
measures  include: 1> 
1)  See  also  among  many  other  Kraus  1978,  especially 
pp  70-82;  Ehrich  1978,  pp 191;  Fiselius 1977,  pp  71-72; 
Risch  1978,  pp  199-204;  Nagel  1975,  pp  92-93;  Nagel  1979a, 
pp  24-40. 
4-140 protection  of  hardware  and  software  from  damage 
protection of  data  against  industrial  espionage, 
sabotage,  and  computer  crimes,  etc. 
general  principles  of  orderly data processing 
principles  for  the  keeping  of  personal files 
requirements  of  regulations  on  the  acquisition  and 
transmission  of  data. 
One  of  the  most  striking  examples  so  far  is  that  of  computer 
bureaux.  The  bigger  ones  in particular  stress  that  they  have 
had  to  take  no,  or  in  terms  of  cost  only  minor,  additional 
security measures  following  the  Federal  Data Protection  Law, 
since  their  security  was  already  adequate.1>  They  point 
out  convincingly  that excellent data  security  is a  pre-
requisite  for  their  business,  as  otherwise  customers  would  not 
entrust their data  for  processing.  However,  some 
knowledgeable  people,  in strict confidence,  refer  to  cases 
where  bureaux  did  take  security measures  to  meet  the  Federal 
Data  Protection  Law.  These  insiders  considered  such  measures 
as  long  overdue  correction of  old  omissions  and,  emphatically, 
not  as  data  protection  expenditure.  Significantly,  bureaux 
emphasize  their  high  level  of  data protection. 
1}  See  e.g.  the  manager  of  the  Federation  of  German  Computer 
Bureaux  (VDRZ}  Lange-Hellwig,  in:  Computerwoche, 
26.11.1976,  p  5. 
See  also Singer  1978a,  p  42i  "For  data  security  for  a 
long  time  much  has  already  been  done  in  every  bank  in  its 
own  interest.  It  can  be  mainained  that  the  Federal  Data 
Protection Law  asks  for  nothing  that  is  not  otherwise  in 
existence  or  planned". 
4-141 To  sum  up,  it can  generally  be  said  that  experience  so  far  of 
the  German  Federal  Data  Protection  Law,  especially  in  the 
private  sector,  has  shown  that  even  in  the  initial  period,  in 
the  area  of  security measure  for  data protection,  no  serious 
costs  have  arisen.1> 
4.3.4.2.5  Summary  and  general  considerations 
To  summarize,  it  can  be  said  that  the  German  Federal  Data 
Protection  Law  has  caused,  particularly  in  the  private  sector, 
no  excessive  burdensome  data  protection  costs. 2>  On  the 
contrary,  real  data protection costs  in  the  great  majority  of 
cases  can  be  described  as  marginal. 
1)  Cf.  a  private  communication  from  the  Chairman  of  the 
Gesellschaft  fur  Datenschutz  und  Datensicherheit  Hans 
Gliss  of  3  August  1979,  p  2:  "The  question  is  always 
important  as  to  whether  the  security measures  would  have 
had  to  be  taken  even  without  the  German  Federal  Data 
Protection  Law,  in  this  or  a  weaker  form  because  of 
existing  risks.  We  believe  that you  will  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  only  relatively little cost  can  be 
directly attributed  to  the  German  Federal  Data Protection 
Law." 
See  also Betriebswirtschaftliches Institut fur 
Organisation  und  Automation  (BIFOA)  1978:  "The  principle 
of  appropriateness  enunciated  in  art.  6  of  the  German 
Federal  Data Protection  Law •••  can  in  borderline  cases  be 
met  exclusively  through  organisa~ional meaures  , ••• 
Organisational  measures  (arise)  primarily  from  the  firms 
themselves,  their  prices  are  not  fixed,  are  difficult  to 
calculate,  and  are  rarely identified. 
2)  See  e.g.  Poths  1978,  p  87,  who  concludes  that  costs 
for  the  introduction  of  data  protection  in  the  smaller 
and  middle-sized  firms  in  the  machine  construction 
industry  (10-500  workers)  amount  to  less  than  DM  30,000 
to  DM  70,000.  It  is  generally  assumed  that  larger  firms 
have  relatively smaller  data protection  costs  than  small 
and  medium-sized  ones. 
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experience  of  the  law  during  the  introductory  and 
reorganisation  phase;  running  costs  of  a  stabilised data 
protection  regime  will  be  much  less. 
No  cases  of  applications  being  suspended  entirely  because  of 
data protection  have  appeared.  Lost  opportunities  for 
earnings  (opportunity  costs)  cannot  therefore  be  ascertained, 
if there  have  been  any. 
No  serious  losses  from  difficulties  and  costs  have  been 
reported  which  could  be  attributed  to  inefficient data 
processing  for  the  sake  of  data  protection.  Even  the 
treatment  of  individual  legally autonomous  firms  within  a 
group  as  independent  units  so  that  data  flows  between  them  are 
confirmed  as  flows  between  third parties,  has  not  (because  of 
the  generally liberal  stipulations  of  the  Federal  Data 
Protection Law)  apparently  led  to  a  noticeable  reduction  in 
personal  data  flows  and  processing  between  associated 
~ 
firms. 1) 
1)  See  e.g.  Breker  1978a  and  1978b  for  insurance  companies 
which  might  be  seriously affected,  who,  by  way  of 
reference  to  all-embracing  "justifiable  interests"  (i.e. 
especially "every  economic  interest",  as  e.g. 
rationalisation,  check  on  customer  potential,  advertising, 
risk  reduction,  lowering  of  costs,  profitability)  "reduce 
the  special  problem  of  data  protection  within  big  groups 
to  a  non-problem". 
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must  not  be  ignored.  Apart  from  improved  public  relations 
and  other  unmeasured  but  important  effects  (reduction  of 
error  rates,  updating  etc.  of data  records),  there  are 
cost-reducing  rationalisation effects  which  must  not  be 
underestimated,  and  which  at least  compensate  for  the  real 
data  protection  costs.  Rationalising  effects  in  data 
processing  and  general  organisation  cannot  be  analysed 
further  here,  but  references  are  given. 1> 
In  this connection,  it is  sometimes  argued  that  such  positive 
effects  of  rationalisation  cannot  be  attributed  to  data 
protection,  as  in  this  respect data  protection  is  not  causal, 
but  only  a  "stimulus  for  hitherto  unnoticed  opportunities", 
and  that it would  therefore  be  wrong  to  take  this 
rationalisation  factor  into  account  quantitatively within  a 
general  theory  of  data protection costs. 2> 
That  may  appear  reasonable  at  first.  But  if  a  data  protection 
measure  initiates or  brings  about  rationalisation whose  costs 
are  booked  as  data  protection  expenditure,  then  this 
expenditure  must  be  properly  reduced  by  the  rationalisation 
profit achieved.  Alternatively,  the  rationalisation profit 
can  be  regarded  as  caused  by  a  general  rationalistaion 
measure,  in  which  case  the  costs  of  the  rationalisation 
measure  logically are  also  no  longer  bookable  as  data 
1)  See  e.g.  Datenschutz-Berater  1977,  p  75-76  and 
Datenschutz-Berater  1978a,  pp  36-38.  The  above-mentioned 
l1terature  on  the  orderliness  of  data  protection etc.  is 
in this  respect of  importance. 
2)  See  Poths  1978,  p  88. 
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beneficial  rationalisation measure  with  an  implicit cost-free 
data  protection side-effect.  Both  methods  yield  the  same 
(reduced)  data  protection cost. 
In  the  not  too  distant  future,  probably  one  of  the  most 
important  positive effects of  data protection  for  business  is 
that  observation  and  imple~entation of  data  protection, 
especially  in  larger  firms,  is a  step  in  the  direction of  the 
rational  and  effective general  manage~ent of  information. 
Such  management  of  business  information  (perhaps  integrating 
the  functions  of  data  processing  and  administration)  would  on 
the  one  hand  treat  information  as  a  resource  contributing  to 
general  business  productivity,  and  on  the  other  hand  would 
include  the  dynamic  aspects  of all  information processing  and 
movement  in  the  firm. 
This  step  towards  company  information  management  is  not  an 
automatic  consequence  of data protection.  However,  the 
implementation  of  data  protection  creates  certain  conceptual, 
instrumental  and  organisational pre-requisites  in  this 
direction,  which  can  be  effected  forthwith  in  the  larger 
firms.  This  applies particularly  to  the  German  conception  of 
data  protection,  which  relies  on  central  professional  data 
protection  commissioners  reporting directly  to  top  management, 
with  far-reaching  functions  in  all  fields,  and  access  to  vital 
instruments  of  data protection management  and  control,  such  as 
registers,  etc.  relating  to  the  resource  of  personal  data. 
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raises  the  question whether,  how  far,  and  under  what 
conditions  a  general  system of  registration,  but  especially  a 
general  licensing  system,  is as efficient,  or  more  efficient, 
than  the  German  decentralised  system  of  internal  self-control 
with  limited,  mainly  occasional,  control  through  regional 
supervisory  authorities.  The  question  can  only  be  broached 
here,  and  is probably difficult to  answer  even  in principle, 
as  a  meaningful  answer  would  have  to  include  an  assessment  of 
the  data protection levels  actually  achieved  in  individual 
cases.  This  question  remains,  however,  as  German  data 
practice so  far,  and  probably  in  the  future,  is  stamped  with 
deep-seated  vagueness  because  of  the  (perhaps  unavoidable) 
fuzziness  of  a  seemingly precise omnibus  law  loaded  woolly 
with  provisions.1> 
This  uncertainty  in  the  data  protection  obligations  of  the 
individual  DP  user  must  increase  his  costs,  unless  it is 
balanced  by  a  correspondingly  tolerant  interpretation  of  the 
law  in practice.  In  this situation,  appropriate 
unbureaucratic  licensing  procedures  would  make  data  protection 
obligations  and  tasks  for  the  firm  clear,  predictable  and 
quantifiable  (all  of  which  is  importftnt  in  this  area). 
1)  Even  today  the  following  failings  of  the  Federal  Data 
Protection  Law  are  criticised - vague  drafting, 
contradictory  recommendations,  unclear  concepts,  different 
definitions  for  the  same  facts  and  even  difficulties  in 
defining  such  basic  terms  as  data  bank,  concern,  third 
party;  see  Jamin  1978,  p  66. 
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4.4.1  Overestimation  of  data protection  costs 
A  summary  of  the  findings  of  the  analysis  of  the  various 
estimates  and  experiences  of  the  four  selected  countries  is 
given  below.  If  some  categorical  comments  are  made  on  the 
cost of data protection,  no  general  and  definite  judgement  is 
intended;  this  is  a  simplified  presentation. 
If therefore  it is  stated  that data protection costs  are  on 
the  whole  negligible  or  marginal,  it should  not  be  assumed 
that data protection controls  could  not  be  devised  which, 
generally  or  in  sectors,  could  give  rise  to  heavy  data 
protection costs.  Clearly every  new  data  protection  law  or 
other  regulation  poses  the  serious  problem  of  how  to  bring 
about  the  desired effect on  data protection with maximum 
efficiency,  i.e.  with  minimal  expenditure.  But  one  can 
refute  the  dogmatic  judgement  which  maintains  at  the  national 
level  that  the  costs  of  data  protection  are  too  high,  and 
leads  (through  hints  that at  the  international  level  there  is 
a  threat  of  distortion  of  free  competition  by  data  protection 
costs)  to pressure  on  national  decision-making  committees. 
However,  a  rational  basis for  a  European  (and  possibly  more 
comprehensive)  policy  of  harmonisation  of  data protection 
should  be  produced,  based  (among  other  things)  on  economic 
realities. 
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general  statements  made  above,  that  comments,  especially  on 
data  protection  costs,  are  at  best  estimated  guesses,  in  most 
cases  merely  speculations  which  tend  to  be  too  high, 
especially if  they  are  made  by  potentially affected users  and 
their representatives  in  the  broadest  sense. 
Partly  this  is  due  to  lobbying,  but  has,· as  e.g.  the  prior 
estimates  of  the Office  for  Management  and  Budget  show,  other 
objective  grounds.  Moreover,  as  again  the  example  of  the 
Office  for  Management  and  Budget  shows,  statements  on  data 
protection  costs,  based  on  practical  experience,  are  not 
precise cost  figures,  but are  rather  based  mainly  on  estimates 
which  tend  also  to  be  set  too  high  through  inattention  to 
certain cost  reducing  factors,  imprecise  cost  calculations 
etc.  In  any  case,  the  assertion  of  the  unreliability of 
current statements  on  data  rotection costs,  and  of  the 
connected,  far-reaching  and  generally extreme  over-estimation 
of  real data  rotection  s  is  the  central  finding  of  the 
present  study. 
Solely  on  the  grounds  of 
of  the present empirical 
unreliability  and  incompleteness 
ormation,  separate  meaningful 
statements  relating  to  the  arious  special  sectors, • 
organisations  and  groups  (p  blic administrations,  private 
business,  computer  bureaux,  citizens  etc.)  are  not  possible 
within  this  study. 
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of  this  section  as  to  the  general  validity  of  the  results 
of  this  study  and  in  the  light  of  the  general  findings, 
basic  reliability and  general  dependability  of  statements 
is  claimed  as  far  as  "real  existing  data  protection"  is 
concerned.  The  clear  convergence  of  the  findings  of  the 
examination  of  the  various  assessments  and  experiences  in 
respect of  data protection costs  in  four  countries  (and 
beyond)  bears  this  out. 1> 
The  further  consideration,  that  various  interests  at national 
level  would  oppose  all possible planned  data protection 
controls  which  would  clearly  be  more  cost-intensive  than  the 
present  regulations  in  the  four  countries,  strengthens  this 
conclusion  with,  moreover,  due  regard  to  future  data  cost 
controls  (e.g.  in  UK  and  USA). 
4.4.2  Notification 
Automatic  notification  of  the  data  subject  of  the  fact  of  his 
inclusion  in  a  personal  data  system  (and  possibly  of  the 
content  of  his  record),  in  the  sense  of  an  unrequested 
automatic  notification  by  the  organisation  which  stores  the 
data  (as distinct  from  notification at  the  request  of  the  data 
subject)  can  in  principle  be  extremely costly,  of  course;  as 
1)  Other  countries,  especially  France,  Austria,  Denmark, 
Norway,  Canada  were  included  in  the  preliminary  study, 
but  there  were  no  findings  contrary  to  those  given  in 
this  summary. 
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was  required  by  individual  direct mailing.  In  observed 
practice,  however,  apprising,  especially  in  the  private 
sector,  plays  almost  no  role  from  a  cost viewpoint.1> 
That  may  lie  in  the  fact  that  the  legislator,. in  view  of  the 
probably heavy costs,  and  under  pressure  from  interested 
circles,  goes  to  the  opposite  extreme  and  in  a  far-reaching 
way  dispenses  with  notification obligations.  The  Swedish  data 
protection  law  does  not  provide  any  obligation  to  notify 
without  request:  this  failure  in  the  Swedish  example  is 
partly  compensated  for  through  central  registration  with  the 
Data  Inspection  Board  and  cost-free  right  of  access.  In  the 
German  data  protection  law,  the  notification  obligations  are 
so generally stipulated  and  loosely  phrased  that private data 
processing  organisations,  with  few  exceptions,  have,  through 
loose  interpretation,  been  able  to  evade  them  completely  so 
far.  With  suitable  arrangements  (e.g.  notification  on  the 
occasion of  routine direct business  contact with  the  data 
subject,  or  through  business  partners,  etc.}  far-reaching 
notification obligations  are  conceivable,  which  need  not  be  at 
all costly. 
1)  This  does  not  apply  to  the  same  degree  for  the  American 
Federal  Administration  and  the  special  kind  of  general 
apprising  of  the  public  in  the  form  of  far-reaching 
publication obligations  under  the Privacy  Act: 
correspondingly  less  costly procedures  are  in  this  respect 
also probably currently  being  worked  out. 
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Apart  from  the  notification obligations,  legislators  in 
general  approach  the  rights of  the  data  subject  in  a 
similarly careful,  not  to  say  su~picious,  way,  as  far  as 
information  is concerned  as  to  whether  he  is  on  record  and 
the  content,  and  the  informing  of  third parties.  Apart  from 
fears  that  the data  subject might  learn  too  much  about  the 
affairs  of  organisation,  there  is  a  desire  to  minimise  the 
volume  of  requests  for  information  not  only  from  more  or 
less  "difficult" people,  but  from  the  public  in  general,  and 
as  far  as possible  to  pass  on  to  the  enquirers  any  costs 
arising,  not  least  for  the  purpose  of  deterrent. 
It must  be  stated emphatically  that  such  fears  and  trends, 
compared  with  the  reality  of  the  generally  almost  negligible 
volume  of  information  requests,  appear  to  be  completely 
exaggerated  and  unwarranted.  Experience  in  four  countries 
and  beyond  shows  that  the  rights of  access  provided  by  data 
protection  laws  (and  moreover  within  the  framework  of 
"freedom  of  information"  legislation)  are  used  by  the  data 
subject  only  to  a  limited  degree,  and  that  abuse  does  not 
occur  at all  in practice.  Concentrations  of  information 
requests  which  have  occurred  have  generally  been  based  on 
special  situations  and  particular  legitimate  reasons  for  the 
data  subjects  to  request  the  information,  and  do  not  justify 
a  general  restrictive attitude. 
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especially  in  the  private sector,  in  general  no  information 
costs  arise  which  are  worth  mentioning.  It is,  therefore, 
in practice  unnecessary  to deter  information  requests  by 
information  fees.  On  the  other  hand,  a  full  cost-covering 
fee  without  levying  prohibitive access  fees  seems 
unrealistic  anyway.  The  levying  of  small  fees  (e.g. 
covering  only direct costs}  appears,  however,  on  various 
grounds  (danger  of  higher  charges  on  grounds  of  broad 
interpretation by  private offices,  general  accounting  and 
collection  costs  exceeding  the  charge}  to  be  rather 
illogical.  It is,  therefore,  probably  appropriate  with  very 
few  exceptions  to  avoid  any  information  fees.  The 
"emergency  brake"  for  exceptional  circumstances  where 
special  costs  or  other  burdens  arise  should  be  provided  not 
in  the  form  of  access  fees  but  in  the  form  of  administrative 
or  judical  decision  on  the  individual  case. 
4.4.4  Data  protection  commissioners  and  other  data  protection 
personnel  costs 
The  German  Data  Protection  Law  is  at  present  the  only  one 
where  a  data protection commissioner  provided  with  far-
reaching  duties  and  powers  constitutes  the  central  element 
of  a  data protection  implementation  and  control structure, 
relying  mainly  on  internal  self-control.  Nevertheless,  it 
is noteworthy  that  the  full-time  data protection 
commissioner  is  the  exception,  and  that  generally,  after  a 
relatively short  change-over  period  of  intense  activity 
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protection  load  is quite  small,  i.e.  that  with  an  efficient 
procedure  for  the  (usually)  part-time data  protection 
commissioner,  the  data protection personnel  costs  arising 
from  him  can  be  kept  within  bounds.  This  is  of  wider 
relevance,  as  various  operational  functions  are  concentrated 
in  the  person  of  this  commissioner  which  probably  have  to  be 
discharged  in  a  more  or  less  corresponding  form  in  private 
organisations  under  other  national  data  protection 
regulations.  In  the  absence  of  adequate  data,  it is 
difficult  to  assess  how  far  other  personnel  costs  arise. 
Probably  the  main  factors  are  the  initial data protection 
training  of  the  personnel  involved  in  personal  data  during 
the  change-over  period,  and  to  a  smaller  degree  the 
permanent  routine  briefing,  together  with  the  notification 
of  the  data  subjects  and  the  processing  of  their  information 
and  correction  requests.  While  in  respect  of  the  American 
Privacy  Act  there  are  suggestions  of  relatively  high  initial 
training  costs  in  the  public  sector,  there  are  in  this 
connection  no  signs  of  specially high  costs  under  the  German 
•  or  Swedish  data  protection  laws. 
In  the  general  absence  of  a  large  v~lume of  work  on• 
notification  and  information  requests,  corresponding  small 
personnel  costs,  even  with  a  possible  future  increase  in 
work,  can  through  efficient organisation  and  automation  be 
reduced  to  an  acceptable  minimum  for  the  treatment  of 
special  cases  {corrections,  blackings,  deletions). 
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In  the  case  of  registration and  licensing  fees,  such  as 
those  raised  in  Sweden  and  as  those  being  considered  in 
Britain,  the  problem  is essentially not  so  much  their 
absolute  amount  (practically  of  no  importance)  as  rather 
the  problem  of  their  method  of  calculation.  In  this 
respect  the  concept  being  discussed  to  a  certain extent  in 
Britain of  a  fee  covering  the  costs  of  a  data  protection 
authority  does  not  seem  to  be  very  practicable  due  to 
various  considerations.  In  this  connection  it is 
indicative  that  the  Swedish  Data  Inspection  Board  which 
has  experience  in  this matter  is,  on  the  contrary, 
tending  towards  minimising  and  finally  completely 
abolishing  such  fees. 
If  fees  can  be  raised  at  all,  then  they  should  in  any 
case  not  exceed  low  and  simply  structured  lump  sums  (per 
data  file,  application  or  such  like). 
4.4.6  Data  security 
The  (technical  and  organisational)  dqta  security  costs, 
which  a  priori  to  a  great extent  are  regarded  as  a 
special,  if  not  the  decisive,  element  of  data  protection 
costs,  obviously  move  into  the  background  in practice  as 
being  marginal.  This  may  be  partly due  to  the  fact  that 
data processing agencies  to  a  certain extent  do  not  take 
their  security obligations  too  seriously. 
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security measures  are  already  being  taken,  either  due  to 
other  safety  requirements  and  various  self-interests,  so 
that relatively minimal  additional  measures  due  to  data 
protection  are  necessary,  or  measures,  which  for  other 
reasons  were  already  overdue,  are  being  taken  with  regard 
to  data  protection  requirements,  which  can  only  be 
actually  taken  into  account  to  the  lowest  degree  as  true 
data  security measures  due  to  data  protection  with  regard 
to costs. 
In  practice  this  way  of  viewing  matters  is  obviously 
accepted  basically  by  the  data processing  agencies.  In 
any  case,  the  arising  data  security  measures  due  to  data 
protection are  not,  as  far  as  can  be  seen,  regarded  as 
being  considerable  by  those  engaged  in  the  field. 
4.4.7  Opportunity  costs 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  application  of  the  concept 
of opportunity costs  in  the  sphere  of  data protection 
regulation  does  not  seem  to  be  unproblematical,  no 
concrete  opportunity costs  were  able.to  be  identifi~. 
Their  possible  existence  can,  of  course,  not  be  fully 
excluded.  In  view  of  the  relatively  less  restrictive 
effects  in  toto  of  the  data  protection  legislation 
considered it can  probably  be  assumed,  however,  that  in 
general  no  dramatic  opportunity  costs  (will)  arise  and 
that  any diffusely occurring  costs  (will)  remain 
theoretical. 
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effects  for  the  data processing  agencies 
The  true  data  protection  costs,  which  with  correct 
costing  tend  to  be  low,  can  be  still further  reduced  in 
terms  of  figures  by  various effects with  regard  to cost 
and  other  positive effects of  data protection within  the 
framework  of  a  total  estimate  of  the  burden  due  to  data 
protection  in  the  case  of  personal  data  processing 
agencies.  It is,  of  course,  not  to  be  neglected  that  a 
precise  evaluation  in  terms  of figures  of  these  various 
positive effects  (especially within  the  scope  of  this 
study)  is not possible;  however,  there  are  sufficient 
signs  to  conclude  that  the  net  burden defined  in  this  way 
of  the  data  processing  agencies  due  to  data protection 
actually  remains,  in  general,  marginal  in  its effect. 
In  saying  this,  it is  assumed  that  the  various  data 
protection obligations  and  requirements  are  met  correctly 
and  in  accordance  with  the  law,  and  at  the  same  time, 
however,  in  an  efficient  manner.  This  implies,  on  the 
one  hand,  a  clear  internal data  prot~ction policy  ang  an 
appropriate  precise  organisation of  the  data protection 
measures  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the .widest possible 
automation  in  the  sphere  of data protection  (data  and 
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distribution of  information,  data  security measures  with 
regard  to  hardware  and  software  etc.).l) 
Such  positive effects lie,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the  sphere 
of  increased  efficiency in  data  processing  operation, 
especially  in data  management  (reduction  and  more 
efficient organisation  of  data,  more  up-to-date  and  more 
correct data  etc.)  and  other  functions  (e.g.  auditing), 
as  well  as  general  organisation.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
seriously and  efficiently operated  internal data 
protection policy  can  give  important  impulses  in  the 
direction of  economical  and  integrated  general operations 
information  management  which  goes  beyond  data  protection 
and  personal  data  on  the  one  hand  and  data  processing  on 
the  other  hand.  Data  dictionary  systems  etc.  can  be,  for 
example,  valuable  elements  for  an  efficient operational 
data  protection  and  at  the  same  time  essential  bases  for 
economical  data  administration. 
Last  but  not  least,  public  relations effects arise, 
especially  in  the  sectors where  this  is  of  special 
• 
importance  and  where  at  the  same  time  there  exists  an 
1)  It must  be  clearly pointed  out  in  this  connection 
that  data  protection  costs  arising  for  a  data 
processing  agency  also  depend  on  the  general 
organisational  and  technical  efficiency  of  the 
agency.  This  also applies  to  information  costs. 
This  is  also  a  further  reason  for  opposing  access 
fees  to  cover  costs.  There  is  the  danger  that 
inefficiency will  be  passed  on  to  the  data  subjects 
without  the  agencies  being  subject  to  healthy 
rationalisation pressure  with  regard  to  the 
information  given  under  the  right  of  access. 
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this potentially  increased data protection costs.  This 
concerns  sectors,  for  e~ample,  such  as:  banks,  credit 
information  organisations,  insurance  companies,  address 
vendors,  direct advertising  agencies,  opinion  research 
institutes,  government statistics offices  and  also 
functions  such  as  personnel  files. 
In all such  areas,  the  confidence  which  the  specific data 
subjects  place  in  the  correct  handling  of  the  data 
concerning  them  is more  or  less  the  basic  foundation  for 
every activity in  the  respective  area.  Therefore  data 
protection  which  is optimal  as  far  as  possible  and 
acceptable  to  the  data  subjects  is  becoming,  on  the  one 
hand,  an  essential public  relations argument  and,  on  the 
other  hand  the  basic  prerequisite.  This  (in  view  of  the 
increasing  anxiety of  the public  with  regard  to  their 
privacy1>)  is  becoming  so  to  an  increasing  degree, 
1)  See,  as  one  of  the  most  recent  documents  in  this 
context  the  American  opinion  poll  of  Harris/Westin 
1979.  Cf.  also Westin  1978,  pp  14-16  as  well  as,  in 
particular,  the  quotations  taken.from  the  poll  ~ 
Zientara 1979,  p  35: 
"It is  not  surprising,  then,  that  63%  of  the  public 
agrees  with  the  statement  that  'If privacy  is  to  be 
preserved,  the  use  of  computers  must  be  sharply 
restricted  in  the  future• ••••  The  message  is  loud  and 
clear.  If  the  institutions  of  this  society  expect  to 
be  able  to  continue  to make  widespread  use  of 
computers,  the  public  must  be  convinced  that  the 
personal  information  stored  in  the  computers  is 
adequately  protected  from  improper  use." 
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protection  legislation.  Therefore  the  pertinent effort 
made  by  the  (private  and  public)  data  processing  agencies 
of  these  areas  (and  more  and  more  beyond  these)  perhaps 
still represents  itself  as  data  protection  costs  but  at 
any  rate quite definitely not  as  "unnecessary  additional 
costs  due  to  data  protection  legislationu.  This 
basically demonstrates  that  in  the  final  ~nalysis it is 
actually  a  question  of  public  relations costs  or  general 
business  costs  ("costs  of  being  in  business").  If 
regarded  in  a  similar  fashion,  data  protection  costs 
would  represent  themselves  to  a  substantial  degree  as 
costs  of,  or  basic  condition  for,  the  conflict-free 
introduction  and  stable operation  of  modern,  in 
particular  automatic,  information  processing  systems. 
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caused  by  data protection  costs 
4.5.1  Definition  of  the  issue 
The  consideration  that  national  data  protection 
regulations  cause  costs,  that  different  national  data 
protection  regulations  result  in  more  or· less 
considerable  but  different  costs,  and  that  finally, 
distortions of  competition arise  from  this  on  the 
international  level,  seems  basically  to  be  quite 
plausible. 
Such  distortions of  competition  caused  by  data protection 
costs  could  mainly  consist  in  that  companies  of various 
countries  competing  in  international  markets  have 
unjustifiable  cost  advantages  or  disadvantages  in 
competition  due  to  differing  burdens  caused  by  data 
protection costs.  Distortion  could  also  be  seen  in  that 
companies  operating  internationally must  meet  several 
data protection  laws  at  the  same  time,  so  that  for  them 
accumulation  of costs arises  through  the  fact  that  they 
must  take  certain data protection measures  several  times 
or  that  they  must  at  the  same  time  take  different,  in 
some  countries  even  conflicting,  data protection 
measures. 
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competition  applies  basically  to  companies  of  every  type, 
such  distortions  are  especially  feared  for  information-
intensive  companies,  above  all for  large multinational 
companies  with  intensive  internal  communication.  In 
particular  in  the  sphere  of  the  data processing  industry, 
corresponding  fears  have  been  expressed  ~ith  regard  to 
internationally operating  bureaux,  including  data 
transmission  services  (value-added  networks  etc.),  and 
the  software  industry. 
It must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  although  fears 
with  regard  to distortions of  competition  at first  appear 
quite  plausible  and  therefore  are  expressed  frequently  by 
different  interested parties,  such  fears  are  always 
formulated  very  generally  and,  as  far  as  can  be  seen,  can 
practiqally  never  be  demonstrated  in  specific  cases  with 
some  degree  of  detail. 
4.5.2  General  evaluation  of  the  issue  of  competition 
The  results  of  this study  seem  to  explain  this deficiency 
(let it be  noted,  only  with  regard  to  questions  of 
distortions  of  competition  caused  by  data protection 
.  -
costs).  As  shown  in  the  statements  above,  data 
protection costs  considered  in general  are  low,  and  in 
any  case  not  large  enough  to  affect  the  international 
competitiveness  of  companies.  In quite  individual,  very 
special  situations  this  assessment  may,  in  certain 
circumstances,  not  apply  to this degree  of  certainty,  but 
such  individual  cases  cannot  affect  the  overall  judgement. 
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that data protection  regulations  are  conceivable  which 
are  very  cost-intensive  and  therefore distorting with 
regard  to  international  competition,  and  it cannot  be 
excluded  either  that  a  country,  in  aiming  at  a  specific 
problem,  will  pass  such  a  law.  The  assessment  given  here 
refers  basically  only  to  "normal"  national  data 
protection legislation,  i.e.  in particular  to  the 
"omnibus  legislation"  as  well  as  the  already partly 
existing  legislation concerning certain sectors  (e.g. 
with  regard  to  finance  and  credit  systems,  address 
vending  and  direct advertising,  science  and  research). 
However,  it is  also  to  be  assumed  that  basically  no 
country will  pass  an  excessively cost-intensive data 
protection  law  since,  on  the  one  hand,  there  is  no 
demand ·for  such  a  law  as  the  public  in  general  is 
obviously satisfied  with  the  data  protection  level 
attained  {and,  as  shown,  not  cost-intensive)  in,  for 
example,  Sweden  and  Germany;  the  innovations  usually 
demanded  appear  to be  inconsiderable  so  far.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  internal  national  opposition  to  cost-
intensive  laws  would  already  be  so great  that  it wou~d 
never  come  to  such  data  protection  laws  and  international 
distortions of  competition.  The  influence  of  national 
associations  of  interested  parties  in  the  formulation  of 
the existing  various  national data protection  laws  is 
already  a  central  element  of  recent  data  protection 
history. 
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no  international distortions  of  competition  due  to  d~ta 
protection  costs,  because  of  the  lack  of  appreciable  data 
protection costs.  Even  certain relatively  unimportant 
extra  burdens  which  accrue  to  companies  operating 
internationally,  in particular multinational  companies, 
in  certain  circumstances  due  to  the  fact.that  they  are 
faced  with  various,  differently conceived  data protection 
laws,  in  no  way  become  concentrated  into distortions  of 
competition  due  to  costs.  Any  internat~onal cos·t 
differences  caused  by  data  protection  or  extra  burdens 
fade  in  comparison with  other,  quite  virulent 
international  cost  differences  as,  for  example,  in  the 
field  of  international  telecommunication  rates. 
With  the  negation  of  distortions  of  competition  caused  by 
data protection costs,  no  judgement,  of  course,  is  made 
with  regard  to  any  existing distortions  of  international 
competition which  do  not  arise  through  different data 
costs  but  directly  through  certain data  protection 
regulations,  in  some  circumstances  motivated  by 
protectionism.!}  If,  however,  certain  data  protection 
regulations  result directly  in effects  impairing  -
international  competition,  then  these  are  not  competition 
distortions caused  by  data protection costs  which  are 
being discussed  here  solely. 
1)  In  this  connection,  for  example,  the  statements  of 
the  Report  of  the  Legal  Committee  of  the  European 
Parliament  1979,  pp  6,22 with  regard  to  the  problems 
of  data  protectionism  and  distorted  competition 
conditions  are  basically quite  relevant.  See  also 
Pantages/Pipe  1977;  Pantages  l977b;  Schwappach  1978; 
Gassmann  1976. 
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protection costs  represent practically  no  critical 
element  in  the  international  sphere  which  decisively 
limits data protection aims.  On  the  contrary,  it seems 
that  both  nationally  and  internationally  (assuming  in 
each  case  an  economically efficient formulation  and 
carrying  out  of  data  protection  regulations),  a 
considerably  higher  data protection  level  is  realisable 
before  data  protection  costs  become  critical.  \ 
\ 
\ 
4.5.3  Evaluation  from  the point  of  view  of  the  data  sub1ect 
\ 
Apart  from  any differences  in  the  access  fees  require~ in 
specific cases,  the  individual  data  subjects  are  not 
affected  either  as  regards  costs  due  to  the  differences 
in  the  national  data protection  laws.  (Even  in  the 
purely  national  sphere  there  are  differing  access  fees  as 
well  as  substantial differences  between  existing  various 
data  protection  laws  concerning  different  sectors.) 
It must,  however,  not  be  ignored  that  the  individual  is 
considerably  hampered  and  practically prevented  to  a 
greater  extent  in  the  exercising  of  his  data protection 
rights  at  international  level  than  a~e  internationalJy 
operating  companies  with  various  national  bases  and 
representatives.  This,  however,  is  again  not  really  a 
cost problem,  but  a  de  facto difficulty which  naturally 
has  economic  implications  (costs  for  international  data 
protection consultation,  translation,  communication  costs 
etc.)  as  soon  as  the  data  subject  seriously  attempts  to 
overcome  these difficulties. 
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protection  poli~v 
In  view  of  the  data  protection -~osts  which  tend  to  be 
-~ow,  and  thr:ough  this  the  absence  of  distortions  of 
international Eompetition  cause~ by  data  protection_cost 
which  are  of  any  practical  relevance,  there  is  no  need 
for  a  European  harmonisation  polic~ which  is  primarily 
directed  towards  the  reduction  of  data protection  costs 
and  of  corresponding  distortions  of  competition.  The 
necessity  of  an  international  and  especially European 
data  protection  harmonisation  policy  arises  from  an 
economic  standpoint  rather  from  the  necessity  of  a  .comm~~ 
data  processing  market  generally  free  from  distortions  of. 
competition  due  to  data protection or,  put  in  more  commc:·· 
terms,  from  the  necessity  of  a  common  data  and 
information  market. 
The  basic  result  of  the  study  presented  here  concertu nc 
the question  of  data  protection costs  lies,  however,  ·-
showing  the  relativity  of  the  data  protection  issue,  .::-o 
that  a  European  data protection harmonisation  policy  ~ 
made  possible  which  does  not  just  concentrate  on  the 
limited  cost  aspect,  and  anxiously  strives  for  the 
removal  of  the  international  data  protection  cost 
differences,  but  also actively  works  for  the  uniforn1 
international  level,  taking  into account  at  the  same  ~7  ~E 
the  overriding  aspects  of  the  information  market  ard 
industrial policy  aspects. 
4-16') It must  be  noted  that  this  does  not  imply  a 
trivialisation of  the  data prot€ction  cost  issues.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  problem  and  the  task  in  general  still 
remain,  i.e.  to  realise  the  data protection  aimed  at with 
the  highest possible efficiency  (but  without  the  data 
protection cost  considerations  which  have  been  put  into 
proper  relationship  here  determining  the  decision  about 
the  data protection  level  to  be  aimed  at).  On  the  other 
hand,  the  study  and  adequate  taking  into  consideration  of 
the  cost aspects  lead  to significant conclusions  for  the 
actual  formulation  and  practical  realisation  of  data 
protection. 
Accordingly,  various  elements  of  a  data  protection 
harmonisation policy  are  now  listed  in  summarised  form  as 
they  arise  as  the  result  of  this  data  protection  cost 
study. 
4.6.1  Cost-relevant  elements  of  a  data  protection 
harmonisation policy 
4.6.1.1  Principles 
In  view  of  the  basic  triviality  of  data  protection  costs, 
the  ambitious  concept  of  the  European  Parliament  of  ~ 
"guideline  for  the  harmonisation  of  data  protection  law 
at the highest  level  for  the  citizens  of  the  Community••1
> 
seems  to  be  realisable  as  far  as  expense  is  concerned,  if 
the principle of  efficiency  is observed.  Besides  the 
uniformity  and  simplicity of  such  data  protection 
1)  Europaisches  Parlament,  Rechtsausschuss  1979,  p  7. 
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regulations,  their durability  and  in  particular  their 
calculability in  the  sense  of  foreseeability  of  their 
requirements  are  important.  An  essential  contribution of 
a  Community  guideline  would  therefore  be  the  creation  of 
stable  and  foreseeable  business  conditions  in  regard  to 
data  protection  in  the  European  data  and  information 
market. 
The  provision  of  an  adequate  transition and  conversion 
period  for  each  harmonisation  guideline· is  fundamentally 
important  for  a  decisive  minimisation  of  the  {one-time) 
data protection costs. 
4.6.1.2  Registration  and  licensing 
In  view  of  the  considerable uncertainty  in  the 
applicqtion  of  national  data  protection  requirements 
which  the  German  system of data protection self-
monitoring  has  caused  in  business,  whereas  the  Swedish 
licensing model  is obviously  regarded  by  business  as 
being  an  instrument  creating  precise  and  clear 
regulations  for  the  individual  case,  the  introduction  of 
an  essentially  uniform  registration and  licensing 
t  ~ 
obligation of  personal data files  or  data  processing 
applications  at  European  level  seems  to  be  inevitable  in 
the  long  run.1>  For  the  individual  data  processing 
agency  such  official  approval  would  take  on  the  function 
1)  Cf.  also  the  relevant  Recommendation  No.1  of 
Europaisches  Parlament,  Rechtsausschuss  p  9. 
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international  harmonisation,  especially with  regard  to 
public  agencies,  corresponding  companies  and  individual 
persons  abroad,  documents  and  guarantees  the  correct 
observance  of  data  protection. 1 > 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  a  licensing  requirement  is,  of 
course,  also  an  essential  contribution  to  the  general 
raising  of  the  data protection  level  obtained  in 
practice,  further  economic  aspects  advocate  a  data 
protection  licensing  system  which,  as  the  Swedish  example 
shows,  does  not  have  to  be  excessively  expensive  at  all. 
In general  terms,  a  licensing  system  increases data 
protection efficiency insofar  as  it enables  pragmatic 
solutions  to  be  achieved  for  various  individual  aspects 
of data protection without  unsuitable  concessions  with 
regard .to  the  data  protection level  attained. 
Adequate  registration  and  licensing  of  personal  data 
files  and  data  processing  applications  thus  enables  the 
publicity  requirements,  in  particular  in  the  field  of 
notifications  and  granting  of  information,  to  be  kept  at 
a  practical  level,  since  the  corresponding  registers 
which  are officially kept  and  are  generally  accessible 
and  published  in  one  form  or  another  (directly  or 
indirectly)  already  cover  a  basic  requirement  of 
1)  It  seems  significant  that  traditionally  very 
pragmatic  British  voices  have  been  raised  in  support  of  a 
licensing  system;  see  British  Computer  Society/Computing 
Services Association/Data Processing  Association  1978. 
See  also  European  Computing  Services  Association  1978 
where  in particular  the  concept  of  a  data protection 
certificate  is  mentioned. 
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publicity.  In  particular,  however,  the  special 
efficiency of  a  licensing  system  is  founded  on  the 
confidence  which  it generates  among  the  public  in  regard 
to  the  data protection  level  attained.  Through  this, 
substantial  friction  losses  in  the  field  of  data 
protection are  avoided  to  a  great extent.  Corresponding 
confidence  in  the  observance  of  data  protection  reduces, 
for  example,  the  occurrence  of  information  requests,  with 
all  the  potential subsequent  problems  connected  with 
them. 
For  the  reasons  stated  above,  registration  and  licensing 
should  be  made  free  of  charge  or  for  a  nominal  lump-sum 
fee. 
4.6.1.3  National  data  protection  authorities 
The  setting  up  of  national  data protection authorities 
(in  certain  circumstances  with  a  regionalised  structure) 
is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  logical  complement  to  a  data 
protection  registration  and  licensing  system  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  necessary  for  the  efficient  implementation 
of  national  data  protection  regulations  and  international 
harmonising  guidelines.  l)  In  addition  to practical' 
decisions  on  individual  cases,  valuable  know-how  and 
means  are  set  up  at  the  same  time  at  a  central point, 
through  which  substantial  contributions  can  be  made,  not 
1)  See  also  the  Recommendations  no.lO  ff  of  the  European 
Parliament  with  regard  to  the  setting  up  of  national 
independent  data protection  bodies  and  their  functions, 
Europaisches  Parlament,  Rechstausschuss  1979,  pp  10,  11, 
28,  29,  31. 
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protection,  but  also  to  the  development  of  more 
comprehensive  concepts  concerning  data  and  information 
policies  and  of  relevant social objectives. 
4.6.1.4  Notification 
Any  community  guidelines  concerning  the  (free  of  charge) 
notifications with  regard  to  storage,  processing, 
distribution etc.  of  personal  data  should  be  based 
substantially  on  the possibilities of automated  (direct 
or  indirect)  notification procedures.  If general 
notification  in  the  form  of publications  or  virtual 
notifications  in  the  form  of  data  registers  etc.  of  the 
data protection authority,  which  are  kept  open  to  general 
access,  are  not  regarded  as  sufficient,  it should  be 
carefully checked  to  what  extent  the  obligation  of 
periodic  repeated  notification of  the  data  subjects  is 
suitable.  An  efficient general  data protection structure 
on  the  basis  of  a  licensing  system  administered  by  a  data 
protection authority,  and  also  the  utilisation of 
efficient notification  procedures,  permit  the  data 
subjects  to  be  repeatedly notified  not  only  on  the 
occasion  of  the  first storage,  proceqsing,  transfer etc. 
of personal  data,  but  also at certain periods  or  on 
certain  occasions  in  areas  where  this  appears  to  be 
suitable for  the  interest of  data protection  that  is  not 
only  theoretical.  1) 
1)  Recommendation  no.4  of  the  European  Parliament,  which 
only  aims  at single notification  in  the  case  of  initial 
storage,  probably  does  not  go  far  enough.  See 
Europaisches  Parlament  Rechtsausschuss,  1979,  pp  9  & 28. 
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4.6.1.5  Granting  of  access 
Even  from  the  aspects  of  cos.·ts,  -~t  seems  proper  not  to 
impe~e the  riglit  9~  da~a  .subj'e~ts·~o·data  p~otecti~n 
in:eormation ·either  by  fee!3  or. ·by. time  limitations  or  .  . 
other  limitations.  l)·  on  th~ contrary,  tl\e  national  .  - ~ .  .  . 
.  . 
·data protection  authorities,· both·. at  nat:ionai  l~vel  and. 
lo'  •  I  ' 
in  co-oper~tion. at .  in.tern_~ti-~_ot:l.~~-. ~evel,  s~ould~ · 
persis·te~.tly  suppor:t.  data·  -~u.bj·ects. :tn  the  exe~ctse· of· 
•  •  •  '  •  •  •  1-,•  ,  ..  " 
<  • 
their .rights  to·  inf.qrmation ·and :notification,  and· other: 
of  I  •  ~  ' 
as~ociated  right~  _bas~d  qri:  th~ ·pr i.nciple  of· reglstrqtion 
.  '  ..  '  .  .  '  . .  . 
and ·licensing. 
.  . 
In  this.  c.o~neqtio.pl  a~  ess~ntial  .  .  . 
object;.ive_·is  tp  reduce·  ~he  impl~c;it  and  partly 
. oonside·rabl~· er i vate  admi'nistrati.ve  bu~den. w·~ich  arises 
tor  ~he  indiVidual  in  pursuance  of  his  data  protection 
rights,  es~ecially  i_n  . thE¥. ·n~ tional: sphere!  so  that it 
subst~ntial~y to  theoretical  po·s·i ti6Rs. 
Apart  f~om certain  saving  ~egu.latlonf  (especial!~ as  .  . 
- ..  .  . 
regards  some  sectors),  only administrative  or  lega~  .  . 
decisions  concerning  individual  cases  (as  an  "emergency 
brake"  so  t6  spe~k)  should  be  able  to  limit.the  right  of 
(I 
the  data  subject  to  information  and  notification  which  is 
basically not  burdened  by  either  fees  or  time  or  other 
limitations. 
1)  See  also  Recommendation  no.3  of  the  European 
Parliament,  which  does  not,  however,  exclude  a  time 
limitation,  but  otherwise  favours  complete  freedom  from 
fees  and  costs  for  the  exercising  of  data protection 
rights  by  data  subjects.  Europaisches  Parlament 
Rechtsausschuss,  1979,  pp  10  & 30. 
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. . In  the  international  sphere,  however,  due  to  economic 
considerations,  channeling  of  such  requests  by  individual 
data  subjects  via  the  co-operating  national data 
protection authorities would  probably occur. 
4.6.1.6  Data  security 
In  the  sphere  of  data  security,  one  can  reasonably  expect 
from  Community  guidelines  only  more  or  less precise 
objectives  (similar  to  the  list  in  the  appendix  to  para.6 
of  the  German  Federal  Data Protection Law).  Further 
putting  into  specific  terms  of  this  data  security 
objective,  and  in particular  the  periodic  informing  in 
this  respect  of  the  data  processing  agencies,  should  be 
left basically  to  the  co-operating  national  data 
protection authorities. 
4.6.1.7  Data  protection  commissioners  and  data  protection 
liability 
The  question  of  personal  and  substantial  data  protection 
liability is potentially a  competition-distorting 
element.  At  this  point  it is  merely  remarked  that 
effective carrying  out  of  data protection  regulations 
presupposes,  on  the  one  hand,  personal  liability  (also  • 
subject  to  criminal  law)  and  on  the  other  hand, 
substantial  liability both  for  material  (financial)  and 
immaterial  (moral)  damages  which  in  certain 
circumstances  should  be  essentially  independent  of 
negligence  (strict liability).  Whilst  it also  seems 
appropriate  to  identify  a  specific  person  responsible 
comprehensively  for  data protection  legal  requirements 
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protection  commissioner),  the  specific data  processing 
agency  should  in  the  final  analysis  be  fully  liable 
itself,  in particular with  respect  to  the  civil liability 
law. 
International  harmonisation  is  especially necessary  with 
regard  to  immaterial  (moral)  damages.  1) 
4.6.2  Costs  of  data  protection  harmonisation 
The  costs arising  from  data protection harmonisation 
carried  out  at  European  level  cannot  reliably  be 
estimated  in  the  abstract.  They  are  probably,  however 
(if  harmonisation  takes  place  with  regard  to  content 
roughly  within  the  framework  outlined  here),  not  heavy. 
This  applies  especially  to  the  additional  burdens  arising 
for  personal  data  processing agencies;  and  this  is 
probably  because  practically  an  international  consensus 
implying  nine  (and  more)  governments  with  respect  to  data 
protection  harmonisation  will  hardly  be  realised  which 
leads  to  high  data protection  burdens.  In  addition,  it 
would  also  be  the  aim  of  international  data  protection 
harmonisation  to  limit,  if not  reduce,  the  data 
protection  costs  existing  in  the  international  sphere. 
With  regard  to  the  costs  arising  through  the 
international  data  protection  harmonisation  mechanism  to 
be  established,  no  reliable estimates  can  be  made  at  the 
1)  With  regard  to  the  questions  of  liability,  see  also 
Recommendation  no.3  of  the  Europaisches  Parlament 
Rechtsausschuss,  1979,  pp  9  &  28. 
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particular,  the  conversion  and  carrying  out  of  any 
international data  protection  harmonisation  guidelines 
etc.  will  be  transferred mainly  to  the  specific 
appropriate  national  bodies  (preferably  central  national 
data protection authorities),  no  appreciable  additional 
costs  should  occur.  This  applies  especially  if  the 
national  data protection authorities  carry  out  such  a 
guideline  in  self-organising  practical  co-operation,  and 
on  a  Community  basis  for  example  merely secretarial  and 
clearing  functions,  or  even  only  observation  functions, 
are  attended  to. 
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orientated  towards  economic  and  other  related  aspects  of 
data  protection 
4.7.1  Accompanying  research  for  the  preparation  and 
implementation  of  European  data protection guidelines 
In  addition  to  the  aspects  which  were  investigated  or 
mentioned  in  this  part of  the  study,  there  are  many 
economic  and  related  aspects  which  must  be  taken  into 
consideration within  the  framework  of  the  preparation  and 
implementation  of  European  guidelines  for  data  protection 
harmonisation.  This  applies  in particular  if special 
data  protection  guidelines  for  specific  sectors  of  the 
economy  or  data processing  applications  are  concerned, 
and  in  general  to  the  problems  of  international  data 
flows. 
Accompanying  research  orientated  towards  economic  aspects 
would  in  this  connection  have  basically  the  double 
objective  of,  on  the  one  hand,  investigating  the  economic 
effects of  planned  guidelines  which  may  be  inadequate 
when  it comes  to  their  practical  application  as  regards 
costs  or  otherwise  and,  on  the  other  hand,  of  showing  the 
possibilities  of  efficient  implementation  and  subsequent 
• 
application  of  appropriate data protection  regulations. 
The  practical  experience,  for  example,  gained  in  the  USA 
and  Canada  with  various  data protection  regulations  and 
other  regulations  concerning  information  in  the  various 
sectors of  the  economy  at state and  federal  level  (e.g.  in 
the  field  of  finance  and  credit  information)  can  be  taken 
as  starting points  and  subjects  of  such  investigations. 
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of  the  relevant practices  (e.g.  in  the  framework  of 
specialised  networks:  SWIFT,  SITA •••  or  of  internal 
networks  of  internationally operating  organisations)  and 
also  of  the  first practical  results  of  relevant 
regulations  (especially  in Sweden)  would  be 
indispensable. 
In  this  context  the  following  issues  appear  specifically 
to  need  further  investigation: 
practical  implications  and  costs  of  the  public  data 
protection  supervisory authorities  (European 
Community,  Scandinavia,  Austria,  Canada),  and 
estimation  of  the  corresponding  implications  and  costs 
of  European  data  protection  harmonisation  (including 
financing  schemes) 
elaboration  of  a  body  of  European  data  protection 
statistics covering  on  a  coherent  basis  the  practical 
implications  and  costs  etc.  due  to  the  various 
national  data protection  regulations  (private  sector) 
practical  economic  implications  (cost etc.)  of 
international data  protection  regulations  in  specific 
.  - sectors  of  industry  (address  vendors/direct  mail, 
banking  and  insurance,  credit  reporting  etc.,  computer 
bureaux  and  data  bank  vendors  etc.)  with  special 
regard  to American  sectoral data protection 
regulations 
study  of  the  harmonisation  issue  on  the  level  of  state 
data protection  regulations  within  and  between  the  USA 
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the  issue  of  de  facto  distortions  of  international 
competition  due  to  data  protection 
practical  implications  and  problems  of  international 
data  protection  regulations  with  regard  to  internal 
communications  of  multinational  companies  and  groups 
(particularly  in  the  areas  of  clients,  marketing, 
financial  and  personnel  data) 
function  of  data  protection  as  an  integral  part of 
efficient data  resource  management  at  company  level 
experience  regarding  the  practical  implications  and 
costs  of  various  international  freedom  of  information 
regulations  (Sweden,  USA,  Canada  etc.) 
practical  and  economic  aspects of  the  data protection 
issue  with  regard  to  new  electronic  information  and 
communication  technologies 
data  protection,  personal  profiles,  automatic 
decision-making,  administrative  and  technical  control 
technologies. 
4.7.2  Economic  aspects  of  data  protection  of  legal  persons 
A  second  possible main  point of  emphasis  of  research 
orientated  towards  economic  aspects ·is,  in  this 
connection,  the  problem of  the  protection of  the  data  of 
or  about  legal  persons.  In  this  case,  taking  into 
account  the  realities of  the practical  field  and  of  the 
European  interest  in  harmonisation,  it would  be 
necessary  to  investigate  the  type,  method,  operational 
and  economic  effect  of  such  data  protection  of  legal 
4-177 persons.  It  is  to  be  assumed  that  these  problems  will 
considerably  increase  in  importance  in  the  coming  years. 
4.7.3  Legal  framework  of  a  European  common  data  and 
information  market 
A third possible  main  point  of  emphasis  (which  widens  the 
problems  of  data protection)  of  future  research  is 
finally  the  extremely  important  question  of  the  necessity 
with  regard  to  industrial policy of  creating  an  enlarged 
common  legal  framework  concerning  data  and  information  at 
European  level  for  the  building  up  of  a  real  common  data 
processing  market.  It  is  to  be  noted  that,  in  view  of 
the  continuing  build-up  of  national  and  European  public 
data  transmission  networks  and  generally accessible  data 
banks  (kept  by  private  or  public entities),  and  also  the 
future  diverse  information  services  to  be  based  on  these, 
the preparation  of  an  integrated  European  data  and 
information  market  is  already  urgent  at  the  present  time. 
A basic consideration  is  that  the  lack  of  adequate 
institutional  framework  concerning  data  and  information 
both  at national  and  European  level will  delay  and  obstruct 
the  development  of  this  sector  of  the  economy  which  is 
extremely  important  for  the  economic efficiency  and  * 
independence  of  Europe. 
The  exceptional  importance  which  legal  regulations 
concerning  data  and  information  can  have  for  the 
development  of  decisive  sectors  of  the  service 
industries,  and  especially  the  information  industry,  can 
be  clearly  shown  for  instance  by  the  statement  that 
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information)  the  entire  banking  and  financing  industry  as 
we  know  it would  not  be  conceivable.  The  mature  and  far-
seeing  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  legally guaranteed  data 
protection  by  Swedish  industry  as  a  necessity  and 
prerequisite for  the  socially acceptable  and  economical 
introduction  and  utilisation of  modern  information 
technologies points  in  this direction  as well. 
In  this  connection  it should  therefore  be  investigated  to 
what  extent,  beyond  data protection  regulations,  further 
common  European  legal  regulations  concerning  data  and 
information are  neccessary.  In  this  case,  the  following 
problem  areas  of  future  research  in  the  field  of 
electronic  information  industry  can  be  named  in  the  form 
of  keywords: 
Data  and  information  liability or  guarantee  regarding 
permanent  availability,  quality etc.  of  data  bank 
services  and  such  like 
Proprietary  rights  with  respect  to  electronic  data  and 
information as  well  as  services  and  products  based  on 
these 
Rights  of  access  and  use  by  individuals  and 
organisations  of  data  banks,  data  networks, 
application  software,  interpretational  know-how  etc. 
Private  and  public organisation  of  infrastructures  in 
the  area  of  information  technology,  information 
resources,  information  industries etc. 
4-179 Legal  issues  of  authentification  and  evidence  with 
respect  to electronic data  etc. 
Private  and  governmental  rights  of  access  and 
inspection with  respect  to data  banks  etc.(e.g.  as 
legal  evidence,  checking  of  data  and  programs  for 
automatic  decision-making,  publication  of 
cryptographic  transmission  codes  etc.) 
Adequate  research  into  these  and  related  fields  is  also 
of  special  importance  for  the  Community,  since  through 
this an  important  contribution  is made  to  the 
determination  of  positions  concerning  industrial policy 
which  the  Community  is occupying  in discussion  and 
competition  with  the  USA  as  the  dominating  information 
industry. 
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